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ABSTRACT 
This thesis studies the Chilean experience of a 
democratic road to socialism, initiated with the election 
of Salvador Allende as president in 1970 and ending with 
his overthrow by the Chilean armed forces in 1973. The 
interplay of political, economic and cultural variables is 
considered and an effort is made to assess their relative 
significance concerning the failure of la via chilena. 
Allende's Popular Unity government was within the 
tradition$ of Chilean history since 1930: leftist electoral 
participation and popular support, respect £or the democratic 
system, state direction in the economy, ideological competit-
ion and the political attempt to resolve continuing socio-
economic problems. Chile was politically sophisticated but 
economically underdeveloped. In a broader sense, th~ L:e.ft 
sought complete independence £or Chile and a genuine national 
identity. U.S. involvement is therefore examined as a 
continuing theme in perceptions 0£ Chilean history. 
The seeds 0£ Popular Unity's downfall were as much 
inherent in the contradiction between an absolute ideology 
and a relative political strength as in the opposition 0£ 
those with a vested interest in the existing system. 
the Left itself was a part 0£ that system. 
Indeed, 
Popular Unity went a considerable way in implementing 
its policies, but the question of power was not resolved as 
the political forces became stalemated. The revolutionary 
Left proposed breaking with the democratic process, but 
did not have the means to do so. The armed forces, 
£earing possible action by the revolutionary Left, 
receiving wide popular support and implicit or explicit 
congressional sanction, and in danger 0£ internal disunity 
as a result 0£ the political conflict, finally supplied 
its own solution to the political deadlock. The 
fundamental change in direction 0£ recent Chilean politics 
occurred not in 1970 but in September 1973 with the 
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PREFACE 
All history is conceptually laden: since all historians 
including empiricists have to establish their historical field, 
theoretical assumptions are inevitable, producing what Pieter 
Geyl characterized as an "argument without end". The abundant 
literature that has emerged on Salvador Allende's Chile is 
especially notable for the wide divergence of interpretation, 
reflecting amongst other things the intense and diverse ideological 
debate that has existed in recent Chilean politics and society. 
The reviewers of one selection of books, by both Chileans and 
others, titled their review "Visions of Chile" to emphasize the 
plurality of ideological perspectives. They demonstrated that 
interpretations were dependent upon the questions asked, which 
were ideologically inspired. "Each set of questions leads to 
different answers within the same web of reality." 1 
The political polarization that occurred in Chile in the 
1960 1s and the early 1970•s has meant that the radical visions, 
those of the revolutionary Left and the Right, have received the 
most attention. However these visions appear to this author the 
least satisfactory in the degree to which the ideological 
perspective distorts the reality of the Chilean experience, thus 
encouraging simplistic answers rather than genuine insight. 
First, the initial assumptions of these visions tend to be 
self-fulfilling, so that not only are the answers inherent in the 
1. A. and J.S. Valenzuela, 'Visions of Chile' in 
Latin American Research Review, Fall 1975, 157. 
questions but the possibility 0£ other answers is constricted. 
The revolutionary Left views as inevitable a violent confrontation 
between the .f'orces 0£ revolution and reaction, or in Marxist terms 
between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Therefore the 
central premise of the Allende strategy, building socialism through 
the existing democratic system rather than destroying that system 
first, was doomed to failure, as confirmed by the overthrow of 
Allende. "The Chilean tragedy confirms ••• that there is no such 
thing as a peaceful road to socialism. 112 (my emphasis) 
The Right begins with the premise that Marxism was a movement 
and ideology alien to Chile. Thus the very existence 0£ Popular 
Unity was an aberration: its election victory in 1970 discredited 
the democratic system rather than legitimized the Marxist government. 
This premise is so selective as to be an unreal view of Chilean 
history. 
Second, the ideological preoccupation tends to produce an 
over-simplification of language, as history becomes an allegory 
of the good and bad. In the scheme of the revolutionary Left 
those who are not for the revolution are against it. Thus, 
"Those who are irrevocably committed to nonviolence would do well 
to admit that they are not revolutionaries and to confine their 
activities to seeking reforms which are safely within the framework 
3 of the capitalist system." The discrediting term "bourgeois" is 
used to describe all forces of the status quo, ignoring the large 
and heterogeneous nature of the Chilean middle class or the initial 
sympathy that some sectors of the middle class felt with Popular 
3. 
P.M. Sweezy and H. Magda££ (ed.), Revolution and Counter-
Revolut ion in Chile, New York 1974, 11 • 
Ibid. 
Unity, as expressed in the radical electoral campaign of the 
Christian Democrat candidate. Nor were the proletariat solidly 
behind Allende. As one reviewer complained, "Bourgeoisie and 
proleteriat run amok on the stage of history like dinosaurs in a 
LI. 
chicken run". ' In the Chilean context the language of class 
struggle often confuses as much as it clarifies, notwithstanding 
the appearance of class struggle in its classic form by 1972. 
The Right views Marxism as inherently bad; thus the Left 
in Chile becomes equated with totalitarianism despite Allende's 
prclessed concern for a pluralist, democratic form of socialism. 
Only by viewing Marxism as an aberration can they speak of a 
return to normality after 1973. These semantic tricks do not 
disguise the irony of the overthrow of a democratically-elected 
government and a democratic system in the name of Democracy, or 
the human loss of thousands of Chileans dead and many more in 
exile. As a New Yorker cartoon exclaimed in 1971, "When a 
Communist can win a free election, I say there's something wrong 
with free elections1 115 
Third, inherent in the ideological perspectives of these 
visions is the focus on external actors as primarily responsible 
for the Chilean tragedy. For the Left, since Chile is a dependent 
capitalist economy, the blame for the overthrow of the Allende 
government lies with the centre of the world capitalist economy, 
the United States. The Chilean Right and the armed forces are 
by definition the local allies or clients of the CIA and the 
4@ D. Lehrmann, 'Review Article: Allende's Chile: the Judgement 
of History and the Verdict of Fririge-Marxism' in Journal of 
~opment Studies, Jaii,. 1978, 251. 
5. New Yorker, 24 April, 1971 • 
Pentagon. 
For the Right Marxism, as something alien to Chile, 
emanates from Moscow and Havana. Thus the Chilean Communist 
party, with its faith in international communism, remains the 
real totalitarian threat to Chilean freedom, despite the £act 
that the Socialist party in word and action was more radicaL 
But this focus on external actors, while valuable for 
placing Chile in a wider context, has several failings. It 
tends to confuse the evidence of foreign involvement, 0£ which 
there is enough to excite both sides, with the actual significance 
0£ that evidence. It allows for the side-stepping 0£ self-
examination, which gives these visions their air of self-justificat-
ion. It also devalues the internal dynamic of Chilean politics, 
failing to establish whether this was in itself sufficient to have 
created the overthrow of Allende. 
The simplistic conclusion of these visions, that democracy 
and socialism are incompatible, both played a major part in the 
disastrous dialectic that resulted in the military coup in 1973 
and has serious implications for the future: for the revolutionary 
Left socialism cannot be attained by democratic means; for the 
Right democracy with socialism is not democracy. 
i'n1Y Allende was overthrown is the central concern of this 
thesis. Since Allende's essential objective was a democratic 
transition to socialism, and since both democracy and socialism 
were overthrown by the armed forces in 1973, two questions arise. 
The first asks why Chilean democracy failed. The second asks why 
a socialist transformation failed; since this deals with probable 
rather than actual consequences of decisions and events, it is 
necessarily more hypothetical than the first. Between these two 
questions is the crux of the issue; the interaction of democracy 
and socialism in Chile. 
My initial premise is that the revolutionary process, 
unleashed in Chile in 1970 and terminated in 1973, was not 
inevitable, in form or outcome. I assume that the subjective 
has some importance in history, that men can change the course 
of history. Moreover, I am allowing that the "accidental" event, 
for example, a sudden drop in the world market price of copper, 
can affect outcome as much as the "determined" event, such as the 
response to the Allende government of those with a vested interest 
in the existing order. 
My focus is on the domestic situation in Chile. Outside 
actions and events will be considered only for their impact on the 
internal dynamic. For example, the changes in American foreign 
policy towards Chile will be examined for their practical implications 
in regard to the overthrow of Allende, not for what they tell us of 
the American politic. 
Within this internal dynamic, my primary concern is with the 
Chilean Left itself, its character and aspirations, choices and 
actions, in the belief that self-examination is as important as 
polemic if the Chilean tragedy is not to repeat itself. 
At the centre of the Chilean tragedy was Salvador Allende, 
the medical doctor and politician whose dream of a democratic road 
to socialism ended in his own death. His story is written by the 
. / . Spanish poet Juan Ramon Jimenez: 
My feet, so deep in the earthJ 
My wings, so far into the heavens! 
- And so much pain 
in the heart torn betweenl 
xli,. 
At the centre also was the poet PablQ Neruda, veteran of 
the Spanish Civil war and the struggle £or justice in his own 
country, whose voice many Chileans heard. His funeral, a few 
days after the 1973 coup, became the occasion for the first 
popular protest against the military junta. 
The Mexican poet Octavio Paz wrote on the event of the 
1973 coup, "Whether or not reality is unpleasant, it is real ••• 
Latin America is a continent full of rhetoric and violence - two 
forms of pride , two ways of ignoring rea 1i ty. "6 The tragedy in 
Chile breeds a commitment: a self-examination of the theoretical 
assumptions against reality, and not just within their O\,m terms 
of reference. It is not enough to trust one's voice, one has to 
answer £or it. 
6. o. Paz, 'The Centurions of Santiago' in Dissent, 
Spring 1974, 355-6. 
CHAPTER I 
THE 1970 ELECTION 
Salvador Allende and la via chilena 
In 1970 world attention focused on Chile, where for the 
first time a Marxist leader had come to office freely elected by 
the people. Supported by the Popular Unity coalition (UP) 
Allende had pledged a non-violent socialist transformation 0£ 
Chile, a revolution by ballots, not bullets. This election was 
striking, but also consistent with Chile's strong democratic and 
legalist tradition, which contrasted with the norm of the so-called 
politics 0£ illegitimacy existing in most other Latin American 
countries. 
Since the early 1930's transitions of power had been 
peaceful and through legitimate institutions. The 1925 Constitution, 
which established the presidential executive as predominant, was 
adhered to, unlike the practice in other Latin American countries. 
The Chilean Congress remained the strongest and most durable in 
Latin America. The parliamentary system was open, multi-party, 
and intensely competitive, permitting a variety of political 
alternatives. Human rights were largely respected, and there was 
a low level of military intervention in politics. 1 
While the political system was accepted by all political 
forces, with the occasional exception of the extreme Left and Right, 
1. see F.G. Gil, The Political System of Chile, Boston 1966; 




the Chilean electorate constantly experimented with new political 
forces, alternating between parliamentarian and authoritarian and 
a variety of ideological solutions. In the post-war period, not 
one of the political forces which had reached office had been re-
elected for a second term, suggesting a perennially dissatisfied 
electorate. 
From 1946 to 1952 a party coalition was led by a middle-class, 
anti-clerical group, the Radical party, which had emerged from the 
Popular Front (1938-41) as the centre of gravity in Chilean party 
politics. However, the factors responsible for the Radicals' 
central role at the same time made it difficult for them to govern 
effectively. They were characterized by a fluidity and ambiguity 
of programme, which enabled them to hold together a wide, diverse 
following, but which also earned them a reputation for political 
. . 2 expediency and opportunism. 
In 1952 Carlos Ib&riez, the dictatorial president of 1927-31, 
was re-elected as a strong man who would transcend party politics 
and politicians. 11 Iba'nismo" was more a mood of strong disillusion-
ment than a movement, a reaction against the inefficiency of the 
parliamentary system by a heterogeneous group of social forces 
cutting across party lines. Ibanez's appeal of paternal authoritar-
ianism was comparable to that of Peron in Argentina. Significantly, 
for the first time the majority of rural workers and tenant farmers 
defied the conservative lando~mers to vote for Ib~ez, reflecting 
not only a breakdown in the political implications of rural 
2. on the Radical party, see J. -P. Bernard, et al., 
Guide to the Political Parties of South America, 
Middlesex 1973, 256-9; B.G. Burnett, Political Groups 
in Chile, Austin 1970, 182; Gil, 75. 
paternalism, but also the failure of the preceding coalitions 
of the Centre and the Left to produce reform in rural Chile. 3 
However, in his second term Ibanez proved weak and 
ineffectual, failing to deliver on his demagogic promises. To 
combat inflation of 71 per cent in 1954 and 84 per cent in 1955, 
he brought in the U.S. Klein-Saks agency, which introduced harsh 
stabilization measures and became the subject of hatred by the 
lower classes. This marked the end of Ib~nez•s populism and the 
beginning of a bitter and repressive confrontation with the 
working class. 
had evaporated. 
By the end of his term, his political support 
Following the failure of caudillo-type government, the 
Chilean electorate returned to orthodox party politics, electing 
in 1958 a leading Chilean industrialist, Jorge Alessandri. His 
was a right-wing "government of managers", supported by the 
Conservative and Liberal parties. Alessandri 's formula was 
orthodox economic liberalism relying on import restrictions, wage 
ceilings and currency controls to combat inflation. Foreign 
capital was sought in the form of investment and aid, which required 
creating an attractive domestic climate. Between 1958 and 1964, 
Chile's foreign debt rose from $569 million to $1896 million, most 
of the new capital coming from the United States. 4 
But once again inflation undermined the government's 
credibility, after its stabilization programme collapsed with a 
3. on Ibanez, see Gil, 77-9; K. Medhurst (ed.), Allende's Chile, 
London 1972, 16-19; I. Roxborough, et al., Chile: The State & 
Revolution, U.S.A. 1977, 35-6. 
4. Roxborough, et al., 38; Sigmund, 25-9. 
balance-of-payments crisis in 1962. Moreover, the Cuban 
Revolution and the Alliance £or Progress had changed the tide 
of opinion underneath Alessandri: competent management and 
maintenance of the status quo were no longer acceptable. 
In 1964 Latin America's first Christian Democrat government 
was elected in Chile, the Christian Democrats replacing the 
Radicals as the fulcrum of the multi-party system. Eduardo Frei•s 
absolute majority was also the first in a Chilean post-war election. 
Frei pledged a "Revolution in Liberty", and went some way toward 
fulfilling his ambitious reform programme. But in the last years 
of his administration the usual problems re-emerged: high inflation, 
internal dissension, an increasingly intransigent Congress. and 
falling electoral support. 5 
Thus, the Chilean electoral tradition was characterized by 
a cyclic rather than linear pattern, with certain themes re-emerging 
continuously. Rather than any decisive break in that tradition, 
the Allende victory stressed its continuities. 
The election of Allende was neither a pre-determined nor a 
random event. Given the long tradition of leftist participation 
in electoral politics, the strong commitment to democratic legalism, 
the emergence in 1958 of a well-defined and evenly-divided Right-
Centre-Left schema, and a rapidly expanding electorate, the 
possibility of a leftist victory was inherent in the Chilean political 
system and culture. In 1958, Allende's margin of defeat by 
Alessandri was found in the forty thousand votes received by a leftist 
priest, Zamorano, standing as an independent. In 1964, events 
5. on the 1964-70 Christian Democrat government, see Sigmund, 
23-91. 
conspired against Allende when he faced an alliance of the Centre 
and the Right. His 39 per cent of the vote would have brought 
him a clear victory in 1958. In 1970 events favoured Allende: 
with a smaller percentage of the vote than he received in 1964, 
he gained a narrow plurality over the candidate of the Right. 
Thus, it was a set of historical circumstances that tilted the 
balance in favour of a leftist victory. 
The implications were far-reaching. First, control of the 
government by the Left was reversible; that is, if they were 
voted in by one set of alternatives, they could be voted out by 
another. Second, the evaluation of political performance in 
pragmatic terms meant that Allende had to deliver material improve-
ment more effectively than his predecessor. Third, it indicated 
the continued predominance of political elites, notably the parties, 
which meant that the interpretation of public opinion by these 
elites was more important than that opinion itself. Sigmund 
concludes that the 1970 result "was directly related to shifts 
within and among the parties in 1969, which had a much greater 
influence on the outcome than did shifts in public opinion as a 
result of the actual campaign in 1970. 116 
The mobilization of the Chilean masses was also an integral 
part of the competition between political elites. The Christian 
Democrats on the one hand and the Marxist parties on the other vied 
to demonstrate that they could take the process of mobilization 
furtherest. 7 One reflection of this was the endless "numbers game", 
6. Sigmund, 77. 
7. see H .A. )liandsberger and T. McDaniel, 'Hypermobilization in 
Chile, 1970-1973' in world Poli tics, July 1976, 502-41 • 
whereby partisan Chilean newspapers argued over the size of' 
political rallies. 
However, one must avoid simplistic conclusions that the 
political elites could control outcome. A common explanation 
£or Allende's victory among the Centre and Right was to blame 
the tactics and leftist stance 0£ the Christian Democrat 
candidate, Radomiro Tomic. But leaving aside the question 
0£ Tomic • s own political commitment , this makes the dubious 
assumption that a different set of tactics would have produced 
victory. Nor did Tomic•s third placing mean that Frei had 
"failed", as the Left concluded. This explanation raises the 
questions of whether effective reforms could be equated with 
electoral success, or indeed whether "success" was possible 
8 
within the political system. 
Although the parties promoted the mobilization of workers, 
peasants and "marginals", the effects of mobilization could take 
unexpected forms. In particular, popular mobilization created 
alienation from the political system in other sectors. This 
anti-parliamentarian and potentially anti-democratic movement 
resulted in a return of' political support to the Right, reflected 
in the appeal of Alessandri 's campaign. The slim plurality of 
Allende's victory, and the fact that it was the Right candidate 
who was close behind, suggested that Chile in 1970 was ripe not 
so much for revolution as for civil war. 
The interpretation of Allende's election as the culmination 
of processes 0£ mobilization and movement to the left of the Chilean 
8. see M.J. Francis, The Allende Victory, Tuscon 1973, 76; 
Sigmund, 108-9, 123-7. 
people has come under critical examination. Prothro and 
Chaparro found that the marked shift of Chilean government to 
the left between 1952 and 1972 occurred without a corresponding 
increase in the ideological content or leftist orientation of 
bl . . . 9 pu ic opinion. One must distinguish between the electoral 
endorsement of a Marxist government and an ideological 
endorsement of Marxism by the Chilean people. The Chilean 
electorate experimented constantly and its relatively high level 
of politicization was stratified rather than unified. The 
movement to the left occurred at the system level, the result of 
individual alternatives afforded by the political system. 
'l'hus, the predominant trend in the Chilean electorate in 
the late 1960's was not of radicalization, as one might have 
expected from a leftist victory, but of polarization. On the 
political plane, polarization was reflected in, and encouraged 
by, several trends: the disintegration of consensus within the 
Centre parties, the re-emergence of the Right, and the achieving 
of unity among the Left. These ensured that the combination of 
forces behind the absolute victory of Eduardo Frei in 1964 would 
10 not be repeated. Instead the result was a three-way contest 
between candidates representing the Right, Centre and Left. 
9. see J. W. Prothro and P .E. Chaparro, 'Public Opinion 
and the Movement of Chilean Government to the Left' 
in A. and J.S. Valenzuela (eds.), Chile: Politics and 
Society, New Brunswick 1976, 67-114. 
10. In 1964 Frei received 56 per cent of the vote, supported 
by a Centre-Right alliance. 
The experience of office caused existing conflict within 
the Christian Democrat party to surface in 1967 when Frei 
11 temporarily lost control of the party. On one side were the 
officialistas, including Frei himself and many of the older 
members of the PJX!, who reaffirmed the evolutionary principle, 
giving priority to economic development. On the other side 
were the more idealistic rebeldes, including much of the party 
youth, who chose a revolutionary line emphasizing redistribution 
and social justice. The former saw 11communitarianism" as the 
future ideal, the latter as the immediate objective. 
Between these two groups emerged a third, the terceristas, 
who inclined towards the rebelde arguments, but who were 
respectful towards the officialistas. Their prime objectives 
were to accelerate reform, but also to recapture the political 
and ideological unity of the PDC before it had come to office. 
They believed that the party's openness to the Right in 1964 was 
responsible for the emerging disunity. A leading tercerista, 
/ Senator Renan Fuentealba, expressed the feelings of this group 
at the PDC convention in mid-1969: 
11 • 
12. 
••• in 1964 the reactionary right had no alternative but 
to vote for the Christian Democrat Party, which was the 
only force able to confront the Socialist-Communist 
coalition. The fear of Allende made them vote for the 
Christian Democrats. And in 1964 Christian Democracy 
was a youthful, original and uncorrupted party.12 
on the conflict within the PDC, see F.G. Gil, 'Ideology and 
Pragmatism: The Crisis in Chilean Christian Democracy• in 
J.D. Martz (ed.), The Dynamics of Change in Latin American 
Politics, New Jersey 1971, 199-207; A. von Lazar and 
L. Quiros Varela, 'Chilean Christian Democracy: Lessons in 
the Politics of Reform Management• in cunter-American Economic 
Affairs, Spring 1968, 51-72; Sigmund, 50-76. 
quoted by L. Goure and J. Suchlicki, 'The Allende Regime: 
Actions and Reactions• in Problems of Communism, May-June 
1971, 51. 
Pressure from the Marxist parties and the left-wing 
within the PDC caused the F'rei government to exhibit a greater 
leftist orientation in its last two years, especially on the 
dependency issue. In the copper industry, Frei demanded that 
Anaconda join the government's 11Chileanization" programme, amid 
strong criticism from the Left that 11Chileanization" had 
benefitted the copper companies more than Chile. 13 The high 
price of copper in the late 1960's certainly made it more 
imperative that the government increase its control over the 
whole copper industry. 
On the hemispheric level, at a special meeting of CEGLA 
in Vina del Mar in 1969, Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdez argued 
the growing economic disparity between the United States and 
Latin America and the need for increased Latin American integration 
to counteract this trend. 14 This indicated a response to the 
same awareness that was, on the l.J=ft, giving inspiration and 
conviction to "dependency theory": the acknowledged failure of 
u.s. aid programmes, and the recognition that the Latin American 
situation, far from improving, was actually deteriorating. 
Parallel to this awareness was an edging towards trade ties with 
Cuba, demonstrating the F'rei government's lack of faith in the 
American-sponsored trade embargo with Cuba through the OAS, which 
it had quietly accepted in 1964. 
This apparent leftist trend in Christian Democrat opinion 
was reflected in the PDC's choice of candidate £or the 1970 election, 
13. The copper companies were accruing high profits from the 
unanticipated high price of copper on the international 
market (62c a pound). 
14. see Sigmund, 81-2. 
since Frei could not constitutionally run for a succeeding term 
of office. Although Radomiro Tamie had long been considered 
Frei•s logical successor, he differed from him both personally 
and ideologically. Both were charismatic, but whereas Frei 
appeared austere and politically aloof, Tomic came across as 
strongly partisan, with a reputation as a brilliant political 
orator for which his opponents characterized him "Mr Blah-Blah-
Blah". Representing the concerns of the terceristas, Tomic 
stood ideologically to the left of the officialista Frei. 
Tomic•s appointment as Chilean ambassador to the United States 
(1964-1968) meant that he was the only major Christian Democrat 
politician not affected by increasing public dissatisfaction 
with the Frei government. 
But Tomic's ambassadorship tended to discredit him in the 
eyes of the Left, for whom any connection with the United States 
was like the kiss of death. 15 Tamie had ma.de overtures to the 
Left, in particular the Communist party, in the hope of forming 
a Centre-Left coalition behind his candidacy. Fuentealba had also 
concluded, 11To run in the presidential election of September 1970 
without a coalition 5,lith the moderate left] will lead us to 
death". 16 But the Communists knew that such an alliance would 
cancel out any hope of a united Left, since the Socialist party 
would be most unlikely to enter into a coalition with the 
Christian Democrats, and certainly would never accept a Christian 
Democrat candidate. Therefore the Communists rejected the discreet 
15. 
16. 
e.g. see P. Neruda, Memoirs, Middlesex 1978, 346. 
.,. 
quoted by Goure and Suchlicki, 51. 
advances of the PDC leaders, PC Secretary-General Luis Corval,n 
declaring, 11Con Tomic ni a masa" (To mass with Tomic, never!). 17 
This rejection ensured that Tomic would have to campaign for the 
Christian Democrats alone, since his leftist stance precluded an 
alignment with the Right, who had been alienated even by Frei's 
policies. 
The processes of disintegration and leftist orientation 
were also operating within the Radical party. In the late 1960's 
the contradictory nature of the party, one current inclined towards 
Marxism and the other responding to traditional liberalism, finally 
began to be resolved in favour of the former. 18 At the party's 
convention in June 1967, the leftist sectors of the party emerged 
predominant, with the respected Alberto Baltra elected as chairman. 
The party's next convention in June 1969 confirmed this orientation. 
Baltra was selected as the Radical candidate for the 1970 president-
ial election, and the party's right-wing leaders, including its 
1964 presidential candidate, Senator Julio Dura:n, were expelled. 
The party then began a dialogue with the Communist party, seeking 
to align itself with the Left. The expelled right-wing formed a 
new party, the Radical Democrats, which allied itself with the 
Right. 
The Right' s nomination of its own presidentia 1 candidate 
was independent of whether the Christian Democrat candidate was 
radical or moderate. The re-emergence of the Right was due partly 
to the absence of factors that had pushed it into a reformist 
17. quoted by H. Millas, Anatomia de un fracaso, Santiago 
1973, 31. 
18. F.G. Gil, The Political System of Chile, Boston 1966, 75, 
describes the contrary pulls within the Radical party. 
position in 1964. The "freedom or communism" issue was no 
longer the centre of political debate, nor did the Cuban 
Revolution feature as the polarizing catalyst as it had in the 
early 1960 1s. Furthermore, there was no repeat of the Curic6 
by-election of March 1964 to frighten the Right. 19 
On the positive side, the Right had found a renewed self-
confidence. In May 1966 the Conservative and Liberal parties 
finally buried their Catholic-secular dispute of a century before, 
and combined to form the National party. This organizational 
strengthening was accompanied by a rallying of forces, as Frei's 
reforms, especially his agrarian reforms, alienated rightist 
support of the government. The Right also exploited the desire 
for law and order in a period of economic and social unrest, with 
the activities of the MIR providing a convenient target. The 
upsurge in support £or the Right was reflected in the 1969 
congressional election, where the National party nearly doubled 
its vote to become the second-largest party after the Christian 
Democrats. The fall in the latter's vote from the 42.2 per cent 
of 1965 to 29.1 per cent in 1969 was primarily due to the defection 
of conservative votes. 
But the trump card of a confident Right was its as yet 
undeclared candidate for the 1970 election, former president Jorge 
Alessandri. Although seventy-four, Alessandri was the one 
national figure of the Right: a popular and prestigious figure,· 
19. In March 1964 a Marxist defeated the rightist candidate 
in a by-election in Curic6, considered to have been a 
conservative rural bastion. The result frightened the 
Conservative and Liberal parties into support for the 
Christian Democrat Frei in the presidential election, in 
order to obstruct Allende; see Sigmund, 29-30. 
from a family famous in Chilean history. 
At the time of the 1969 congressional elections, the 
Right fermented the idea that a high vote for the National 
party would encourage a reluctant Alessandri to stand. 
Following the election Alessandri duly declared his candidacy. 
Believing in their own propaganda, and also in reaction to 
their humiliation in 1964, the Right were confident that 
Alessandri would win the presidency. 
The strong candidacy of Alessandri on behalf of the Right 
presented the parties of the Left with the need to achieve unity 
and back a single candidate. Yet the formulation of a common 
programme and of the rules governing the internal organization 
of the leftist coalition were achieved with surprising ease 
during October and November 1969, considering the bitter debates 
within the Left after the 1964 defeat. Despite their objection 
to broad alliances with middle-class groups, the Socialists 
accepted the inclusion of the Radicals in the coalition. 
It was the process of choosing a single candidate that 
revealed the differences of ideology and interest among the 
various parties comprising Popular Unity ( UP - Unidad Popular). 
It was partly an indication 0£ the strong element of personalism 
in Chilean politics that ideological questions were interpreted 
into personalist terms. But it was also a reflection of the 
fundamental nature of the UP coalition and of the Chilean Left 
that it represented. 
The idea of Popular Unity was to bring all the parties of 
the Left together, without sacrificing the essential character of 
any single party. The programme declared, 
The Unidad Popular government will be pluralistic: 
it will be composed of all revolutionary parties, 
movements and currents of opinion. In this way it 
will be a genuinely democratic, representative and 
coherent body.20 
Pluralism was achieved by adopting simultaneously the strategies 
and concerns of all the coalition members. On one level, each 
party influenced the programme in the areas with which it was 
most concerned: the Communists on institutional matters, the 
Socialists in foreign affairs, MAPU in agrarian reform, the 
Radicals on nationalization and the mixed economy. 21 On another 
level, it was implied that the strategy of broad incremental 
changes desired by the Communists, and the strategy of class 
polarization and confrontation favoured by the Socialists, were 
to be simultaneous processes. Popular Unity was a combination 
of the concepts of a national liberation front and a workers' front, 
representing the previous leftist coalitions, the Popular Front and 
FRAP respectively. 
Thus the democratic, pluralist nature of UP evolved from the 
realities imposed upon the Left: the strong democratic commitment 
of the Chilean political culture and the fragmented nature of the 
Left itself. Strategic differences were not resolved in favour of 
one group, nor were they synthesized, but rather added together. 
Practical coherence and direction would largely come from the person 
of the president. It was in this context that the choice of 
candidate became the issue on which the UP coalition almost floundered. 
20. 
21. 
'The Programme of Unidad Popular' in s. Allende, 
Chile's Road to Socialism, (J.E. Garcls, ed.), 
Middlesex 1973, 33. 
see Sigmund, 89, 302-3 n15. 
Each of the six parties comprising Popular Unity nominated 
two candidates, then el±mina tion and consensus would £0 llow. 
The Communist party, the pivot of the coalition because it held 
together the Socialists and the middle-class groups, knew that a 
Communist would not be acceptable as a presidential candidate. 
Therefore it nominated the poet Pablo Neruda, an indication that 
it was prepared to support another candidate. Neruda later wrote 
that his candidacy was designed to force the other parties to come 
22 to an agreement. 
An impasse developed between the Communistst Socialists and 
MAPU, who supported the Socialist Salvador Allende, and the Radicals 
and the two miniscu.le parties API and the Social Democrats, who 
backed their nominees, Alberto Baltra and Rafael Tarud. 23 The 
implications were clear: would UP be led by the working class or 
the middle class, would it lean towards the proletarian coalition 
FRAP or the bourgeois-led Popular Front? In retrospect, the outcome 
seems inevitable: the middle class parties accepted Allende's 
nomination. Although the Radicals might attract crucial votes, 
it was the Communist and Socialist parties that would provide the 
bullc of UP support. Moreover, the Socialist party, the Communists 
and the Catholic worker-peasant movement MA.PU would only accept a 
candidate linlced to the working class. Ultimately the Left would 
consider as regression a return to the Popular Front phase. 
later emphasized the development from the 1930 9s: 
22. Neruda, 336. 
23. see Sigmund, 90-1. 
Allende 
••• at the time of the Popular Front ••• although it 
is true that there were the same Parties as today, the 
Radical party, the party of the bourgeoisie, was the 
dominant party, and this is what makes the difference 
between the Popular Unity today and the Popular Front: 
in the Popular Unity, no party enjoys a position of 
supremacy, but there is a supreme class, the working 
class, and there is a Marxist Socialist President. 24 
·16, . 
Although Allende was a Socialist, his nomination represented 
a victory for the Communist party, determining its dominant 
influence in Popular Unity. Other indications confirmed this. 
Strategically, the moderate electoral approach of the PC was most 
explicit, since a large number of Socialists, led by Carlos 
Altamirano, had little faith in the electoral process. The 
inclusion of the Radicals was sponsored by the Communists, and 
accepted by the Socialists only after Allende had received the PS 
nomination. In terms of organization, the PC would always be the 
backbone of any coalition 0£ the Left. Of the six to eight 
thousand UP committees created to consolidate local electoral 
25 support and to be "germinal expressions of popular power", a 
majority were controlled by the Communist party. 
But this pervasive Communist influence left in the dark the 
question of how much faith the more radical Left had in the 
ultimate viability of a democratic road to socialism. Apart from 
the Socialists' theoretical belief in the inevitability of a 
violent confrontation, there was the practical difficulty that 
Allende had in securing the nomination of his o~m party. Two 
more radical leaders, Altamirano and Secretary-General Aniceto 
Rodriguez, first turned down the nomination, and even then the 
24. R. Debray, The Chilean Revolution, New York 1971, 67,jb 
25. 'The Programme of Unidad Popular', 30. 
final vote for Allende in the PS Central Committee was thirteen 
votes against twelve abstentions. 26 In Allende's favour were 
support by the PC, and the fact that after three previous 
presidential campaigns, especially the intense 1964 campaign, 
he was nationally kno\fil, important when competing against the 
name of Alessandri. 
Salvador Allende was in part the voice, in part the 
epxression of the Left that backed his presidential candidacy. 
He personified many of its inherent tensions and contradictions: 
a man of bourgeois origin and a leader in a determinedly 
proletarian party; at the same time a committed democrat and 
committed socialist; opposed to violence yet a passionate 
revolutionary; a part of the political establishment for over 
three decades yet always seeking to transcend that establishment 
and to replace it with a new socialist order. 
Unlike Fidel Castro, who seemed to burst onto the Cuban 
scene from nowhere, Allende had been immersed in the central arena 
of Chilean politics: elected deputy for Valparaiso, the port 
described by Neruda as a 11fil thy rose", in 193 7, he served as a 
minister of public works under Pedro Aguirre Cerda in the Popular 
27 Front, and subsequently was a senator for twenty-five years. 
From his family he inherited a tradition of democratic 
militancy. 
All my uncles and my father were Radical party militants 
at a time when being a radical meant that one held 
advanced views. My grandfather founded the first lay 
26. Sigmund, 84. 
27. see Allende's own account of his political background in 
Debray, The Chilean Revolution. 
school in Chile and his political views earned him 
the nick-name of 'Red Allende•.28 
From his oi.,m experience and nature came a practical commitment to 
Marxist socialism. In his interview with the French Marxist, 
R~gis Debray, Allende repeatedly emphasized that Marxist theory 
should be a guide but not a catechism, in which concern he 
represented the Socialist party which he helped to found. For 
himself, he maintained that he was an activist rather than a 
theorist, reflecting the political rather than ideological 
orientation of the traditional Left. "I am well aware that there 
is no revolutionary action without revolutionary theory, but I am 
t ' 11 f t. 29 es sen 1a y a man o ac ion." His unoriginal but effective 
speeches, and his career as a medical doctor, suggested a practical 
nature. 
Allende's personal strength lay in unifying politically the 
different strands of the Chilean Left, particularly the uneasy 
alliance between the Communist and Socialist parties. His good 
relations with the Communists derived from two things. A 
courageous stand against Ib~nez in the 1952 presidential campaign, 
although of little impact at the time when he received only 5.4 per 
cent of the vote, served him well later when the reputation of most 
/,-., 
Chilean Socialists was tainted by their support for Ibanez. Then 
his moderate position in the PS and quoting of Julius Caesar's 
advice to "hasten slowly" suggested more the evolutionary approach 
of the Communists than the revolutionary rhetoric of the Socialists. 30 
28. Ibid. , 66. 
29. Ibid., 64. 
30. Ibid., 96. 
Dl', 
'"\ " 1 G~11,...,,, ... tr I.J :r. l i I ··1 ,~,i,]1 .0 , ,,., \ 
( , ·1 (,",.,)) ' ·• 
Two assessments of him in the 1960's underline his political 
character. For Gil, Allende was "characterized chiefly by tact, 
extraordinary political intuition, ability and knowledge and a 
1 bl 't f d' 1 d · 11 31 remar<a e capaci y or ip omacy an compromise. More 
critically, Halperin wrote, "His greatest political asset was 
undoubtedly his remarkable skill in not arousing lasting enmity 
32 in anyone". 
Thus Allende contrasted with that other revolutionary 
leader, Fidel Castro, in another way and in a manner consistent 
with the pluralism of Popular Unity. Less charismatic than 
either Frei, Tomic or Alessandri, he encouraged this image. 
The process [the socialist transformation] in Chile 
is neither paternalistic nor charismatic. On the 
personal level ••• I am not a Messiah, nor am I a 
caudillo. We know that popular power is built from 
the base upwards.33 
Pablo Neruda, a long-time associate, described him as 11 the anti-
dictator, the democrat of principles, even in the smallest 
particulars ••• Allende was a collective leader". 34 
In 1964 the Frei campaign had focused its attack on Allende 
the "revolutionary": his frequent endorsement of the Cuban 
Revolution; his personal association with Fidel Castro and Ch~ 
Guevara, and the revolutionary language of his o,m party. In 
1966 he sponsored the creation of the DIAS committed to the 
conception of continental armed struggle against North American 
31. Gil, The Political System of Chile, 290. 
32. E. Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, 
Cambridge 1965, 212. 
330 Debray, 94e 
34. Neruda , 349. 
imperialism, while in 1968 he was criticised £or his personal 
support of five survivors of Guevara's £ailed Solivan expedition 
who had reached Chile. 
Yet the revolutionary image never fitted easily with the 
reality of a respected, senior parliamentarian in a land where 
revolutionary violence was little known. The explanation lay 
partly in his belief that unity was essential in the "effort to 
transcend ourselves"; unity included solidarity of "popular" 
movements despite their tactical differences, and the moral 
35 responsibility of leaders to the people. 
from the Cuban Revolution was that 
His personal lesson 
a united people, a people which is conscious of its 
historical objective, is an invincible people ••• ,when 
it has responsible leadership, when it has men who are 
able to interpret the people's will, to feel that the 
people are the government, and this is the case with 
Fidel anciChe. • •. 36 
Partly it was a romanticism which admired revolutionary movements 
such as those in Cuba and North Vietnam. 
The 1970 election was a case of the ends against the middle, 
since both the Right and Left realised that their best chance lay 
in encouraging divisions within the Centre to undermine the development 
of a middle consensus. Therefore each sought to identify the 
Christian Democrat candidate with the other. An Alessandri poster 
showed photographs of Tomic and Allende, declaring, "They're the 
same ••• vote for another", while the Socialist party maintained, 
11El imperialismo juega dos cartas en esta eleccion: Alessandri y 
35. Allende, 62-4; Debray, 77. 
36 • Debray, 73. 
Tamie" (Imperialism is playing two cards in this election: 
Al':essandri end Tomic .. 97 The major use of television to present 
the candidates for the first time favoured Allende over the 
others. While Allende appeared urbane and surprisingly witty, 
doubts about the state of Alessandri's age and physical health 
were confirmed when the camera focused on his shaking ho.nd, and 
Tomic's oratorical style was better suited to large rallies than 
to the narrow confines of the television studio and screen. 38 
Tamie believed that there was a clear and growing shift 
of the Christian Democrat party to the left, claiming in an 
interview after the election that more than 60 per cent of 
Chile's Christian Democrats were "people with leftist ideas, and 
possibly another 20 per cent would accept a leftist shift by the 
party and the country". 39 However it was probable that his 
electoral programme, emphasizing leftist policies, including 
immediate and complete nationalisation of the copper mines, was 
more radical than that favoured by the majority of the PDC. 
Moreover, through his commitment to accelerating reform, Tamie 
tended to distance himself from the Frei government, which meant 
that he benefitted less from Frei's great personal popularity and 
the positive achievements of the Christian Democrat government. 
This was reflected in his campaign slogan, 11ni un paso atras" (not 





Times of the Americas, 2 Sept. , 1970, 3; Nillas, 31. 
on the role of television and radio in the campaign, 
see Sigmund, 102-3. 
Times of the Americas, 2 Dec., 1970, 1. 
Millas, 23. 
Personalism, the projection of a personal image, was the 
basis of Alessandri•s campaign. The propaganda both for and 
against him concentrated on the person: his supporters spoke of 
Don Jorge, while his opponents dubbed him "The Old Lady". 
Alessandri's appeal was similar to that of Ib~ez in the early 
1950's, the return of a father figure who stood above party 
politics. His campaign theme was• 11Alessandri will return", 
and although he had the support of the National party he stood 
as an independent. Alessandri called for a general depoliticization 
of the country, in reaction against the mobilization of marginal 
groups by the Christian Democrats. He was critical of the political 
nature of trade unions, land reform and developmental processes, 
declaring, IIThere is too much politics and not enough work11 • 41 
His own development perspective was one of orthodox economic 
liberalism, stressing private enterprise and economic efficiency 
and the subservience of reform to economic development. But 
Alessandri never had a formally elaborated programme; his campaign 
was based more on the communication of a mood than on ideas. 42 
After the election, Allende viewed how the Right believed the myth 
which they themselves had created of Alessandri. 
For them, the image of Alessandri was the complete 
answer, it crossed all political boundaries, it was 
an ineffable light. Alessandri would win because 
he was Alessandri. There is something you must 
appreciate: in this country, history has sho\m that 
individuals, names, have an enormous influence.43 
Allende's campaign was based on the Popular Unity programme, 
plus a list of forty basic measures, which, even if some resembled 
41. Time magazine, 7 Sept., 1970, 22. 
42. Sigmund, 93. 
43. Debray, 120-1. 
the usual naive electoral promises, at least had an immediate 
appeal that Tomic's campaign lacked. 44 
On September 4, Chileans went to the poll in an election 
that almost certainly would be close; as one commentator 
observed, 11To the end, the partisans of the three candidates were 
predicting the victory of their choice with the peculiar vehemence 
45 bred of uncertainty". Dr. Salvador Allende had a slim lead, 
receiving 36.6 per cent of the vote to Alessandri•s 35.2 per cent. 
Tamie trailed behind with 28.1 per cent. In terms of votes, 
Allende's margin of victory was 39 ,ooo out of three million. 
His victory represented the consistent ability of the Left to 
attract one third of the electorate since 1958. Rather than 
significantly expanding its vote, the Left's success was due to 
the consolidation of its vote in the areas where it was already 
strong: especially the heavily unionized northern provinces and 
the city of Concepci6n in the south. As usual, a greater 
percentage of men voted for the Marxist candidate than women. 46 
Since no candidate received a simple majority, the Chilean 
Constitution decreed that in fifty days Congress should choose 
between the two leading candidates. Traditionally the front-
running candidate had always been endorsed, but Congress had the 




see D.L. Johnson (ed.), The Chilean Road to Socialism, 
Garden City 1973, 170, for the forty measures. 
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ambiguity of the September 4 result (for instance, who would be 
elected in a second round national vote between Allende and 
Alessandri?)47 and the interval prior to the decision of Congress, 
produced a tense atmosphere which exposed the latent violence in 
Chilean society in the late 1960•s. In those fifty days three 
trends evolved which favoured Allende's ratification by Congress. 
The first was the temporary discrediting of the Right. 
Shocked at the defeat of Alessandri and at the prospect of a Marxist 
president, its leaders overplayed their hand in a panic of manoeuver-
ings to obstruct Allende. On September 9 Alessandri, who before 
the election had declared himself in favour of the tradition that 
the frontrunner be chosen, announced publicly, 
In case of my election by the Congress, I would resign 
the post which would give rise to a new election. I 
can state categorically, of course, that I would not 48 
participate in that election under any circumstances. 
This was clearly an offer to the Christian Democrats: if they 
voted for Alessandri in Congress, he would open the way for new 
elections in which Frei would be eligible to run. The U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on covert action in Chile confirmed in 1975 that 
this 11constitutional gambit" was supported by the United States; 
however, from the ITT documents released in 1972 it would appear 
that th~s strategy to block Allende was chosen by Alessandri himself, 
47. Because of the similarity between Tomic•s and Allende's 
programmes, most commentators believed that the Christian 
Democrat votes would have gone to Allende. Sigmund, 109, 
argues that anti-Marxism in Chile would have favoured 
Alessandri. 
48. quoted by Sigmund, 111. 
in the face of demands from some American groups for more radical 
t . 49 ac ion. Success depended upon the agreement of the vacillating 
Frei, but ultimately his commitment to constitutional democracy 
h . . h t . 50 won over is antipat y owards Marxism. 
The Allende victory also prompted an immediate withdrawal 
of credit from Chilean banks. Between September 3 and October 20, 
$17 million was wi thdra\,m from the Central Bank alone. 51 The 
flight of capital from the country. and of many leading right-wing 
Chileans_ was so great that the Frei government was forced to 
restrict the amount of money that could be taken abroad. The 
near-economic collapse caused by the capital flight encouraged 
the belief that the self-interest of the Right came before their 
concern for the country. 
Secondly, the Chilean armed forces reaffirmed their 
constitutional position. Early in May 1970, army commander 
General Ren~ Schneider stated the position of the armed forces 
if Congress chose the leftist candidate, "Our doctrine and mission 
is support and respect for the constitution ••• The Congress is 
sovereign in the case mentioned and our mission is to support its 
d . . 52 ec1s1on11 • Following the election Schneider reaffirmed this 
principle, amid great pressure on the armed forces to act. The 
49. see United states Senate Select Committee, Covert Action in 
Chile, Washington 1975, 23-5; ITT, Subversion in Chile, 
Nottingham 1972, 29. 
50. ITT, 29-32, 43, 51. 
51. Goure and Suchlicki, 54 n. 
52. quoted by Sigmund, 99. 
U.S. government also promoted a covert campaign encouraging the 
Chilean military to move against Allende, but no military inter-
vention resulted. 53 
Thirdly, the Christian Democrats opted for a conciliatory 
/ 
approach toward Popular Unity. In part, PDC support of the Left 
was encouraged by the discrediting of the Right, which threatened 
their democratic ideals. In part, it was the inclination of the 
left-wing of the party, the former tercerista faction, to align 
with the Left, as seen in Tomic's early support for Allende. 
Furthermore, the lack of public knowledge of the vacillations of 
the PDC right-wing and Frei meant that their approach to the Left 
was not compromised. Primarily, the Christian Democrats supported 
the Left because the UP parties and Allende himself articulated 
clearly and publicly the threat of civil war if Allende was not 
54 chosen. 
If the PDC leaders did support the Left for defensive reasons, 
they were still concerned to go on record as the defenders of 
Chilean democracy. Their price for Christian Democrat support of 
Allende in Congress was a Statute of Democratic Guarantees, which 
included the independence from political interference of the armed 
forces, education, labour unions and the civil service, free and 
democratic elections, complete press freedom, and a pluralistic 
state open to all ideologies and respecting all political parties. 55 
53. see U.S. Senate Select Committee, 25-6, on the American 
campaign toward the military, known as Track II, 
54. see Allende himself, in Debray, 119-20; U.S. Ambassador 
Korry to the U.S. Congressional Committee on foreign affairs, 
United States and Chile during the Allende Years, Washington 
1975, 30; ~ magazine, 19 Oct., 1970, 19. 
5 5. Debray, 119. 
As further insurance the Statute was written into the Constitution, 
and shrewdly negotiated in public. Thus the PDC intended to bind 
Allende publicly and explicitly to democratic, constitutional 
means. They also demonstrated that the PDC had no intention of 
participating in a Popular Unity government, and that they were 
establishing the Constitution as the rule by which to judge UP. 
Allende accepted the Statute in what he later described as a 
11tactical necessity", a phrase subsequently used by the opposition 
. . f . . 56 to indicate a lack o sincerity. 
All three strands were drawn together in an incident two days 
before Congress met to choose the new president: the assassination 
of army commander-in-chief General Schneider. The apparent 
motivation behind his murder by right-wing terrorists was that his 
constitutional position was an obstacle to possible military inter-
vention. The intention was only to kidnap the general, but he 
resisted the attack and was fatally wounded. 
Ironically, Schneider's murder had the opposite result to 
that intended: the unanimous national repudiation of the murder, 
the first of a major public figure in Chile for many decades, sealed 
Allende's ratification as president. Alessandri had asked his 
supporters in Congress to vote for Allende two days before, after 
the failure of his own plan to block the Marxist, but the extremist 
action implicated the entire Right. Both the armed forces and the 
PDC reaffirmed their commitment to the constitutional process, and 
condemned extra=legal political activity. Schneider's death 
56. Ibid, 120. Allende maintained in this conversation that 
the guarantees were quite consistent with the UP programme. 
indicated how close the country had been to political violence, 
both the actual violence of the extreme Right and the threat of 
violence of the Left. On October 24 Allende was elected by 
Congress by 153 votes against 35. 
On the one hand, Allende's election attested the strength 
of legalism in the Chilean political culture, and increased the 
confidence of the Left that the legitimacy of Popular Unity would 
be defended by that legalist commitment. In other words, it 
encouraged belief in the viability of a democratic transition to 
socialism. 
On the other hand, since the UP government remained a minority 
one, the conditional nature of his victory meant that the priority of 
Popular Unity was to gain an absolute majority in Congress. The 
control of the Chilean government by the Left was reversible, and 
the surprise of the Left at its own victory, as well as the covert 
activity to prevent Allende from taking office, produced a defensive 
mentality in the Left. It was thus encouraged to move quickly to 
produce "irreversible" changes. The veteran party leaders of the 
Left were well aware that Allende's election had not achieved complete 
power but only control of a part of the government. 
evolved the government's short-term strategy. 
From this 
Meanwhile, perspectives on the electoral victory within the 
Left differed. The left-wing Socialist, Carlos Altamirano, 
emphasized that the Chilean victory was only a part of the continental 
Revolution and that its precedent was the Cuban Revolution. 
Our struggle has been not only for Cuba's liberty yesterday 
and for the building of socialism in Chile today, but ••• also 
for the continental revolution, the Latin American 
revolution, which must bring liberty, economic independence, 
and social peace and progress to the 20 Latin American 
nations.57 
''O .:) ti 
The new president was faced with the need to allay the doubts 
of potentially aggressive countries, including Argentina, Bolivia 
and the United States, that the Chilean victory would mean an 
upsurge of leftism in other Latin American countries. Therefore 
he stressed the native sources and the individuality of the 
revolutionary process in Chile. 
We very definitely maintain that each country has its o,m 
particular circumstances, and the tactics that its leaders 
must employ in order to achieve a popular victory must, as 
I have already said, be chosen accordingly. We do not 
expert Popular Unity, but if such a movement springs up in 
other Latin American countries or on other continents •••. 
it will be the responsibility of those peoples and those 
countries. 58 
More enigmatically he declared, "The Cuban Revolution had the 
flavour of sugar and rum. The Chilean Revolution will have the 
. d . I 59 taste of meat pies and re wine'. 
57. quoted by L.E. Aguilar, 'Political Traditions and 
Perspectives' in Problems of Communism, May-June 1971, 67. 
58. quoted by Aguilar, 67. 
59. Time magazine, 19 Oct., 1970, 21. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILEAN LEFT 
The vehicle and driving force behind Dr. Salvador 
Allende's presidential election in 1970 were the political 
parties of the Chilean Left: the Communist party (PC) and 
the Socialist party (PS). 1 Because both parties were explicitly 
Marxist and rooted in the working class, and because of their 
long history of involvement in the Chilean political system, they 
were described as the "traditional Left". Their history was 
characterized by a combination of political, in particular 
electoral, unity and ideological diversity, resulting in frequent 
public disagreement. 
Their independent origins explain much of the differ:ent 
nature of each party, and in fact they should be seen in two 
different contexts. The birth of the Chilean Communist party 
was as a loaal labour movement which then adopted the framework 
of international Marxism-Leninism. The movement was founded by 
Luis Emilio Recabarren in 1912 in the mining areas of the desert 
pampas of northern Chile. 
1 • 
Coming into those lowlands, facing those stretches of sand, 
is like visiting the moon. This region that looks like an 
On the Communist and Socialist parties, see: J-P. Bernard, 
et al., Guide to the Political Parties of South America, 
Middlesex 1973, 247-53; E.G. Burnett, Political Groups in 
Chile, Austin 1970, 170-7; F.G. Gil, The Political System 
of Chile, Boston 1966, 278-90; E. Halperin, Nationalism 
and Communism in Chile, Cambridge 1965, 42-170; J. Petras, 
Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development, 
Berkeley 1969, 158=196; B. Pollack, 'The Chilean Socialist 
Party' in Journal of Latin American Studies, May 1978, 
117-152. 
empty planet holds my country's great wealth, but the 
white fertilizer and the red mineral have to be 
extracted from the arid earth and the mountains of rock. 
There are few places in the world where life is so harsh 
and offers so little to live for.2 
Among the nitrate miners ("Those men locked inside walls 0£ 
silence, in the loneliest region and under the loneliest sky113), 
Recabarren set up union centres, newspapers, and generally 
organized the workers' movement. The Communist party, established 
in 1922, retained control of the Chilean labour movement, and 
unionized workers continued to provide the base support of the 
party.4 Only in the late 1950's did the party begin to extend 
its following to the peasantry. Although the membership of a 
number of leading Chilean intellectuals, economists, historians, 
writers, and most notably the poet Pablo Neruda, brought the party 
prestige and respect, the labour leadership was the dominant 
5 influence within the party. 
The origins of the Chilean Socialist party, which lay in the 
world economic crisis of the 1930's and dissatisfaction with the 
Communist party, placed it in another context: the rising tide 
of Latin American nationalism. The immediate cause of the 
amalgamation of five small socialist movements into the Socialist 
party in 1933 was the overthrow in the previous year 0£ Marmaduke 
Grove's twelve-day socialist republic. This republic, with a 
simple humanitarian programme, was in turn a result of the severe 
2. P. Neruda, Memoirs, Middlesex 1978, 167. Neruda himself 
represented this region as a Communist senator in the late 
1940•s. 
3. Ibid., 169. 
4. Unionized workers comprised only 15 to 20 per cent of the 
wo1'king class. 
5. see Gil, 280-1. 
economic and social pressures brought on by the Great Depression, 
and the consequent political repression of the Ibanez dictatorship 
(1927-31). One of the effects of the Depression was a new 
awareness of Chile's integration in the world capitalist economy. 
Some Chilean economists, £or example An!b£1 Pinto, dated Chile's 
persistent post-war economic problems back to the dislocations of 
the 1930's.6 
The Socialist party was also an expression of dissatisfaction 
with Communist leadership of the Left. At this time the Communist 
party, changed from the days of Recabarren, was inward - looking 
and dogmatic; its world-wide strategy had little appeal £or 
Chileans, and it had no great following among the lower classes. 
The Socialist inspiration was for a clearly nationalist approach to 
Chilean problems -- they steadfastly refused to join any Internationals. 
Moreover, the Socialists' self-declared Marxism was seen as a practical 
7 orientation, not as a dogmae Allende, one of the founders of the 
party, discussed its conception in these terms in his interview with 
,,, . b Regis De ray • 
•• • when we analysed the situation in Chile, and we believed 
that there was a place for a Party which, while holding 
similar views in terms of philosophy and doctrine - a Marxist 
approach to the interpretation of history - would be a Party 
free of ties of an international naturee However, this did 
not mean that we would disavow proletarian internationalism •• e 
The Communist Party was characteristically a closed, inward-
looking party.8 
6. Anibal Pinto' s best-known book is, Chile, un caso de desar.ollo 
frustrado, Santiago 1959. 
7. Halperin, 150. 
8. R. Debray, The Chilean Revolution, New York 1971, 62. 
Thus, the ideological nature 0£ the two parties reflected 
their origins: the Communists were utilitarian believers, the 
Socialists were ideological sceptics, defined as much by what 
they were against as what they were £or. 
The basic ideology 0£ the Communist party was rooted in 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The PC consistently supported the 
unity 0£ the international communist movement under the leadership 
0£ the Soviet Union Communist party, 11the cradle 0£ Leninism11 • 9 
Because of their international alignment, they were frequently 
charged with subservience to an outside power, and with importing 
theories rather than developing genuinely nationalist solutions 
to Chilean problems. During the period of British exploitation 
of Chilean nitrates, Recarbarren replied to this criticism in a 
speech in the Chamber of Deputies. His response, in nationalist 
terms, reflected his sensitivity to the charge. 
No capitalist can criticise our international sentiments, 
since nothing is more international than capital. Capital 
has no homeland{ no flag - none, that is, aside from the 
pound sterling. 0 
With the end of the nitrate boom and the emergence of the United 
States as the predominant foreign power in Chile, anti-imperialism 
in practice became synonymous with anti-Americanism. 
The strong anti-Yankee feeling, always present in some form 
in Latin America ••• has served the Communists well in their 
efforts to direct the formidable currents 0£ nationalism to 
their advantage and to conceal the1fnherent antagonisms 
between communism and nationalism. 
9. Halperin, 101. 
10. L.E. Recabarren, 'The Dawn of Social Revolution in Chile' in 
L.E. Aguilar (ed.), Marxism in Latin America, New York 1968, 
93. 
11 ., Gil, 2 80. 
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To the principal theme 0£ anti-imperialism, the Communist 
party added: full state participation in all economic activities, 
democratization of the educational system, electoral reforms to 
extend suf£rage, and reform of the political system. 12 
Yet the close adherence of the Chilean Communisty party to 
the Moscow line remained its most vulnerable side. Not only 
could political opponents accuse the party leadership 0£ subser-
vience as it £o11owed the vicissitudes of Soviet international 
policy, but Soviet action also provoked serious internal discord. 
The 1956 revelations of Stalin's atrocities implicated a number 
of Chilean Communist leaders, while the prompt support of the 
Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1967 dismayed many party 
members, such as the poet Nicanor Parra. 
The contrasting ideological openness of the Socialists saw 
them go from anti-Communism to the Popular Front, to Peronism, to 
Titoism, to Castroism, to, at least partially, Maoism. 13 This 
could have seemed like ideological permissiveness, and did so to 
many, but the Socialists were strongly centred in the nationalist 
ethic. It was their fierce nationalism which enabled them to 
identify with the right-wing Argentine leader, Peron, and to support 
electorally in their ovm country the authoritarian nationalism of 
Ib~nez in the 1950 9s. 
Related to the nationalist ethic was that of a "third 
position", later embodied in the "Third World" concept. Peron, 
Tito, Castro and Mao had all pursued an independent path: the 
£irst attempted a neutralist line between capitalism and Marxist 
12. Ibid"'· 278. 
13. see Pollack, 146. 
socialism; the other three deviated significantly from the Moscow 
line 0£ communism. The Chilean Socialists presented a strong 
La.tin American identity, stressing from the 1930's onwards the need 
£or a united Latin American continent in the £ace of US. imperialism. 
In the post-war Cold War climate, they rejected the Communist 
policy of military blocs and the theory of the two camps, capitalist 
and socialist. Soviet pressure on Yugoslavia and her invasion of 
Hungary were cited as repressive reflections of this policy. 14 
Even the pro-Chinese line of the PS has been interpreted as stemming 
f t . s . t' 15 more roman 1- ov1e ism. 
Over two other ideological tenets the Communists and Socialist 
leaders came into occasionally bitter conflict, in which the PS 
competed with the PC "from the left". Both tenets proceeded from 
the Popular Front strategy adopted by the Comintern in 1935 and 
adhered to by the Communist Party. The first of these was that 
of the "peaceful way", which involved participation in national 
and local elections to secure democratic power in the hands of the 
people. In reply to criticism of the "peaceful way" by Chinese 
Communist leaders in 1963, PC Secretary-General Luis Corvalan 
defended it as the \vay of mass revolutionary struggle, and argued 
that armed revolution should be adopted only when all peaceful 
avenues were locked. He maintained that although the content of 
the revolution was generally identict3;l in all La.tin American 
countries, 11All Marxist-Leninists agree that each revolutionary 
process has its own distinctive features" and "the choice of either 
the peaceful or non-peaceful path is the prerogative of the 
14. Halperin, 149-50. 
15. see Pollack, 137. 
•)1/ 
.,) I @ 
16 revolutionaries in the given country. Chile's strong democratic 
tradition allowed the first. The period of political ostracism and 
repression (1948-58) may have hardened the Communists• resolve to 
pursue this legal, "low profile" approach. 
The Socialists• attitude to the debate was more confused. On 
the one hand, they consistently asserted that violent revolution to 
overthrow the existing order would be in the end inevitable; on the 
other, they equally consistently participated in elections. To 
clear this paradox, Ra~l Ampuero, long-time secretary-general of the 
Socialist party until he led a small break-away group in 1967, 
distinguished between the "peaceful road" and the "electoral road". 
He recognized that the "people's movement has always used all legal 
means whenever possible", but contrasted this with the conciliatory 
participation in the formalist democratic institutions, his accusation 
against the PC. 17 But beyond this rationalization, two other 
factors explained the paradox. Firstly, there was a strong current 
of anti-parliamentarian feeling within the Socialist party, which 
gave them another affinity with Ibanez. Secondly, the Party was 
comprised of diverse elements, from moderate parliamentarians like 
Allende to the young militants headed by Carlos Altamirano, who 
sympathised with the clandestine MIR (Movement of the Revolutionary 
Left). 
The other Popular Front tenet followed by the Communist party 
was that the workers' revolutionary movement should seek an alliance 
with progressive, nationalist bourgeois groups to form a National 
Liberation Front. The PC had played a major role in, and benefitted 
from, the Popular Front government (1938-41) led by the Radicals. 
16. L. Corvaltn, •The Peaceful Way - a Form of Revolution• in 
Peace, Freedom and Socialism, Dec 1963, 7-8. 
Halperin, 151 • 
They saw the bourgeois democratic tradition as an obstacle to 
attempts by "ultra-reactionaries" to engineer coups by the armed 
forces, 18 in which event the Communist party would amost certainly 
be banned. 
The Socialists rejected the concept of the National Liberation 
Front in favour of a Worlcers' Front. Although the leadership of 
the party was comprised primarily of middle-class intellectuals, 
they believed that the middle class had lost all creative energy 
and tended to preserve the value system of the upper class. 19 
They did not make a distinction between the imperialist and 
nationalist bourgeoisie as the PC did. Even the moderate Allende 
said in 1971, 11The penetration and domination of foreign capital 
has increased to such an extent over the last few years that the 
so-called national bourgeoisie has virtually disappeared. 1120 
Thus, to remain true to its anti-imperialist commitment, the 
revolutionary movement should be solely proletarian in composition. 21 
This naturally precluded a coalition with the Centre-left, predomin-
antly middle-class Radical and Christian Democrat parties. The 
Socialist attitude was r.einforced by their unhappy participation in 
the Popular Front, an experience which caused major dissensions 
within the party. The creation of FRAP (Popular Action Front) in 
1957, with its exclusion 0£ the Radicals, followed the Socialist 
line. This time it was the Communists who were uneasy, seeking a 







Gil, 288. F.B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962, 
Indiana 1963, 284-7, discusses the tendency of the Chilean 




Socialists after their division over support for Ibanez. 
Yet despite these idelogical differences, the two Marxist 
parties generally displayed political unity, revealed in a series 
of electoral alliances. In itself, this suggested that the Chilean 
Left was primarily political rather than ideological in 
orientation. Firstly, the very nature of the parties, especially 
the PC, with their commitment to the interests of labour preceding 
th . . t t t Ma • th · b 22 eir commi men o rxism, gave em a pragmatic ent. 
Secondly, the £act that the two Marxist parties worked £rom 
within the existing political system gave them a basically political 
rather than revolutionary background and orientation. This 
integration into the system was a source both of strength and of 
weakness to them. The Communist and Socialist parties benefitted 
from the electoral process, which had almost brought them victory 
in 1958 and did so in 1970, and from the institutional system, in 
obtaining socio-economic benefits for their supporters, unionized 
workers in particular. Their relative success also gave the 
Marxist Left a pragmatic air and encouraged them to continue to 
operate inside the system. 
On the other hand, the existing political system had also rubbed 
off on the Marxists. 
22. 
23. 
Chilean society, though changing and modernizing, has 
extended to the new urban activities and classes a 
traditional clientele system of political domination 
which is structurally and functionally incompatible 23 
with the organization of a modern and effective democracy. 
see L.E. Aguilar, 'Political Traditions and Perspectives• in 
Problems of Communism, May-June 1971, 64-6. 
o. Sunkel, 'Change and Frustration in Chile' in Co Veliz (eda), 
Obstacles to Change in Latin America, London 1965, 34. 
The very success of the Marxist parties was a sign of their 
adaption to clientelistic politics. They exhibited the same 
vertical party networks and dual structure as other political 
parties in Chile: the centre, in Santiago, consisting of the 
party leadership and the ideological arena, and the local 
electoral arena, which was clientelistic in nature. Hence, the 
Marxist parties were themselves contributing to a paternalistic 
political system which it was their aim to overthrow. 24 In 
one sense, the ideological contest between the PC and the PS 
also represented competiton for the same electorate. 
While the political situation in Chile favoured consensus 
and the "rules of the game", then the Communists with their 
stronger political consciousness were the more effective. But 
if events charged a situation of greater polarization, as in the 
early 1960's, then the Socialists, with their more revolutionary 
consciousness, were likely to come to the fore. In such a 
situation ideological differences between the Communists and 
Socialists, and within the Socialist party itself, were also 
l:Oe 
likely to emerge from behind the more usual political unity. 
However, the long immersion of the Marxist parties in the Chilean 
political system had faded their revolutionary impetus; as a 
theatre critic complained, "In Chile even the Left is bourgeois.1125 
The decade of the 1960's saw the "traditional Left" over-
shadowed by more vigorous groups offering major reform. Its 
24. 
25. 
see A. Valenzuela, •Political Constraints to the Establishment 
of Socialism in Chile' in A. and J.s. Valenzuela (eds.), 
Chile: Politics and Society, New Brunswick 1976, 10-13. 
H. Ehrmann, 'Theatre in Chile• in The Drama Review, 
Winter 1970, 80. 
relativist position seemed weak and compromised amid a debate 0£ 
increasing polarity: democratic reform or armed revolution. The 
intensity and absolutist nature of the debate also elevated 
political discussion from the individual national level to a 
continental one, and to hemisphericsigni£icance with the intimate 
involvement of the United States. 
The new political debate was initiated by the Cuban Revolution 
that came to power with the fall of the dictator Batista in 1959. 
Yet the Revolution may have remained of national significance only, 
had not the Cuban leaders claimed for it a continental validity. 
Fidel Castro pronounced that "the Andes will be the Sierra Maestra 
T~t· A ' 26 d t . d t k th t d't' 1 L ft . of .1.a in merica" , e ermine o provo e e ra 1 iona e in 
Latin America out of its complacency. 
From the Cuban Revolution emanated the inspiration and 
ideological perspective of the New Left. Castro and Ernesto 
11Ch~" Guevara, the two main theorists of the Revolution, generalized 
from their personal Cuban experience: 
We consider that the Cuban Revolution contributed three 
fundamental lessons to the conduct of revolutionary 




Popular forces can win a war against the army. 
It is not necessary to wait until all conditions 
for making revolution exist; the insurrection can 
create them. 
In underdeveloped America, the countryside is the 
basic area for armed £ightin g· .27 
These theses were sustained by a call to immediate action, 
of which armed revolution and Castro's export of guerrilla warfare 
were reflections. A large part of the appeal and confidence of 
260 Halperin, 670 The Sierra Maestra was the mountain range in 
the east of Cuba where Castro and his guerrillas began their 
insurrection. 
27. E. Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, New York 1961, 15. 
the New Left was due to the audacity of Castro's Success in 
Cuba, and the supremacy of action over talk. The Cuban leader 
threw dO\,m the challenge to those on the continent who called 
themselves revolutionaries: 11the duty of the revolutionary is 
1 . 28 to make revo ut1on. 11 
The traditional Left, and especially the Comnrunists, found 
themselves in a difficult position regarding the Castroite 
revolutionary challenge. Previously they had criticized the 
tactics of armed revolution as 11adventurist11 • Yet while they 
were patiently preparing the revolutionary consciousness of the 
proletarian masses, the Cuban Revolution was an accomplished 
£act - a nationalist, socialist revolution that had succeeded in 
defying the United States. The Comnrunist parties were in danger 
of being left behind and of missing out on the considerable 
prestige of the New Left in the early 1960•s. 
More important than the immediate ideological differences, 
the New Left embodied a change of nature from that of the 
traditional Left: a change in mood, from a relative to an 
absolute perspective, and a change in character, from the 
supremacy of the party to the supremacy of the revolutionary, 
which gave the New Left a personalist quality. 
The coherence of the New Left and the changes it introduced 
were found in the person of the guerrilla fighter • The guerrilla 
.,. 
was, as described by Che Guevara, the focus of the revolutionary 
struggle. Apart from his actual combat duties, he was 11the 
thrusting engine of mobilization, the generator of revolutionary 
28. F. Castro, Fidel Castro Speaks, (M. Kenner and J. Petras, 
eds.), Middlesex 1972, 137. 
awareness and militant enthusiasm. 1129 In his interaction with 
the peasantry the guerrilla provided ideological and other 
guidance, which resulted in a progressive radicalization of the 
l t . 30 revo u ionary movement. But the guerrilla should also provide 
an example in his own life. 
The guerrilla fighter, as a person conscious of a role in 
the vanguard of the people, must have a moral conduct that 
shows him to be a true priest of the reform to which he 
aspires ••• The guerrilla soldier should be an ascetic.31 
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The guerrilla image combined morality with romanticism, even 
mysticism. It held an appeal of astringency and purity, an offer 
of personal wholeness, which found its highest expression in the 
person of Guevara himself. 
In this man who so painfully embodied the most magnificant 
coherence, intellectuals could see themselves promoted to 
guerrillas, and guerrillas to intellectuals. Che gave 
every revolutionary in America the element each was missing. 
Once again, revolutionaries could hammer out their own 
theory in the furnace of the day-to-day struggle.32 
Thus whereas the party supplied the ideology to the traditional Left, 
in the New Left the revolutionary found his own, improvising as he 
went along rather than playing to a score. While orthodox 
Communists engaged in what American author Norman Mailer described 
as "sound as brickwork" logic, the Cuban revolutionaries thrived on 
paradox. In contrast with the business-like approach of the 
traditional Left, the new generation rediscovered passion as a 
revolutionary characteristic. 
29. J .D. Martz, 'Doctrine and Dilemmas of the La tin American "New 
Left"' in world Politics, Jan 1970, 176. 
30. Guevara, 44-5. 
31. Ibid., 43. 
32e Re Debray, A Critique of Arms, I, Middlesex 1977, 17. 
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The other face of the personal romanticism of the guerrilla 
image was a desire for self-sacrifice and purgation, a desire to 
serve humanity together with a tendency to violence. The irony 
inherent in the image, frequently perceived by Guevara himself, 
was well described by Neruda. 
In a way, this cult of risk was encouraged by the romantic 
spirit and the wild guerrilla theories that swept Latin 
America ••• The flaw in this line of reasoning is its 
political weakness: it is sometimes possible for a great 
guerrilla and a powerful mind to coexist, as in the case 
of Che Guevara, but that is an exception and wholly 
dependent on chance. The survivors of a guerrilla war 
cannot lead a proletarian state simply because they were 
braver, or because they were luckier in the face of death, 
or better shots when £acing the living.33 
The puritanism inherent in Guevara's conception of the 
guerrilla stemmed from the major theme of the New Left, the 
degradation of the individual and collective life in Latin America, 
£or which United States imperialism was largely responsible. 
Our aspirations to victory may be summed up thus: total 
destruction of imperialism by eliminating its firmest 
bulwark: imperialist domination by the United States of 
America ••• What a luminous near-future would be visible 
to us if two~ three or many Viet Nams flourished throughout j4 . the world ••• 
The moral element was also reflected in a spirit of total 
commitment and complete rejection of compromise. The New Left 
repudiated the incrementalist, relativist approach of the old 
Communists, particularly in relationship to the middle classes. 
In the actual historic conditions of Latin America, the 
national bourgeoisie cannot lead the anti-feudal and anti-
imperialist struggle. Experience shows that in our nations 
that class, even when its interests are in contradiction to 
those of Yankee imperialism, has been incapable of confronting 
it, £or it is paralysed by fear of social revolution and 
frightened by the cry of the exploited masses.35 
33. Neruda, 330-1. 
34. Ch~ Guevara, quoted by Martz, 175-6. 
35. Castro, 162-3. 
The commitment of the New Left to "final" solutions to social and 
national development was alien to Latin American political con£lict 
during the forties and fifties. 36 Indeed, the followers of 
Castro were widely known as the "Jacobin Left". 
It was the role of the guerrilla, rather than the more 
obvious ideological differences, which was the primary threat of 
the Castroite Left to the orthodox Communists, in essence a 
question of who was to lead the Latin American Revolution. In 
maintaining the primary role of the guerrilla fighter in the 
revolutionary process, Castro denied the Communist parties their 
self-assigned role of revolutionary vanguaro. 37 Moreover, in 
pronouncing that the guerrilla fighters must be directed from the 
countryside, he was uprooting the Communists from their support 
ba th b 1 . t 38 se, e ur an pro etaria. With a newcomer's audacity he 
asked the Communist parties to prove their revolutionary character: 
11Their attitude toward the guerrilla struggle will define the 
. . Lat. A . 39 communists in in merica. 
The most faithful adherents in Chile to Cuban revolutionary 
methods came from the young, in the parties of the Left, and parti-
cularly among students. Because university students in Chile, as 
elsewhere in Latin America, were a very small percentage of young 





M.D. Wolpin, 1The Trans-National Appeal of the Cuban 
Revolution: Chile, 1958-1970' in Caribbean Quarterly, 
March 1973, 11. This uncompromising spirit pervades 
Castro's speeches in the 1960 1s, see Fidel Castro Speaks. 
L.E. Aguilar, 'Fragmentation of the Marxist Left' in 
Problems of Communism, July-Aug 1970, 6. 
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looked up to by the uneducated for ideas and leadership 
and sought out by the older generation 0£ societal 
leaders as their heirs. In short, they are the 
achievers and they hold in their grasp the greatest 
chance £or power and position.40 
But even then, there was a lack 0£ correlation between positions 
0£ employment and demand £or them. Exacerbated by Chile's 
stagnating economy, this situation could be avoided only by the 
creation 0£ new administrative posts by the state. Halperin 
argues that the real issue in the nationalist struggle was the 
conquest 0£ the state in order to provide employment, which, 
together with a transparent need for social justice and the 
idealism of the young, produced guerrilla movements.41 
These movements express the despair of young members 
of the administrative class, radicalized and alienated 
from society by the deterioration of their prospects 
in countries of stagnating economy. In case 0£ 
success, the movements offer political power and a 
new role £or the administrative class: the 
administration 0£ profound and worthwhile social 
change instead of mere paper-pushing in a deteriorating 
welfare-bureaucracy.42 
The main Castroite group in Chile, the Movement 0£ the 
Revolutionary Left (MIR) emerged in 1966 from the University 
0£ Concepci6n, the most politically developed of the Chilean 
. ·t· 43 un1vers1 ies. Consciously fidelista, the MIR looked mainly 
to rural based guerrilla warfare, while seeking to radicalize the 
peasants. Prior to 1970, however, it mainly advertized itself 
40. B.G. Burnett, Political Groups in Chile, Austin 1970, 72-3. 
41. see E. Halperin, Terrorism in Latin America, Beverly Hills 
1976, 23-38. 
42. Ibid., 51-2. 
43. see Burnett, 71, 86. 
through guerrilla activities, also a means 0£ obtaining funds. 
The MIR was fundamentally opposed to the "so£t 11 policy of the 
Chilean Communist party, believing in the inevitability 0£ violent 
revolution and the need to reject an alliance with the national 
b .. 44 ourgeoisie. In its 1970 response to the Popular Unity victory, 
the movement quoted Saint Just of the French Revolution: "Whoever 
makes a revolution by half, only succeeds in digging his own 
grave." 45 
The Chilean Communist party, while attempting to tone down 
the violent/peaceful debate, reaffirmed the "peaceful road" in 
Chile until this proved closed • (Guevara in £act reached a 
. similar conclusion, an indication that armed revolution was not 
the primary question. 
Where a government has come into power through some form 
0£ popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least 
an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla 
outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibil~ies of 
peaceful struggle have not yet been exhausted.) 
Secretary-General Corval&n accepted the Cuban Revolution as an 
example, but not as a formula £or revolution in Chile.47 The 
Communists were more interested in Cuba's rapid transition to 
socialism after 1959, and also in the new sense of moral 
sensitivity and community spirit that Castro's regime had brought 
to CUba. 48 
44. see Movimiento di Izquierda Revolucionaria, 'The 
Implications of the Electoral Result for the Revolutionary 
Left' in R. Debray, Conversations with Allende, London 1971, 
163-190. 
45. Ibid., 182. 
46. Guevara, 16. 
47. Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, 68-9. 
48. Ibid., 74. 
Nevertheless, as the Chilean Communist party was the 
strongest orthodox party in Latin America and the most loyal to 
the Soviet Communist party outside the Soviet bloc, its relations 
with Havana inevitably paralleled the ambivalent relationship of 
Castro and Moscow. 
The more romantic, ideologically open, and nationalistic 
Socialist party in Chile was by its nature more attracted to the 
CUban Revolution. Gastro•s rejection, after the event, of the 
middle class allies, and his adoption of a line independent from 
the Soviet Union, appealed to the Socialists. Furthermore, they 
responded more enthusiastically to Castro's pragmatic Marxism and 
to his charismatic leadership than did the Communists. The Cuban 
Revolution gave the Socialists the chance to show that they were 
more revolutionary than the PC, their natural inclination being 
to compete with the Communists "from the left". 49 
The tangible effect of the CUban Revolution in Chile was that 
the Socialist party forced the Communist party to accept a radical-
ization of FRAP's programme in 1961. From a moderate 1958 platform, 
in which only the nationalization of the 1TT subsidiary, the Chilean 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, was called for, the Chilean Left 
demanded the expropriation of all major domestic and foreign-owned 
corporations in Chile, the abrogation of military assistance 
agreements with the United States, a "democratic" reorganisation 
of Chilean political institutions, rejection of US aid that came 
with conditions, and the restructuring of the OAS (Organisation of 
American States) to check its use as an instrument of American 
. 1· 50 foreign po icy. The more radical programme, by increasing the 
49. Ibid. , 141 • 
50. Ibid., 64; Wolpin, 24. 
50Q 
distance between the Left and the Centre parties, also temporarily 
put an end to Communist hopes for a broad multi-class coalition. 
Inasmuch as this programme contained the broad outline of the 
1970 Popular Unity programme, one can trace the latter back to 
the Cuban Revolution as catalyst. 11As an evocative symbol, Cuba 
weakened the fatalismo which had traditionally exerted a moderating 
£ 1 . . t' l' ' Ch.l 51 orce upon ega 1tar1an na iona ists in 1 e. 
The radicalization of FRAP represented the adoption by the 
traditional Left of a position closer to that of the New Left. 
The Castroite Left softened its attitude towards the traditional 
Marxist parties in the second half of the decade, when two 
developments emerged to check the initial confidence of the Cuban 
alternative: the continent-wide failure of Gastroite guerrilla 
movements, and Cuba's faltering economic performance. 
The years 1965-7 were marked by a string of defeats for 
guerrilla movements working to the Cuban formula, culminating in 
the death of Guevara in Bolivia. His death revealed the 
essentially fragmented nature of the revolutionary movement, 
tragically just after his own message to the Tricontinental 
Conference in Havana called for the international emergence of 
"two, three or many Vietnams". The reassessment which followed 
the failure of the armed revolutionaries found that the Castroite 
theory of revolution 
greatly simplified the actual events of 1959, reducing 
what was in fact a complex set of circumstances favouring 
eastro to a heroic single-minded triumph of peasant 
rebels fighting in the mountains of the Sierra Maestra.52 
51. Wolpin, 7. 
52. Aguilar, 'Fragmentation of the Marxist Left•, 7. 
In particular, the element of surpirse had been lost. Whereas 
Castro had £aced the demoralized army of Batista, the revolutionaries 
of the 1960 's faced troops who had learnt from the Cuban experience 
and were trained in counter-insurgency methods. Nor did the United 
States adopt a neutral stance, as it had with Castro. The Mexican 
novelist Carlos Fuentes observed that Cuba had made revolution in 
Latin America both more imperative and more difficult. 53 The 
Chilean Communist paper, El Siglo, evaluated Guevara's death thus: 
11All this con£irms that the guerrilla nucleus is not sufficient to 
trigger a revolution. 1154 
The economic shortcomings of the Cuban government were revealed 
in 1970 when the country failed to achieve the ten million ton sugar 
harvest personally pledged by Castro. In the Chilean presidential 
campaign 0£ 1970, the Right made political capital out of Castro's 
July 26 speech to the Cuban people, when he admitted to having made 
mistakes over the economy. Henceforth, the Cuban leaders were 
preoccupied with internal matters and a growing dependence upon the 
Soviet Union. The economic crisis signified the end of the romantic, 
spontaneous stage of the Cuban Revolution, although that spirit 
lingered on among partisans of the New Left. 55 
Thus, by the end of the 1960 1s, the traditional Left was in a 
position to reject the political challenge of the New Left, while 
5 3 • Martz , 191 • 
54. 13 July, 1968, quoted by Aguilar, 'Fragmentation of the 
Marxist Left', 8. 
55. J. Edwards, Persona Non Grata; 
London 1977, is a record by the 
in Havana of the change in mood 
1970. 
an envoy in Castro's Cuba, 
Chilean Charge d 'Af£aires 
of the Cuban Revolution in 
/'') 
),.~ fl,) 
they incorporated the change 0£ mood brought by the Cuban Revolution. 
In particular they adopted Castro's absolute position against the 
United States: the number one enemy against which to rally the 
heterogeneous forces of the Left. eut by retaining the political 
form of the traditional Left, of political parties integrated in 
the existing democratic system, the Chilean Left was as unsuited 
to such an absolutist ideology as the guerrilla movement was suited 
to it. This le£t doubt as to the political capability of the Left 
to fulfil its ideology should it come to power. 
described this paradoxical nature of the Left. 
Octavio Paz 
Not only is it divided into many factions, it is also -
more seriously and crucially - torn between the relative 
weakness of its forces and the geometric absoluteness of 
its programmes. It is as if we tried to drill rocks 
with a needle.56 
The Castroite challenge to the traditional Marxist parties 
for leadership of the Revolution came "from the left". Another 
challenge, interrelated but much closer at hand, came "from the 
right", that of the Christian Democratic party (PDC) representing 
the democratic reformist side of the 1960 9s dichotomy. Although 
basically a party of the Centre, there are several reasons why an 
appreciation of Christian Democracy in Chile is important to an 
understanding of the Left. Under the leadership of Eduardo Frei, 
in 1964 the Christian Democrats pre-empted the Marxist Left as 
proponents of major structural r~form in Chile. Some aspects of 
the F'rei government (1964-70) had a major influence on the Chilean 
Left immediately prior to its own period of government, and indeed 
the period of the Christian Democrat administration moulded 
56. o. Paz, •The Centurions of Santiago• in Dissent, Spring 
1974, 354. 
decisively the nature of the 1970 election which allowed the Left 
to gain office. Moreover, on two occasions, in 1969 and 1971, 
sectors of the POO defected to join the Left in coalition; these 
were generally the younger, more ideologically committed members 
of the party. 
As with the New Left challenge, that of the Christian Democrats 
was translated into ideological terms, due largely to the polarized 
intensity of political debate and to the strong feeling of 
ideological purity among the Christian Democrats in 1964. The POO 
presented a combination of Christian inspiration and technical 
professionalism, in order to attain an ideal "communitarian" society 
which would respond to both the individual and social aspects of 
man's nature. Eduardo Frei, one of Chile's leading intellectuals 
as well as a charismatic political leader, captured this combination 
in his writings: 
The foundations of a humanistic economy should be the result 
of an encounter between our philosophy and the scientific 
experience that emerges from the economy - the vivid 
comprehension of the reality in which we live and the will 
for presence by the Christian as a constructive element in 
the society to which he belongs •••• 57 
The predecessor of the PDC, the Falange Nacional, broke away 
from the traditional catholic party in Chile, the Conservative party, 
in the 1930's precisely over the question of the political implications 
of catholicism. Whereas for the Conservatives these were a paternal-
istic and hierarchical form of democracy based on an economic doctrine 
of classical liberal capitalism, the young Falangists saw the need for 
a pluralistic form of democracy, in which freedoms were guaranteed yet 
57. E. Frei, 'Christian Democracy in Theory and Practice• in 
P.E. Sigmund (ed.), The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, 
New York 1963, 318. 
where there was a degree of economic planning and intervention 
by the State. 
One source of justification for the humanistic nature 0£ 
the PDC•s Christian inspiration was papal social encyclicals 
which were critical of the excesses of both "liberal" capitalism 
and of 11collectivist 11 socialism. 58 Frei attacked both capitalism, 
which in its classical form dehumanized the economy, and communism, 
which had the same results but was statist and bureaucratic by 
nature. 59 In expounding a "third way", Frei saw that the state 
mu.st respect, and indeed encourage, intermediate organisms between 
the individual and the state, such as the family, city, region, 
. . . 60 trade union and business enterprise. The strengthening of these 
organisms would weaken the traditional paternalistic structure of 
society. 
Another source was the writings of the French Catholic 
philosopher, Jacques Maritain, who :saw democracy as the form of 
61 government most consistent with the Christian gospel. However, 
despite this pervading Christian inspiration and the fact that 
nearly all the party leaders were devout Catholics, the PDC 
stressed that it was a non-confessional party. 62 
58. P.E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, Pittsburgh 1977, 31. 
The papal encyclicals were Rerum Novarum 0£ Leo XIII ( 1891) 
and Quadragesimo Anno of Pius XI (1931). 
59. Frei, 'Christian Democracy•, 311-3. 
60. Ibid., 315. 
61. Sigmund, 32. 
62. E. Frei, 'Paternalism, Pluralism, and Christian Democratic 
Reform Movements in Latin America• in w.v. D'Antonio and 
F.B. Pike (eds.), Religion, Revolution, and Reform, 
London 1964, 37. 
Therefore, Christian Democracy lined up against the Marxist 
Left as a movement based on a completely different ideology, a 
difference emphasized by Frei. 
Clearly then, all the Catholics in Latin America are not in 
the Christian Democratic movement. Many good catholics 
think that there is another way. Perhaps the only thing 
r: r: 
,)),. 
we agree on is that this other way must be opposed to 
Communism. The challenge of Communism is not the challenge 
of any ordinary political party. It is the challenge of 
another civilization, another system of life, another 
interpretation of man. This is the reason why the 6 
political challenge in our country is a total challenge. 3 
The communitarian ideal was a corporate view of society, 11 in which 
capital and labour are no longer divorced and therefore do not come 
into conflict, no longer belong to different groups but are united 
64 in the same hands". The Christian Democrats thus rejected the 
notion of class struggle that was integral to a Marxist conception 
of society, Frei delcaring that he was President of all Chileans. 
The Chilean Marxists responded in kind. A leading Communist, 
Orlando Millas, wrote of Christian Democracy, 
a reformist movement 0£ a new type is taking place, a movement 
with a religious and theological tinge and designed to divert 
the Latin American revolution and frustrate it. The 
emergence of this movement is an indication of the deep-
seated revolutionary process now under way. But it is an 
indefinite movement and not very firm ••• In the sphere of 
ideological struggle the superiority 0£ Marxism-Leninism 
is obvious. It is equally obvious that in the £ace of an 
adversary who lays claim to a monopoly 0£ humanism and who 
has appropriated such fundamental Marxist watchwords as 
revolution, freedom and progress, the ideological struggle 
assumes first-rate importance.65 
63. Frei, in D9Antonio and Pike (eds.), 118-9. 
64. Frei, quoted by Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, 
196. 
65. o. Millas, 'New Trends in Catholicism and the Policy of the 
Chilean Communists• in world Marxist Review, March 1964, 28. 
Thus the strongly ideological nature of the PDC forced the Marxist 
Left to define itself more rigorously. 
But the need 0£ the two groups to underscore their ideological 
differences was itself an indication that they were challenging each 
other £or much the same political ground. In response to the same 
forces that encouraged FRAP to radicalize its programme, the 
Christian Democrat programme saw a similar radicalization between 
1961 and 1964, culminating in the April 1964 commitment to a 
"Revolution in Liberty", promising major structural reforms, but 
without the social cost that the class-polarizing Left would incur. 
The PDC were presenting a democratic reformist alternative £or the 
political, economic and social development 0£ Chile. Self-consciously, 
deriving largely from the intellectual capabilities of many of the 
POC leaders, and especially Frei•s active commitment to concepts like 
Latin American integration, Chilean Christian Democracy showed its 
desire to have a wider continental significance as well .. 
In this, the Christian Democrats presented a modern technical 
professionalism, in particular influenced by the economic theorists 
associated with the United Nations Economic Commission £or Latin 
America ( ECI.A). 66 The intellectual mentor of this whole generation 
of Latin American economists was the Argentinian, Dr Rati.l Prebisch, 
who emerged in the late 1940•s and early 1950's as the chief framer 
0£ the ideology of development planning. ECI.A, based in Santiago, 
stressed the adverse effect on Latin American countries of the long 
term decline in world market prices £or primary products in relation 
to manufactured goods, the need £or structural reform in agriculture 
66. Sigmund, 32. 
to make it more productive, and the necessity of Latin American 
integration to achieve economic efficiency and regional unity in 
the face of the overwhelming economic power of the United States. 
The technically oriented, interventionist programme to remedy 
economic defects attracted the dynamic professional and technician 
groups to the party. 67 
Frei•s election in 1964 and his subsequent government showed 
an inter-American approach to development, an approach which encouraged 
and gave focus to the anti-Americanism of. the Chilean Left. The 
challenge of the Cuban Revolution reformulated American policy towards 
the whole of Latin America. The response was the Alliance for 
Progress launched by President Kennedy in 1961. Having failed to 
overthrow Castro, and having unintentionally helped him on his way 
to Communism in the process, the United States became concerned to 
avoid "a second Cuba" in the hemisphere. There was a general 
similarity of objectives between the Alliance and Chilean Christian 
Democracy: the promotion of structural reform and economic development, 
through peaceful democratic processes and with the injection of U.S. 
capital. ECLA doctrines were a common source of inspiration. Frei 
chose to emphasize the positive motivation behind the Alliance, the 
response to the needs of the Latin American people. 
The Latin American origins of the Alliance for Progress were 
especially evident in the non-Marxist political parties which 
had no links with the national oligarchies and were strongly 
opposed to the traditional Latin American Right. 68 
He maintained that, 
In fact, the Alliance was essentially a Latin American 
conception which became reality because it was accepted 
67. Gil, 271-2. 
68. E. Frei, 'The Alliance That Lost Its Way' in Foreign Affairs, 
April 1967, 437. 
by the United States and specially by President Kennedy, 
who understood it and injected new life into it.69 
This underscores a feeling of identity between Frei and Kennedy: 
a common Catholic influence and sense of mission, the technical 
approach to economic and social problems, anti-Communign, and a 
charismatic image of youth, vigour, intelligence and optimism. 
Thus, Chile under a Frei administration was suitable to become 
the model £or the inter-American approach to development. Under 
the Alliance, Frei•s government received more U.S. aid per capita 
than any other Latin American country, and in absolute terms came 
second only to Brazil. "The •openness• of the Chilean political 
system to these North American inputs and others directed at 
political and opinion leaders played a significant role in preventing 
the emergence of more support £or the Cuban Revolution. 1170 
The press response to Frei's election clearly revealed the 
alignments and conflicts that were ope-ll'ating. The New York Times 
editorialized, "The victory is a great relief to every important 
capital in the Western Hemisphere from Washington to Buenos Aires. 
Only Havana will £ail to rejoice in it.,/1 Indeed, Havana did 
not rejoice, calling the election, 11A Victory £or Fear, Money, 
. . ,72 Lies, and Foreign Pressure.• In Chile, the conservative 






the confrontation between free democracy and a Marxist 
yoke ••• the hemisphere was under the threat of an alien 
Ibid., 441. 
Wolpin, 14. 
R.R. Fagen and w,.A .. Cornelius, Jr. (eds.), Political Power 
in Latin America, Englewood Cliffs 1970, 33. 
Ibid., 34. 
extremist penetration which had its bridgehead in Fidel 
Gastro•s Cuba. Chile, in the vanguard of democratic 73 
rebirth, became the country most menaced by these dangers. 
The unanimously recognized failure of the Alliance £or Progress 
and the coincidental decline in the fortunes of the Christian Democrats 
by 1967, (following the typical boom-and-bust pattern of Chilean 
presidencies), gave further credence to the belief that U.S. involve-
ment in Chile, far from being beneficial, in £act denied Chile her 
full sovereignty and hindered her economic development. Edward 
Korry, U.S. ambassador to Chile at the end of the 1960 1s, described 
the process of American entanglement in Chilean affairs. 
I had been appalled by what I found in Chile in 1967. The 
United States had bound itself publicly to the Frei govern-
ment. It had become enmeshed in the political affairs of 
Chile - shockingly so. Dungan (Korry's predecessor, a 
former Kennedy aid~ was described in Washington and 
Santiago as •a member of the Frei cabinet• ••• The United 
States had taken responsibility £or every facet of Chilean 
life - agriculture, education, health, finance, production, 
savings and loans, police, and military.74 
The general view of the Chilean Left was that Frei had been the 
stooge, either consciously or unconsciously, of American imperialism. 
Neruda's summation of him was typical. 11He is a strange, highly 
premeditative man ••• a troubled, serious £ace, very intent on the 
needle and thread with which he is sewing together his political 
life. 1175 
Frei himself appeared to realise the fatal marriage he had 
made with the United States. The title of his 1967 article, "The 
73. Ibid., 31. 
74. E. Korry, 'The Sell-Out of Chile and the American Taxpayer• 
in Penthouse, March 1978, 74. 
75. Neruda, 344. 
Alliance That Lost Its Way", indicated a liberal view: initial 
American intentions were benevolent, but unfortunate actions occurred 
later. Yet in 1971 he wrote, 
The United States has always looked upon us as its back 
yard. The Monroe Doctrine, the Big Stick, the Good 
Neighbour policies and the Alliance £or Progress have 
succeeded each other as political expedients.76 
Frei had allied himself to forces which valued stability over 
democracy and reformism; the choices he had made early on had 
turned around to frustrate him. 77 But in the process he had 
raised expectations among Chileans which had not been satisfied. 
The Right felt he had moved too fast, the Left that he had not gone 
far enough: a drift towards polarization began. 
Among those dissatisfied 1\11.i.th Frei were the leftists of his 
own party, who wanted to radicalize government measures to pursue 
the communitarian ideal immediately. 
·t . . . ' 1 · t t 78 commun1 ar1an1sm 1n socia is erms. 
Moreover, they began to define 
The distance between them 
and the moderates, intensely loyal to Frei, widened when, due to 
economic pressures, Frei put the break on his "Revolution in Liberty". 
76. E. Frei, 'The Second Latin American Revolution• in Foreign 
Affairs, Oct 1971, 95. · 
77. A.L. Michaels, 'The Alliance For Progress and Chile's 
"Revolution in Liberty", 1964-1970' in Journal of Inter-
American Studies and world Affairs, Feb 1976, 87. 
78. see Silva and Chonchol, 'Development without Capitalism: toward 
a communitarian world' in P.E. Sigmund (ea.), Models of 
Political Change in Latin America, New York 1970, 310-12. 
'The Chonchol Plan• in A. von Lazar and R.R. Kaufman (eds.), 
Reform and Revolution, Boston 1969, 59-70, commissioned by the 
PDC, developed a "non-capitalist way of development". For 
the position of the moderates, see w. Thayer, •Communitarianism 
and Christian Democracy' in Sigmund (ed.), Models of Political 
Change, 312-5. 
He maintained the importance 0£ economic growth as a prerequisite 
to social justice. The interpretation of massacres of miners at 
El Salvador and peasants at Puerto Montt by soldiers as a sign of 
growing governmental repression led to the defection of the leftist 
groups, known as the rebeldes, from the PDC in 1969. 
Having been politically defeated, and having had much of their 
ideological ground cut away from underneath them, the Marxist Left 
in 1964 could do little except wait and hope that Frei failed to 
fulfil his promises. Frei•s "Revolution in Liberty" had promised 
revolutionary change with a minimum of social conflict, relying on 
his Christian ideology to inspire Chileans to work for the national 
interest. If he succeeded, and the Left were not involved, they 
would become politically redundant. Therefore, 
for the Leftist opposition ••• an at least superficial 
participation in the process of reform management is a 
manner of maintaining contact with grass root sentiments 
while upkeeping a revolutionary image with a minimum 
degree of responsibility.79 
The Communist party chose to support Frei•s policies which were 
similar to its own in essence, which in practice was only its agrarian 
80 
reform. Otherwise they chose opposition, as over Frei•s 
11Chileanization" of copper. The Socialist party, having similar 
problems of internal unity as the PDC, refused to collaborate with 
the Christian Democrats at all, in line with its ideological 
repudiation of middle-class groups. The political decline of the 
Frei government in its last few years saw the Left's opposition in 
Congress increase. 
79. A. von Lazar and L. Quiros Varela, 'Chilean Christian 
Democracy' in Inter-American Economic Affairs, Spring 
1968, 54. 
80. Millas, 28. 
But in two ways the Left's opposition might rebound to 
its disadvantage if it gained office. First , the Left was in 
danger of over-committing itself to ideological positions that 
it would find difficult to fulfil. Second, it might find 
itself £aced, when in government, with an equally strong and 
obstructive opposition in Congress. 
By the end of the 1960 1s the "traditional" Left had 
reasserted itself, partly because of the political decline 
of its challengers, partly as a result of the mobilizing 
in£luence of these challenges. Thus, the Chilean Left in 
1970 was no longer "traditional", but a curious amalgam that 
had evolved from Chile's historical traditions and from the 
boiling cauldron of the 1960•s. 
CHAPTER III 
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE CHILEAN LEFT 
A characteristic of Chilean political behaviour before 
September 1973 was the importance of ideology as an integral 
element in the intensely competitive multi-party system. Eduardo 
Frei, a leading Chilean intellectual as well as the foremost 
political figure of the 196O's, wrote, 
Politics do not evolve only on a pragmatic plane. 
People also view politics from a broader philosophical 
base... The achievement of power no longer means for 
us, as it does for the people of the United States, 
simply slight variations in political structures, but 
rather a change in the entire social structure, requiring 
new orientations for family, education, state, and man.1 
By 1964 the vast majority of Chileans had accepted that socio-economic 
reforms were necessary if Chile was to develop. Yet there were deep 
differences over the interpretation of methods, style and content. 
Among the Left itself, far-reaching political implications could be 
drawn from ideological differences. Ideology served as both a 
unifying and a divisive element in the seemingly constant flux of 
disintegration and reformation of political parties. 
The ideological dimension also reflected pragmatic political 
considerations. Both inter-party conflict on the national level and 
intra-party conflict in the form of factionalism were frequently 
played out in terms of the interpretation of socio-economic reform. 2 
1. E. Frei, •Paternalism, Pluralism, and Christian Democratic 
Reform Movements in Latin America' in w.v. D'Antonio and 
F.B. Pike (eds.), Religion, Revolution, and Reform, London 
1964, 36-7. 
2. A. von Lazar and L. Quiros Varela, 'Chilean Christian Democracy' 
in Inter-American Economic Affairs, Spring 1968, 53. 
The interplay of political forces, or the unanticipated effects 
of political actions and events, were often interpreted from 
purely ideological perspectives. 
The ideology of the Chilean Left evolved from the inter-
pretation of the "objective conditions" existing in Chile, and was 
a meshing together of economic, political, and cultural perceptions. 
The following discussion is based on an impressionistic study of 
Chilean writings. My concern is with the wider currents of thought 
expressed, while recognising that there are as many degrees of 
variation as there are writers. 3 
The roots of the Left's concern lay in the great disparity 
between the country's natural potential and its actual socio-economic 
condition. Chile had numerous and diverse natural resources: 
minerals in the north, Mediterranean-like agricultural land in the 
central valley, forests and grazing land in the south, sea resources 
with the extension of the sea-limit to 200 miles, and energy with 
oil reserves and abundant hydroelectric power from the fast-falling 
rivers in the Andes. With a relatively low population Chile 
appeared to have the prerequisites for an integrated, diversified 
economy. 
Yet the economy had never 11taken,off 11 as a whole, and seemed 
caught in a state of partial development. Between 1960-67, Chile's 
total domestic product grew at an average annual rate of 4.5 per 
cent, compared with an average Latin American rate of 5.2 per cent. 
3. Although Chilean writers have often discussed Latin America 
as a whole, I am concerned with the special Chilean relevance 
of their writing. 
Its per capita domestic product growth of 2 per cent compared with 
4 a Latin American average of 2.2 per cent. Therefore, even in 
the context of Latin America, Chile's economic performance was 
disappointing. A feature of this stagnation was a voracious 
inflation which engulfed the real value of wages and government 
development programmes alike, resisting the efforts of successive 
governments to check it. 
The French economist Samir Amin described three features 
of an economy by which "underdevelopment" was revealed, all of 
which existed in the Chilean economy in the 1960's. "These are 
(1) unevenness of productivity as between sectors, (2) disarticulation 
of the economic system, and (3) domination from outside. 115 
There were large disparities in labour productivity both 
between and within the sectors of the Chilean economy. The sectors 
of expanding productivity in the post-war period - mining, manufact-
uring and construction - were those where employment had not increased, 
because they were technology and capital intensive. Labour was 
absorbed into the services sector, whose percentage of the gross 
national product had decreased, illustrating the incapacity of the 
. . 6 
system to provide productive work. 
Agriculture, the poorest sector in the economy, also showed 
a decreasing level of productivity, unable either to produce sufficient 
food for the Chilean population or to provide even the official 
4. ECIA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1969, New York 1971, 
5, table 1. 
5. s. Amin, Accumulation on a World Scale, I, New York 1974, 15. 
6. sees. de Vylder, Allende's Chile, Cambridge 1976, 11, 
table 1.2. 
66,, 
minimum wage for most of its workers. 
Unionized/non-unionized, modern/traditional, and urban/rural 
dichotomies in labour productivity had important political as well 
as economic implications. The extreme heterogeneity in productivity 
and income dispelled, for example, the notion of a homogeneous 
working class. It meant also that some workers were included in 
and some excluded from the political system. 
Amin's "disarticulation" of the economic system was 
characterized by a 
lack of communication between the different sectors of the 
underdeveloped economy ••• An advanced economy forms a 
coherent whole, made up of sectors that carry out substantial 
exchanges between themselves ••• Thus, these sectors appear 
complementary. An underdeveloped economy is, however, made 
up of sectors that carry out only marginal exchanges among 
themselves, their exchanges being made essentially with the 
outside world. Some of these sectors are made up of a few 
large-scale enterprises - often foreign, and dependent on 
great international businesses - the governing centres of 
which are outside the underdeveloped economy. ·1 
The extreme unevenness of income distribution in Chile best 
illustrates this 11disarticulation": in 1968, 3 .. 2 per cent of the 
remunerated population received 42 per cent of the national income, 
while 47 per cent of the population received 12 per cent, or less 
than the officially established subsistence wage ( sueldo vital). 8 
Therefore, the development of any one sector had not had a mobilizing 
effect on the other sectors; the expected "trickle-down" effect had 
not occurred in income distribution. 
7. Amin, 16. 
8. G. Martner, 'The Economic Aspects of Allende's Government' 
in K. Medhurst (ed.), Allende's Chile, London 1972, 138. 
Time after time certain sectors have experienced 
temporary 'booms', usually generated by foreign demand 
and affecting mineral exports (gold. and silver during 
colonial times, nitrates between 1880 and 1930, copper 
in the 1950s and 1960s). These booms have largely 
failed to bene£it the economy as a whole, however, and 
once having come to an end they have left stagnation 
and misery behind.9 
Thus, Chileans believed that there was not a lack of economic surplus, 
but that it was used unproductively or exported. 
Other forms of economic concentration and monopoly existed. 
In industry, the large corporation was predominant. In 1966, of 
1,712 nonfinancial corporations in Chile, the 182 largest controlled 
78 per cent of the net capital assets, the top 25 controlled one half, 
10 the top 5 controlled one quarter. In banking, in 1969, 0.4 per 
cent of borrowers took 25 per cent of all bank credit, while 28 per 
11 cent had access to 2.6 per cent. In agriculture, a 1966 study 
revealed that 2 per cent of Chilean landowners held 65 per cent of 
the land, and 78 per cent of the irrigated land, while at the other 
end of the scale, 37 per cent of landowners held 1 per cent of the 
12 
land. 
Among the top corporations there existed family and other 
affiliations, forming a group of clans with wide-ranging interests. 
Prominent among these were the Edwards family, whose interests 
included the Banco Edwards and El Mercurio, the Yarur family, the 
Matte/Alessandri group, and the Banco Hipotecario group, knovm as 
9. De Vylder, 10. 
10. M. Zeitlin and R. Ratcliff, 'The Concentration of National 
and Foreign Capital in Chile, 1966' in A. and J .s. Valenzuela 
(eds.), Chile: Politics and Society, New Brunswick 1976, 301. 
11. Martner in Medhurst (ed.), 137-8. 
12. quoted by P.E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, Pittsburgh 
1977, 20. 
l . ,..., 13 t 1e P1.ranas. 
Chile also suffered from geographical and geological 
"disarticulation.11 • The "shoestring republic" was made up of 
three separate countries: the northern deserts, the central 
valley, and the south of forests, fiords and rain. Economic 
activity and population was concentrated in the central provinces 
of Valparaiso, Aconagua, O'Higgins, and Santiago, while the 
shantytowns (callampas) encircling the major cities were evidence 
of a rural - urban drift. Above all, the capital Santiago was a 
world apart from the rest of the country: with over one third of 
the population, the political, bureaucratic and financial centre, 
and the mechanism through which economic surplus was channelled. 
The country also experienced frequent earthquakes, which had a 
14 major impact on government economic programmes. But the 
inability of the Chilean economy to ride over natural disasters 
underlined its precariousness. 
Domination of the economy from outside took a variety of 
forms which, if their theoretical significance or relation to the 
whole economy could be debated, undoubtedly added up to represent 
an important foreign dependence. Foreign capital was entrenched 
in many sectors, traditionally and most visibly in the economically 
15 strategic mining sector. Most mineral resources, comprising 89 
13. sees. del Campo et al., 'The Clans of Chile' in 
D.L. Johnson (ed.), The Chilean Road to Socialism, 
Garden City 1973, 395-409. 
14. e.g., large earthquakes in May 1960 forced the Alessandri 
government into greater spending, upsetting its monetary 
stabilization programme and setting off high inflation again. 
15. for details of the major foreign investment in Chile in 1970, 
see Nacla, New Chile, New York 1973, 149-167. 
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per cent of Chile's exports in 1970, of which copper accounted for 
78.5 per cent, were directly controlled by foreign interests. The 
11decapitalization" of Chile, where capital outflow exceeded investment, 
was most apparent in the case of the copper Gran Hineria (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Investments and Profits of the American copper 
companies (in $U.s.)16 








Investments in Chile 
199,030,000 
145,877 ,ooo 









From an original investment of $3.5 million in the copper industry, the 
Chilean Copper Corporation (CODEWO) argued that the foreign companies 
had taken out several billion American dollars over five decades. 
The investment of local profits meant that the companies did not need 
to invest further foreign capital. 17 
In the manufacturing and commerce sec to rs foreign investment, 
while less in quantitative terms, was increasing and strategically 
d . t . b t d . tl f t t . · d · t ' 1 S 1s r1 u e 1n 1e ·as -es growing 1n U.<:ci ries. 
Another feature of this foreign presence was a degree of 
16. CODEWO in New York Times, 25 Jan., 1971, 72. 
17. see ibid.; Nacla, 82-117. 
1~. see de Vylder, 14. 
concentration comparable to that in the whole Chilean economy. 
The 43 largest foreign-owned corporations represented only 2.5 per 
cent of all nonfinancial corporations in Chile but controlled 38 per 
cent of their combined assets. American firms held 87 per cent of 
all foreign investment in Chile, with British firms holding another 
10 per cent. The American investment was dominated by the subsid-
iaries of just four companies: ITT, American and Foreign Power, 
19 Kennecott, and Anaconda. There were numerous links between the 
major Chilean and foreign interests: for example, the Yarur family 
with W.R. Grace, the Edwards family with the Roclcefellers and other 
\ . 20 1 merican groups. 
Foreign loans and aid created new forms of dependence. By 
1970 the Chilean public sector had accumulated a foreign debt of 
over three billion dollars, absorbing a large amount of Chile's 
export earnings in interest and repayment. The very servicing of 
this debt required new foreign loans, creating a vicious circle. 
It is this aspect - the overbearing and implacable 
necessity to obtain foreign financing - which finally 
sums up the situation of dependence; this is the 
crucial point in the mechanism of dependence. 21 
Non-capital variants of economic dependence were the necessity 
to import capital equipment and modern technology. The structure of 
Chile's imports had changed from consumer to essential goods, a reliance 
on which compounded the vulnerability of Chile's balance-of-payments. 
19. see Zeitlin and Ratcliff in Valenzuela (eds.), 303-5. 
20. see R. Ratcliff, 'The Ties that Bind - Chilean Industrialists 
and Foreign Corporations• in Nacla, 79-81. 
21. o. Sunkel, 'National Development Policy and External Dependence 
in Latin America• in Journal of Development studies, Oct. 1969, 
31 • 
Having been a producer of capital equipment in the 
nineteenth century, Chile now has to import 90 per 
cent of its investment in plant and equipment. 
Provided by nature with ample coal, petroleum and 
hydraulic resources, Chile nevertheless has to import 
fuels. Having been a major exporter of wheat and 
livestock products, Chile is now highly dependent on 
food imports from the metropolis. 22 
Thus,the hypothetical Chilean Revolution concerned the 
economic, social and political development of the country. On 
the political level it was a question of leadership. On the 
ideological level, the Revolution was a search £or national 
identity: the definition of development in terms of human images. 
The quest £or identity pervaded political, intellectual and 
creative writing in Chile, reflected in Eduardo Frei's remark that 
23 Latin America was like a character in search of an author. 
Creative artists expressed a strong New World feeling. Jean 
Franco notes that Chilean writers have been "among those most absorbed 
with the virgin nature of America.n24 Gabriela Mistral and Pablo 
Neruda, Chile's two Nobel prize-winning poets, both wrote of the 
country's primitive and untamed landscapes with the harsh, abundant 
voices of the American consciousness. Neruda said, 
there are in our countries rivers which have no names, 
trees which nobody knows, and birds which nobody has 
described. It is easier for us to be surrealistic 
because everything we know is new ••• Everything has been 
painted in Europe, everything has been sung in Europe. 
But not in America. 25 
22. A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin Ar~~, 
New York 1969, 102. 
23. E. Frei, 'The Second Latin American Revolution' in Foreign 
Affairs, Oct. 1971, 87. 
24. J. Franco, The Modern Culture 0£ Latin America, Middlesex 
1970, 291. 
25. P. Neruda and c. Vallejo, Selected Poems, edited by R. Dly, 
Boston 1971, 156-7. 
A strong visionary element pervaded Chilean literature. 
Chile had £ound a literary imagination; there remained 
political creativity. The Chilean Left sought its political 
thought from two currents: nationalism and socialism. 
Nationalism in Chile was not the reaffirmation of an already 
existing national identity, as it was in Europe. Apart from the 
traditional Right, searching for its roots in a Hispanic and Catholic 
past, nationalism was a psychological, emotional attitude born out of 
the lack of such an identity and the process of defining one, and 
hence associated with the progressive elements in Chilean society. 
These included the Centre as well as the Left, so that nationalism 
was not confined to the Left alone. 
The frustration resulting £rem economic stagnation focused 
on the theme of Chile•s Second Independence. 
Liberation in the early nineteenth century, 
In the Wars of 
Latin America gained only political independence and 
national sovereignty, and was thwarted in its desire 
to create a way of life £or its people that they could 
truly call their o~m ••• Independence was never a form 
of separation, which retained the same old agrarian and 
economic structures... It would seem that the area was 
denied the gift of political creativity.26 
The radical leftist Carlos Altamirano wrote of, "our full national 
27 sovereignty, that had been snatched away from us". 
Allende, of the moderate Left, 
For Salvador 
We speak of a Second Independence. The first was when 
we defeated colonialism and achieved political independence. 
Now we are struggling for our economic independence which 
26. Frei, 'The Second Latin American Revolution•, 86-7. 
27. see Altamirano, •critical Reflections on the Chilean 
Revolutionary Process• in socialist Thought and Practice, 
18, Sept. 1974, 81. 
will lead to full political independence, something 
which developing countries unfortunately do not enjoy. 28 
These statements reiterate certain assumptions. The 
essential conflict was seen in terms of dependence and independence, 
which were mutually exclusive. Chile had been deprived of true 
independence by outside forces, which resulted in a preoccupation 
with external participants in Chilean affairs. Furthermore, this 
sense of denial was characteristic of Latin America and of developing 
countries generally, creating a continental or global dimension in 
,1hich the basic conflict was seen in larger than merely national 
terms. Political and economic factors were seen to be inseparable. 
Finally, there was the belief that national identity flowed from, 
and demanded as a prerequisite, real independence. 
The main concern that these men expressed was economic 
nationalism. The Great Depression had impressed upon the Centre 
and Left the effects of foreign domination o.f the economy and the 
need to gain greater control over their country's economic resources. 
Economic nationalism introduced three ideas. The first was aimed at 
the integration of the economic enclaves that foreign companies had 
established, especially in the mining sector, into the national 
economy. Second was a deliberate process of i11~a1ization, known 
as "import substitution". Both of these aims required the third, 
that of state-directed development, the practical basis of which was 
laid with the creation by the Popular Front government in 1938 of 
CORFO ( Corporacion de Fomento) , which began to invest in the economy 
~~8. s. Allende, 'The Chilean Road to Socialism' in 
J .A. Za.rnmit (ed.), The Chilean Road ta.. Socialism, 
Sussex 1973, 19. 
and undertake economic planning. 
But continued high inflation and insufficient growth 
convinced Chileans of the failure of orthodox economic policies 
and the need for more fundamental or systemic changes. Robert 
Ayres noted that, 
Chileans have responded more to the absolute as opposed 
to the comparative or relative nature of their economic 
and social condition. What appears increasingly salient 
is Chilean awareness of the untenable nature of the 
country's economic and social development in absolute 
terms, regardless, for example, of the fact that Chile 
might rate higher than Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, or 
Peru on almost all measures of such development. 29 
In 1958, economist Jorge Ahumada viewed the Chilean condition in 
terms recalling Samir Amin•s "disarticulation11 : 11The crisis is 
total, and it llas its origins in the lack of harmony of the dis-
jointed institutions, activities, and values of the nation11 • 30 
This altered awareness provoked structuralism, which emerged 
in the 1950 1s, arguing the need to change basic economic relation-
ships. The structuralists sought to break up the various forms 
of monopolistic control of economic resources: foremost the 
agrarian latifundia system, both inefficient and intrinsically 
unjust, but also the concentration of corporations, banking, and 
. 31 The approach was mainly inward-looking, concerned with income. 
internal economic relationships. It stressed that structural 




R.L. Ayres, 'Economic Stagnation and the Emergence of the 
Political Ideology of Chilean Underdevelopment' in 
World Politics, Oct. 1972, 39 n. Ayres emphasizes the 
admixture of the economic and the political in this ideology. 
quoted by E. Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, 
Cambridge 1965, 186. 
see Ay-res, 39-44. 
pJ.anning but by a broadened concept of the state. 
Whatever the political shape that the new development 
model may take, it would appear indisputable that the 
state will have to assume the leading role in it ••• 
Politics aimed at bringing about these fundamental 
transformations will affect private interests and will 
demand new patterns of behaviour which are compatible 
with accelerated development. This will not be achieved 
simply by economic planning but will require a whole new 
philosophy of the functions of the state, and a thorough 
reorganization of the ways and means of government action.32 
Thus, this post-war generation of economists also made an important 
humanistic contribution to development theory by viewing economic 
phenomena as part of a larger and evolving cultural whole. The 
structuralists accused the American Klein-Saks mission, which_ 
advised Ib~ez on economic policy in the mid-1930's, of failing 
to consider the human implications of tough stabilization measures 
and of offering only monetary palliatives rather than dealing with 
the structural causes of inflation. Similar criticisms were made 
with regard to the policy of the international monetary agencies 
33 of tying economic aid to domestic stabilization measures. 
Structuralist theorists, whose mentor was the Argentinian 
director of ECIA., Dr Ra~l Prebisch, included Chilean economists 
Anibal Pinto, Osvaldo Sunkel and Felipe Herrera. Through their 
leading positions in such organizations as ECLA, CEPAL, ILPES and 
the Inter-American Development Bank, they gave structuralism both 
influence at governrfient level and intellectual respectability. 
Both the Christian Democrat· and Popular Unity governments were 
32. o. Sun1<el, •Change and Frustration in Chile• inc. Veliz 
(ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America, London 1965, 
143-4. 
33. F.B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962, Indiana 
1963, 268, 275, 428-9 n. Pike had made an exhaustive 
study of Chilean writing up to 1962. 
in£luenced by the structuralists, in ideology and through the 
employment of persons associated with these organizations. 
'1'7. 
The other face of economic nationalism was anti-imperalism, 
which in reality was virtually synonomous with anti-Americanism. 
Anti-imperialism remained mostly the preserve of the Left: the 
need to liberate Chile from foreign dominance had been a theme 
of the Left since the days of Recabar~en. The Left concentrated 
on the inter-relationship between foreign interests and the local 
ruling elite groups, who combined to exploit both the natural 
resources and the workers of Chile. Gil wrote in 1966, 
The specific Communist position is that at present Chile 
is ruled by a native oligarchy allied to United states 
imperialism but that the country is now approaching a 
people's democratic revolution against these two enemies. 
The central task of the party is stated in consequence to 34 
be the formulation of a united front of all popular forces. 
Allende said to Regis Debray, "We 'Socialists have proclaimed that 
imperialism is our number one enemy, and therefore we gave and still 
. f' t . 't . 1 1 · b · " 35 give irs priori y to nationa i eration. The Left placed 
itself in the tradition o.f President Jos~ Manuel Balmaceda 
(1886-91), who attempted to recover Chile's nitrate resources from 
British control and was defeated in the civil war of 1891. The 
Left interpreted Balmaceda as a visionary who committed suicide 
in solitude, having been defeated by the foreign companies and the 
. 1 · 36 Clulean o igarchy. 
34. F.G. Gil, The Political System of Chile, Boston 1986, 279. 
35. R. Debray, The Chilean Revolution, New York 1971, 69-70. 
36. see S. Allende, Chile's Road to Socialism, Middlesex 1973, 
14, 56; P. Neruda, Memoirs, Middlesex 1978, 348-9. 
The dominance of foreign capital was a symbol of national 
decadence. 
. / 
Julio Cesar Jobet, a noted Chilean economist with 
Marxist leanings, believed that Chilean underdevelopment, the 
result of her colonial ties with the industrialized nations, 
had provoked a disintegration of the existing national conscious-
ness. "Economic and social backwardness has brought on great 
moral decadence.1137 The leftist Christian Democrat Radomiro 
Tomic wrote, 
National capitalism began to develop on the basis 0£ 
exploitation of the working class, creating social 
tensions previously unknown in Chilean society. 
Foreign capital took over control of nitrates, then 
of copper and Chilean foreign trade. The economic 
customs revenues from nitrate and copper provided the 
ruling classes with such an easy life that the old 
austere, pioneering and enterprising spirit of the 
previous generation disappeared.38 
The anti-imperialism of the Left was supported by the 
theory of economic dependence formulated by Prebisch. He 
observed that the notion of comparative advantage, an integral 
justification of economic liberalism, was simply not working in 
Latin America. The gap between the value of primary exports and 
industrial imports was increasing in favour of the developed 
industrial nations. His solutions were: first, the implement-
ation of structuralist policies; second, increased import 
substitution; third, Latin American integration. The latter 
would provide for increased bargaining power in the face of the 
overwhelming economic dominance of the United States, as well as 
37. J.C. Jobet, •consequences of Imperialist Penetration in 
Chile t in L .E. Aguilar (ed.), Marxism in La tin America, 
New York 1968, 154 • 
38. R. Tomic, 10ne View of Chile's Present Political and 
Economic Situation• in Zammit (ed.), 32. 
'79,, 
creating broad markets as a prerequisite for industrialization. 39 
Prebisch's conclusion was that the historical processes 
which allowed the Western industrial nations to achieve economic 
development were not operating in the same way for the under-
developed nations. Chilean economist Osvaldo Sunkel described 
the paradox that the Chilean economy had experienced both 
stagnation and change in the post-war period, and the resulting 
frustration: 
••• very rapid and intense change has taken place, but 
this has not produced certain expected social consequences, 
such as have resulted from the process of economic develop-
ment in what are now advanced, industrialized countries.40 
This awareness undermined Pan-Americanism, the existing 
basis of inter-American relations, by rejecting its central 
assumption, a commonality of interests between the United States 
and Latin America. The Left believed that any such commonality 
had been imposed on them by 11 the monster of the North11 • 41 The 
overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs fiasco 
in 1961, and the invasion of the Dominican Republic by U .s. marines 
in 1965 all lent credence to the belief that Pan-Americanism was a 




Pan-Americanism was also rejected on a cultural plane. 
see F. Herrera, •Economic Integration and Political 
Reintegratiod in M. Adams (ed.), Latin America: Evolution 
or Explosion, New York 1963, 92-104; for a Chilean argument 
in favour of Latin American integration. 
Sunkel, •Change and Frustration in Chile', 116. 
the phrase by which the Cuban nationalist Jos~ Marti described 
the United States; see also Ruben Dario's famous 'Ode to 
Roosevelt' describing the fundamental contradiction between 
America's "manifest destiny" and Latin American interests. 
To the Chilean Left, economic dependence resulted in cultural 
"denationalization": the absorption of local cultures into 
the American Way of Li£e. 
'The Defeat t : 
The poet Enrique Lihn wrote in 
To be chosen by a chosen people 
is not a task that can be accomplished exclusively 
on the level of human forces. 
Absolute correctness in the addition of myths, such is 
the way of truth, the American way, 
crossed by the Divines and the Saints 
and those who sewed with their bones the time 
of the limitless drama of expansion.42 
The theme of cultural dependence lay behind the association of 
indigenous art movements with leftist political orientations. 
The New Chilean Song Movement, which emerged in the 1960 9s and 
included Isabel Parra, Victor Jara, and the groups Inti-illimani 
and Quilapayun, fused social themes with native folk music. The 
new wave cinema, which gained impetus with the election of Allende, 
was explicitly revolutionary, recreating and re-interpreting Chile's 
pas-t in a series of committed, passionate and lyrical films. Atf. 
example was Miguel Littin's 'The Promised Land' (1973), based 
historically on a peasant revolt at the time of the 1932 Socialist 
Republic, but seeking to deepen the contemporary socialist trans-
formation by showing how ordinary men became revolutionaries. 
Creative writers expressed the same theme of debasement. 
Chile ts foremost novelist, Jos~ Donoso, portrayed in novels such 
as Coronation (1957) and The Obscene Bird of Night (1969) an aging 
decadent upper class whose sterility of values contrasted with the 
vigour of the lower classes. Neruda concluded in his poem 'They 
42. E. Lilm, 'The Defeat' in E. Rodriquez Monegal (ed.), 
The Borzoi Anthology of Latin American Literature, 
II, New York 1977, 838. 
Receive Instructions Against Chile': 
In this way they decide from above, from the roll of dolJ.ars, 
in this way the dwarf traitor receives his instructions, 
and the generals act as the police force, 43 
and the trunk of the tree of the country rots. 
But there was an ambivalence in the Chilean Left •s attitude 
towards the United States. They shared a feeling of identity, of 
being part of the New World; ironically, the most violently anti-
American, the New Left, displayed the same combination of visionary 
idealism and morality that was an essential element of the pci.ri tan 
legacy in America. Octavio Paz wrote of the mixture of fascination 
and horror, love and envy which the Third world felt, wanting 11 to 
be both like the 'developed nations• and unlike them. The Third 
world has no idea of what it is above and beyond a will to being." 
Unlike the primordial opposition between East and West, the North-
South duality in the Americas was like alternating currents within 
the one body: the North embodying the Reformation and the South the 
Counter-Reformation. The-Third World sought to identify itself in 
antithesis to the West, becoming "the other by definition, its 
. . t . II 44 ( . . 1 h . ) caricature and 1 s conscience. origina_ emp asis Anti-
Yanlceeism was also often a means by which Chileans could avoid their 
own responsibility for the Chilean condition, by 1:>.laming all problems 
on an external cause. 
Another nationalist concern was to create a genuine identity 
that grew out of Chilean realities. There was frequent criticism 
of the importation of foreign ideological formulas. Any political 
43. Neruda and Vallejo, 129. 
44. o. Paz, Alternating Current, London 1974, 194, 193. 
party with international alignments came in for such criticism, 
notably the Communists, but also the Christian Democrats. The 
non-Communist Left held to the notion of a Third Way, between the 
excessive materialism and dehumanizing nature of capitalism and 
the state oppression of Communism. 
In the international sphere the Third Way concept was an 
attempt to find a way out of the Cold Wa1° rigidity of the post-war 
period. While the non-Communist Left was suspicious of the PC's 
links with the Soviet Union, it saw the U.S. anti-Communist 
crusade as a form of imperialism. In international relations 
the Left advocated an independent, nonaligned foreign policy, one 
not bound by the strategic considerations imposed upon them by the 
United States. By advocating such a foreign policy in 1964, the 
Christian Democrats deprived the leftist parties of one of their 
most important platforms, although in office the PDC remained 
committed to the West and to inter-American solutions. 
Left. 
Socialism was the second major theme in the ideology of the 
It is as well to be aware of Frei's warning: 
Is it possible that the Latin America which today speaks 
of socialism with the same voice that once proclaimed 
freedom uses the term as a cover for a multitude of 
confused and contradictory illusions?45 
Before the 1960 9s, the self-proclaimed socialism of the Radical 
and Democrat parties had done more to create an image in Chile of 
. . d f th h d th M . t . 1 · t 46 what socialism stoo or an a e arxis soc1a 1s • 
The first source of Chilean socialism was the perceived 
45. Frei, 'The Second Latin American Revolution•, 93. 
46. Pike, 263. 
need to humanize the economy. However this was the concern of 
more than simply those advocating socialism. Eduardo Frei wrote, 
I drea.m of a synthesis of justice and freedom in an 
economy that is based entirely on man's ability, not 
on inherited factors of money, class or race. In 
Latin America it is man that must be made great.47 
Allende, in his first presidential message to Congress, stated: 
our task is to define and put into practice, as Chile's 
road to socialism, a new model for the state, a different 
economic system and a new pattern of society which 
concentrates on man, on his needs and his hopes.48 
The difference was qualitative: whereas Frei believed that 
it was possible to humanize the existing system, Allende believed 
that the system itself was at fault. Thus, socialism represented 
the need to change the entire system. As Allende explained: 
No goverrunent has been capable of solving these essential 
problems of the people. And this is not just happening 
in Chile, it is all over Latin America, and there have 
been democratic governments, pesudo-democratic governments, 
and dictatorships. So one has to come to a very obvious 
conclusion: it is the method, it is the system.49 
The historical processes in the Uni tecl States and in Chile 
had produced different conceptions of capitalism. Capitalism 
might not have created a spiritual dimension in the United States, 
but it was at lea.st successful, which bred its ovm ethos. In 
Chile, capitalism was seen to be both unsuccessful and morally 
debasing. 
In 1955, Feli~ Cruz, a respected non-Marxist historian, 
observed that most notable Chilean scholars who had developed in 
the preceding thirty years had been strongly iJ.1..£ luenced by Marxist 
47. Frei, 'Paternalism, Pluralism, etc.•, 40. 
48. Allende, Chile's Road to Socialism, 144. 
49. s. Landau, 'An Interview with Allende' in Nacla, 18. 
ideology and had concluded that classical capitalism and 
democracy had outlived their usefulness. Co:iinciding in the 
early 1950 1 s was a new trend in Chilean historiography whereby 
the country's past was interpreted in accordance with theories 
of materialistic determination and class conflict. 50 In Chilean 
poetry this trend was expressed in Neruda's Canto General (1950). 
The fundamental purpose of this epic Latin American poem was to 
rewrite the continent•s history from the perspective of the 
working class in order to correct the distorted official history. 
Thus, for example, it was not the American company Anaconda but 
individual Chilean miners who built the huge copper mine 
Chuquicamata. The Chilean novel was also characterized by a 
t " 1 1 t· h" 51 s rong awareness or c ass re a ions ips. 
Marxist socialism, represented by the long traditions of 
the Communist and Socialist parties and by this intellectual 
movement, and deriving from the secular t1'adi tion in Chile, ,,ras 
the mainstream of Chilean socialism. Christian socialism emerged 
in the left-wing of the PDC in the late 1960 's and was represented 
in the subsequent defections from that party to MAPU in 1969 and 
the Left Christians in 1971. The Christian - secular distinction 
was very important in Chilean politics, capable of creating intense 
enmity between parties that were natural allies in a class sense: 
the Conservatives and Liberals in the, nineteenth century, and the 
Christian Democrats and Radicals in the 1960•s. While MAPU became 
counted among the revolutionary Left, the split in that party and 
the unwillingness o.f the Le.ft Christians to join the UP coalition 
50. Pike, 265. 
51. Franco, 291. 
indicated an undercurrent of suspicion of the predominant Marxism. 
A second source of socialism was social concern over the 
poverty that existed £or a large proportion of : Chileans. 
One must distinguish between "underdevelopment" and "poverty", 
the latter not synonomous with the former but largely a consequence 
of it. Poverty could be measured by partial indices (health, 
nutrition, housing, illiteracy, mortality, etc.) or by a synthetic 
index (average income per capita). 
Chile's per capita income, as calculated by ECIA for the 
1965-69 average, was $645. This was quite respectable for Latin 
America, where only Argentina and Uruguay had higher avera.ge income 
levels. 52 More to the point, however, was income distribution 
(see table 2). 




















These figures indicate the very low standard of living 0£ the 
majority of Chileans, the wealth of a small high income group, 
and the relatively large middle sector, whose standard of living 
was precariously above that of the lower income group. Psychologi-
cally, the failure of wages to keep up with inflation threatened 
52. ECLA, lkonomic Bulletin for Latin America, XVII, 2, 1972, 
New York· 1973, 30-1. · 
53. De Vylder t 7, table 1. 1 • 
the middle sector particularly. 
Chile. 
Partial indices further described widespread poverty in 
Infant mortality was at an alarming, if declining, rate, 
while malnutrition remained the most serious health problem. 
Low-income families also faced a growing housing shortage and 
inadequate sanitary facilities. Illiteracy was still a problem, 
despite a considerable expansion of educational facilities m1der 
the Alessandri and Frei governments. It was estimated that one-
third of the economically active population was unemployed or 
marginally employed. There was not only a striking gap between 
the living standards of high and low income groups, but also an 
urban-rural dichotomy. 54 
Creative writers responded to Chile's socio-economic 
problems by adopting the role of their country's conscierll'.le and 
by expressing a feeling for the collective as well as the 
individual. Chile had a noted tradition of committed poets: 
Mistral, Neruda, Nicanor Parra, Enrique Lihn. Novelists also 
concentrated on social themes, with a pervading sympathy for the 
poor and oppressed: 11The Chilean novel never strays far from 




While so much of Western art is concerned with individual 
experience or relations between the sexes, most of the 
major works of Latin-American literature and even some of 
its paintings are much more concerned with social phenomena 
and social ideals ••• and it is here that Latin American art 
for figures for these partial indices, see Ayres, 37-8; 
De Vylder, 7-9; ECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin 
America, 1972, 30-1. 
Franco , 291 • 
achieves its profoundest v1.s1.0n - with that form of 
love which the Greeks called agape or love for one's 
fellow men ••• Here lies the true originality of Latin-
American art: it has kept alive the vision of a more 
just and humane form of society and it continues to 
emphasize those emotions and relationships which are 
wider than the purely persona1. 56 
A third source of socialism was a perceived "stalemate" 
in the existing political system, resulting in the inability of 
successive governments to resolve basic socio-economic problems. 
Robert Ayres defined the "stalemate" as 11a situation in which no 
single political or social force has been able to impose its 
direction on the state apparatus, or to impose policy directives 
in accordance with a coherent ideology11 • 57 
Chilean administrations since 1925 were characterized by 
a cyclic boom-bust pattern. Governments often presented a 
leftist orientation and then slid inexorably to the right once 
in power. Ambitious electoral programmes faded away; efforts 
at a populist approach alternated with a return to authoritarian 
government, often accompanied by increasing repression. Neruda 
wrote of his "ungrateful" republic, 11Its Presidents were acclaimed 
in the first month and martyred, justly or not, for the remainder 
58 of the five years and eleven months of the tenure". 
The pluralism of the Chilean body politic meant that no 
president had enjoyed an absolute majority in Congress. Therefore 
the "rules of the game" dominated: the basic premises of represent-
59 ation, compromise and consensus. 
56. Ibid., 311. 
57. Ayres, 50. 
58. Neruda, Memoirs, 337. 
59. Von Lazar and Quiros Varela, 53. 
The inter-play between highly competitive politics and 
the demands of numerous public and private institutions 
and groups resulted in a bargaining system which could 
be called the 'politics of conciliation•. Its main 
characteristic was that change could only be incremental, 
not radical. 60 
Stronger critics described "immobilism" as the main feature of 
the political system. Recent elections were characterized by 
their "noncriticality", that is, of not producing a durable 
realignment of party loyalties on behalf of change or innovation. 61 
The implication of the stalemate situation was the need for 
a breakthrough, often described in terms of the replacement of 
"formal" democracy by "effective" democracy. An implication in 
another direction was anti-parliamentarianism and the acceptance 
of more authoritarian solutions. This was a belief of many 
Socialists, such as Clodomiro Almeyda. 
Democratic liberalism ••• which in advanced capitalist 
countries permits the development of the people's movement, 
in the dependent countries only serves to anarchize society 
and to facilitate the rule of the reactionary minorities 
under cover of a semblance of public liberties that does 
not reach the masses and that they are unable to use.62 
But,as one Chilean intellectual noted, the stalemate theme 
was itself a result of the conflict of ideology and politics. 
There has been a sharp discongruity between an ideology 
of master planning and the incrementalist bargaining 
system. This incongruity has probably contributed to 
the pervasive feeling of permanent crisis in Chilean 
politics. 03 
In the late 1960 9s the Left's ideology centred on "dependency 
60. A. Valenzuela, 'Political Constraints to the Establishment of 
Socialism in Chile' in Valenzuela (eds.), 23. 
61. see R.L. Ayres, 1Unidad Popular and the Chilean Electoral 
Process' in Valenzuela (eds.), 30-66. 
62. quoted by Halperin, 162. 
63. A. Valenzuela, 25. 
theory", a neo-Marxist variant of Lenin's 'Imperialism: the 
highest form of capitalism', stressing national liberation and 
socialist revolution. Dependency theory was a loose definition 
which, like Guevara's guerilla theory, held its coherence and 
purity only briefly. It developed from two main currents. 
The first was the convergence of a variety of interrelated ideas: 
the ECLA dependency theory of Prebisch, the growing post-war 
Third World identification, and the more recently emerging 
resource ideology, which observed that the vast bulk of non-
renewable resources traded internationally moved from the develop-
64 ing to the de\e..oped world. 
The second was the political conflict of the sixties in 
Latin America. Dependency theory exhibited the uncompromising 
spirit that emanated from the Cuban Revolution, of which it could 
be seen expost facto justification, in particular the unyielding 
anti-Yankeeism that liberals like Frei characterized as "strategic 
65 hatred". The catalyst of the theory was the frustration 
resulting from the experience of democratic reformism. To the 
Chilean Left, Frei's "assertive nationalism" had in fact meant 
the continuing "denationalization" of Chile: specifically, 
increasing economic dependence; and in the wider sense, American 
penetration of all facets of Chilean life. As Osvaldo Sunkel 
explained, "One of the objectives of an ideal development policy 
seems to be, on the contrary, the affirmation of the national 
, 66 




see P. Connelly and R. Perlman, The Politics of Scarcity: 
Resource Conflict in International Relations, London 1975. 
Frei contrasted this "strategic hatred" with his o,-m approach 
of "assertive nationalism", see Halperin, 5-8. 
Sunkel, 'National Development Policy, etc.', 25. 
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convincing as a critique of orthodox liberal models of development. 
In 1968 the economist Andre' Gunder F'rank analysed Chile's 
underdevelopment in a renowned study of the mechanism of economic 
dependence. He argued that underdevelopment in Chile was "not 
an original or traditional state of affairs; nor ••• a historical 
stage of economic growth which the now developed capitalist 
countries passed through" but "the necessary product of four 
centuries of capitalist development and of the internal contradict-
. . 1 · 't lf 67 ions of capita. ism 1 se 11 • Traditional economic liberalism had 
served to produce "periphery" underdevelopment in order to attain 
the development of the "metropolis". Development/underdevelopment 
became the modern equivalent of the original Marxist contradiction 
between capital and labour, incorporating the notion of the inter-
national division of labour. 
Frank preserved the theme of the continuity of economic 
dependence from the colonial period through independence to contem-
porary Chile. But his historical analysis offered two implications 
which differed from those of traditional Marxist ideology. The 
first concerned the attitude of the Left to the middle class. 
Traditional Marxists believed that Chile had a feudal past, which 
was reflected in contemporary society. Therefore they viewed the 
revolutionary ppocess in two stages: a national democratic revolution, 
then the socialist revolution. Franl< argued that Chile had evolved 
out of the world capitalist system as a "dependent capitalist society". 
67. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 3. 
Dependency theory originated among radicals connected with the 
North American Marxist magazine, Monthly Review, in which 
Frank's theses were first published. Almost unlcnmm in the 
United States, the Spanish edition of Honthly Review, published 
in Buenos Aires and Santiago, was widely read and influential 
among leftist Chilean intellectuals. 
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Hence, the workers and peasants should reject any alliance with 
the bourgeosie, since the phase theoretically requiring broad 
alliances never in £act existed. The Chilean MIR believed that, 
The La.tin American bourgeosie, unlike those of Europe 
and North America, did not develop through its own 
efforts, but basically as the illegitimate daughter 
of foreign capital. This relationship of dependence 
has not only been maintained but strengthened in the 
last decades.68 (my emphasis) 
The wave of economic nationalism in Latin America was seen as a 
secondary contradiction between the interests of imperialism and 
th . 1 b . 69 e nationa ourgeosie. 
The second implication was a complete break with the 
international capitalist system, since as long as Chile remained 
within tha:tsystem its dependency would increase. Ultimately, 
this suggested autarchic development, perhaps also a response 
to the isolation Cuba was enduring. The new dependency theory 
brought a change of mood equivalent to that of the Cuban Revolution: 
the shift from a relative to an absolute perspective, a revolution-
ary fervour, a strong moral element and sense of urgency. The 
interests of the developed and the underdeveloped nations were 
now seen to be in essential conflict. The dominance of foreign 
capital was no longer a symptom of Chilean decadence but the root 
cause of it. According to Pedro Vuskovic, Allende's first 
economic minister, 
The stagnation, inflation, inequality, unemployment and 
denationalization of the economy, existing in extreme 
and increasing degree, were the inevitable outcome of 
68. MIR, 'The Implications of the Electoral Result for the 
Revolutionary Left' in R. Debray, Conversations with 
Allende, London 1971, 164. · 
69. Ibid., 164-5. 
the kind of subordinate capitalist development that 
characterized the Chilean economy and society. The 
state itself with its tradition of involvement in 
the economy of the country, was no more than an 
associate in the process of monopolization and 
dependence intrinsic to that system.70 (my emphasis) 
Frank's own conclusion was recognizably Castroite in tone. 
11The Latin American intellectual and Marxist will have to decide 
if he will remain inside pursuing reformism, or outside with the 
people making the revolution". 71 But as the Harxist parties• 
leadership of the Revolution was less threatened by dependency 
theory than by Castroite political theory, they were able to 
adopt it more easily. 
While dependency theory was a penetrating challenge to 
traditional development models and was p_sychologically gratifying, 
it left undefined the alternative to dependence. Furthermore, in 
at least two respects it was unrealistic. Its black-and-white 
vision would be difficult to implement and, by concentrating 
solely on the external relationship of dependence, it tended to 
underestimate the importance of internal class relationships. 
Hith Popular Unity's commitment to a democratic road to socialism, 
it was in the implementation of its ideology that the Left would 
face some harsh realities and that it \·rould have to find both 
political imagination and intellectual restraint. 
70. quoted by Nacla, 82. 
71. A.G. Fra1~c, 'Latin America: Capitalist Underdevelopment 
or Socialist Revolution?' in S.A. Halper and J .R. Sterling 
(eds.), Latin America: The Dynamics of Social Change, 
London 1972, 154. 
CHAPTER "N 
THE POPULAR UNITY INITIAT"NE 
The strategy of the Allende government in its first year in 
office was determined by two factors: the heterogeneous nature of 
Popular Unity and its minority status. In Congress in late 1970 
UP had 20 senators out of 50, and 60 deputies out of 150 in the 
Chamber of Deputies. These factors determined above all that the 
transition to socialism would be gradual if Allende was to stay 
within the Constitution as he had pledged. The objective of 
Popular Unity might be "total scientific Marxist socialism" 1 , but 
it remained a future goal, not an immediate reality. The victory 
of Popular Unity initiated a revolutionary process, not a Revolution. 
That moment of transcendence had yet to come. 
The nature of Popular Unity required that it undertake 
simultaneously the structural changes it had promised and a short-
term policy to reactivate the depressed Chilean economy. The 
short-term economic policy of the government was motivated not only 
by economic and social considerations, reactivation of the economy 
and a more egalitarian distribution of income, but also by the 
political considerations of gaining popular support to increase 
representation in Congress. In the struggle for power, the UP 
government had to prove itself able to deliver material improvement 
to the Chilean people. I I A t • Joan Garces, one of llende s advisers, 
wrote, 
1. R. Debray, The Chilean Revolution, New York 1971, 118. 
The political power of the Popular Government is 
indissolubly linked with its short-term economic 
success. • • The road followed by the Chilean 
government requires economic effectiveness as 
a sine qua non. 2 
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Pedro Vuskovic , minister of economic affairs and an independent 
Marxist, explicitly recognized the political priority. 
When the main fields of concern and the economic 
priorities are established, certain basic political 
requirements emerge. In other words, economic 
policy is subordinate, in its content, shape and 
form, to the political need of increasing the 
Popular Unity• s support. 3 · 
The attention of the political parties was focused on the 
municipal elections in April 1971. Compared with Frei in 1965, 
Allende was at a disadvantage since congressional elections did 
not fall due in the honeymoon period after the presidential 
election, with Congress remaining untouched until March 1973. 
Allende would gain little real power from a marked victory in 
the municipal elections. They were, however, designated as a 
plebiscite on the government's first five months in office. 
If Popular Unity received a clear majority, then Allende could use 
his executive power to call a referendum on proposed institutional 
changes to consolidate the revolutionary process. In particular, 
this meant the replacement of the bicameral Chilean Congress by a 
unicameral People's Assembly. 
2. 
3. 
J. GarcJs, 1Chile 1971: A Revolutionary Government within 
a Welfare State• in K. Medhurst {ed.), Allende's Chile, 
London 1972, 44. 
P. Vuskovic, 1The Economic Policy 0£ the Popular Unity 
Government in J .A. Zammit {ed.), The Chilean Road to 
Socialism, Sussex 1973, 50; see also P. Vuskovic, 
•Chile: Toward the Building 0£ Socialism• in D.L. Johnson 
(ed.), The Chilean Road to Socialism, Garden City 1973, 
416-27. 
UP's short-term economic policy was a combination of 
Keynesian state-sponsored expansion and redistribution of 
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income. 11Given the existing political conditions, only income 
redistribution can provide the necessary impetus to mobilize 
and redirect the economy", wrote one government official. 4 
Real wages were increased significantly, in favour of wage and 
salary earners, while there were strict price controls. Thus, 
to retain his absolute level of profits_,_ the manufacturer was 
required to increase production. The government's policy was 
a mixture of incentive and coercion: the manufacturer was given 
a greater internal market by the increases in the real wages of 
the people, but if he did not increase production, wage increases 
and price controls were liable to lead him to bankruptcy. The 
government was counting on the utilization of idle industrial 
capacity, estimated at up to 30 per cent, and full employment 
to increase production. 
The policy of government spending and deficit financing 
was successful in creating a mini-boom in the economy. The 
gross domestic product rose 8.5 per cent in 1971, including 
spectacular rises of over 12 per cent in the industry and 
construction sectors, in which over 70,000 housing units were 
begun. While the share of wage-earners in total national income 
moved from 53 per cent in 1970 to 58 per cent in 1971, consumer 
prices rose only 21 per cent between December 1970 and December 
1971, compared with the 35 per cent increase in 1970. 
ment was reduced by half by the end of 1971. 5 
Unemploy= 
4e J. Ibarra, 1 Some Aspects of the Popular Unity Government's 
Development Model I in Zanuni t (ed. ) , 60. 
5. figures from ECLA, Economics Survey of Latin America, 1971, 
New York 1973, 107-13. 
This boom, and the other popular measures the government 
fulfilled, including free milk to schoolchildren and "health 
trains" to the south of Chile, took effect in a dramatic increase 
of support for the Popular Unity coalition in the municipal 
elections. There was also the absence of the totalitarian 
repression that the Right had predicted. In the election UP 
candidates received 49.7 per cent of the vote, almost 14 per 
cent up on Allende's presidential vote, and the opposition 
parties took 48 per cent. Notably, Allende's own Socialist 
party increased its vote to 22.3 per cent from 12 per cent in 
the 1969 congressional elections, indicating the strong personalism 
in Chilean politics. By discounting invalid and blank votes, 
pro-governmer1t newspapers claimed an absolute victory of 50. 86 per 
6 cente But this concern with minute percentage differences, in 
elections that were largely symbolic, suggested that far from being 
resolved, the question of power had become even more undecided. 
Nor was UP's margin of victory substantial enough to encourage 
Allende to call a referendum. 
The results also indicated subtle shifts in the balance 
of forces within Popular Unity. The substantial rise in the PS 
vote meant that the PC, which increased its vote slightly to 
16.9 per cent, was no longer the biggest party within the coalition. 
The disappearance of the UP conrrnittees after the 1970 election. 
also diminished Communist predominancee But together the two 
Marxist parties accounted £or almost 40 per cent of the vote, 
increasing the Marxist and proletarian sectors in UP. This 
6. P.E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, Pittsburgh 1977, 
142-3. 
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coincided with a weakening in the non-Marxist middle-class 
influence. The Radicals, partly affected by a scandal in the 
copper administration involving a Radical minister, dropped 
from 13 per cent in 1969 to 8.1 per cent in 1971.7 
With Allende committed to constitutional means, the re-
emergence of leftist groups both within and outside UP posed 
for him a major political problem both in terms of unity among 
the Left and of relations with the opposition. 
At the PS national congress in January 1971 Carlos 
Altamirano, leader of the left-wing and renewed for his fiery 
revolutionary speeches, replaced the more traditional Aniceto 
Rodriguez as secretary-general. Allende's support of 
Altamirano was subsequently used by the opposition to argue 
that Allende really believed in violent rather than democratic 
means. But this purely ideological explanation ignored more 
realistic political explanations: Allende's attempt to co-opt 
and neutralize the radical elements of the PS, and his intense 
personal rivalry with Aniceto Rodriguez. 8 At a news conference 
in February he said confidently: 
we have said that the transformation and the changes are 
going to be within the bourgeois democracy. And if 
Comrade Altamirano thinks we should go faster, I will 
tell him why we are not going to go faster.9 
The response of the underground MIR, having reappraised 
its strategy of armed revolution following the 1970 electoral 
7. Economist, 10 April, 1971, 40-1. 
8. see A. and J.S. Valenzuela, 'Visions of Chile' in Latin 
American Research Review, Fall 1975, 164-5. 
9. L.A. Sobel (ed.), Chile and Allende, New York 1974, 41-2. 
victory, made Allende's position doubly difficult. The 
organization chose not to join the UP coalition but to maintain 
its "clandestine, compartamentalized, politico-military structure" 
£or as long as the capitalist system existed in Chile, thus 
. . f . 10 keeping its freedom o action. MIRistas organized and led 
many of the illegal seizures (tomas) of £arms, factories and 
housing estates, in line with their self-appointed "radicalizing 
role 11 • 11 But the MIR declared support for the government, thereby 
giving the opposition the means to hold the Allende government 
accountable for the illegal activities 0£ the MIRistas. 
The two major Centre groups in the government coalition 
were also affected by the question 0£ radicalization. Both MAPU 
and the Radical party were split in 1971 over whether they should 
define themselves in social democratic or Marxist terms. The new 
secretary-general of MAPU, Rodrigo Ambrosio, led the movement in 
. . 1 . t . t ' 12 an increasing y Marxis or1.en at1.on. The more prominent members, 
including Minister of Agriculture Jacques Chonchol, left to join 
the newly-formed Christian Left party. 
Similarly, at its Convention in August 1971 the Radical 
party adopted a Declaration of Principles accepting the Marxist 
concepts of historical materialism and the class struggle. Five 
10. MIR, 'The Implications of the Electoral Result for the 
Revolutionary Left' in R. Debray, Conversations with Allende, 
London 1971, 189-190. 
11. Sergio Zorrilla, quoted by J. Huasi, 'Blow after Blow' in 
Johnson (ed.), 197; see also 'MIR - The Underground Surfaces• 
in Nacla, New Chile, New York 1973, 30-3. 
12. see MAPU, •Analysis of the Classes in Chilean Society' in 
Johnson (ea.), 207-38. 
of the seven Radical senators and seven out of 19 deputies le£t 
the party in protest, forming the party of the Radical Left (PIR) 
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which declared its support £or Allende. Alejandro Rios Valdivia, 
Allende's minister 0£ defence, pointed out that the Radical party 
had never been Marxist, nor a party of the workers, but had aimed 
at attracting the middle sectors to Popular Unity. Allende agreed 
that the Radicals were trying to change their own distinctive 
ideology to become something they were not. 13 
These political realignments corresponded with a realignment 
within the major Centre party outside Popular Unity, the Christian 
Democrat party. After Allende's election, the Christian Democrats 
were faced with whether to follow a policy of support for Allende 
or one of "constructive opposition", the alternatives reflecting 
the personal, ideological and political differences between Tomic 
and Frei. The PDC national assembly in December 1970 avoided a 
confrontation by a compromise, electing as chairman Senator Irureta, 
who announced that the Christian Democrats would support "positive" 
Allende proposals but show "inflexible" opposition to proposals 
which jeopardized fundamental values. The party rejected an offer 
from the National party to form a "civic front" in opposition to 
1 U . 14 Popu ar nity. 
Several offers by the left-wing Christian Democrats to the 
UP coalition for collaboration, including an offer to run joint 
mayoral candidates in the municipal elections, were rejected by the 
UP central committee, despite Allende's own willingness to accept. 
13. see 'Radicalism is not and cannot be Marxist' in Johnson (ed.), 
181-2, £or Rios Valdivia's position; s. Allende, •Radicalism 
and Bourgeois Sectors' in Johnson (ed.), 285-9. 
14. see Sigmund, 134-6. 
Mea.nwhile, the position of the right-wing group around Frei was 
becoming increasingly hard-line towards the government, as a 
result of alleged government pressure on Christian Democrats in 
the civil service, and particularly because of personal attacks 
on Frei in pro-government newspapers. 
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Christian Democrat attitudes toward the government hardened 
considerably with the assassination on June 8 of Frei•s former 
minister and close friend, Edmundo Perez zujovic, by the extreme 
left Organized Vanguard 0£ the People. Perez was a leading 
right-wing Christian Democrat who had been associated by the Left 
with the increasing repression by the Christian Democrat administrat-
ion. Allende immediately placed Santiago province under a "state 
of emergency", and denounced the murder as a "deliberate provocation 
intended to alter the institutional life of the country", while 
police tracked down and in a gun battle killed two suspects, 
brothers Roland and Arturo Rivera. Christian Democrat leaders 
claimed Pe'rez's death was the result of a "climate of hate, 
defan,3.tion and of violence" which the government was sponsoring 
. . 1 t' £ t . t 15 with its to era ion o ex rem1s groups. 
A resolution of the ambivalent PDC policy was initiated by 
a by-election in Valparaiso in July when the opposition parties 
co-operated informally to present a single candidate. Christian 
Democrat Dr. Oscar Marin was elected with just over 50 per cent, 
while the Socialist candidate, Hernan del Canto, received 48 per 
cent of the vote. 
15. Sobel (ea.), 42-3. 
The election led the leader of the former tercerista 
£action in the PDC, Bosco Parra, to introduce a resolution 
prohibiting collaboration between the Christian Democrats and 
the National party. When it was defeated, P·arra, two youth 
leaders and six congressmen left the PDC to form the Christian 
Left, which aligned with Popular Unity. Significantly the 
defection did not include Radomiro Tomic, suggesting that his 
loyalty to the Christian Democrat party was stronger than his 
leftist inclination. He criticized the government for rejecting 
Christian Democrat offers for closer co-operation. 16 
The realignments in 1971 among the political parties were 
towards polarization into a government/opposition dichotomy. 
The changes meant that Allende's coalition was larger, but less 
coherent and organised, since neither the Christian Left nor the 
PIR had formally joined the coalition. Their conditional backing 
indicated that they believed in socialism, but that they were not 
prepared £or the transformation 0£ Chile into a straight Marxist 
. t 17 socie y. Moreover it remained to be seen how much electoral 
support the Christian Democrat defection brought to Allende, 
although in the 1969 precedent of MAPU the PDC had retained most 
of its votes. 
On the other hand, the Christian Democrat party was left a 
more coherent party and more committed to opposition. 
it ended its working compact with the UP government. 
In September 
16. R. Tomic, 'One View of Chile's Present Political and Economic 
Situation• in Zammit (ed.), 37-40. 
17. Economist, 21 Aug., 1971, 36-7; Sigmund, 149-52. 
Between the Marxist Le£t and the Christian Democrats there 
existed £undamentally different interpretations 0£ law and 
legitimacy. The Christian Democrats saw Chilean law in an 
abstract sense, as something sacrosanct. They chose to make 
institutional legitimacy as their value, represented by the Statute 
0£ Democratic Guarantees. 
The Chilean Left claimed a revolutionary as well as institut-
ional legitimacy. In his speeches Allende often re£erred to the 
moral authority he exercised as leader of a popular revolutionary 
18 movement. The Marxists viewed Chilean law in a relative, 
historical sense, as expressed by Allende's legal advisor, Eduardo 
Novoa, 
Like all legal systems the world over, the Chilean one is 
simply the expression of a particular historical form of 
social life and organization ••• the legal system is 
neither inert nor neutra1.19 
Allende criticized the "class bias" of the Chilean judiciary when 
the Supreme Court refused to lift the parliamentary immunity of 
/ 
Senator Raul Morales, wanted by a military prosecuter for involve-
. .d . . 20 ment in the Schnei er assassination. 
This difference in interpretation was the basis of conflict 
regarding Allende's nationalization programme, particularly over 
the means employed by the government. Nationalization played a 
crucial role in UP's plans £or the construction 0£ socialism. The 
Popular Unity programme de£ined in the new economy the existence 0£ 
18. s. Allende, Chile's Road to Socialism, Middlesex 1973, passim. 
19. E. Novoa, 'The Constitutional and Legal Aspects 0£ the Popular 
Unity Government's Policy• in zammit (ed.), 28. 
20. Debray, The Chilean Revolution, 97-8. 
three sectors - public, mixed, and private - corresponding to 
the pluralist nature of the government coalition. There was 
nothing new in a mixed economy; what was new was the intention 
to make the public sector predominant to enable effective economic 
l . 21 panning. 
Because, with the exception 0£ copper, the opposition-
controlled Congress would not legislate the nationalization of 
industries, Allende had to resort to existing legislation. On 
the advice of Novoa, and with AlLende's ovn1 long experience of 
working within the institutional system, he intended to use a 
variety of means acquired by the executive over the years enabling 
him to intervene in the economy. These mechanisms, which gave 
the president considerable, if finite, flexibility of action, had 
come into being because of the perceived inadequacies of the 
Chilean industrial bourgeoisie at the time of the Great Depression. 
At that time they were designed to aid the private sector, now they 
were to be used to counter-purpose, to supplant the bourgeoisie and 
establish a dominant state sector. 
One such mechanism, passed in 1932 under President Garlos 
Davila's administration, allowed the government to send officials 
("interveners") to oversee production should a private company 
operate below capacity, or temporarily to requisition a company 
producing goods 110£ basic necessity" should for some reason 
production cease. Under these laws the UP government intervened 
in a variety of companies: textiles, machinery, coal, brass and 
21. see 'The Programme of Unidad Popular' in Allende, 37=9. 
cement. Workers• seizure of plants was one ratruonale £or stepping 
in; in this way the government gained control of the Ford Motor 
Corporation, and fourteen textile mills seized simultaneously by 
22 workers in May 1971. 
The Government also used CORFO, previously the main state 
organism for sponsoring the private sector. On the grounds of the 
nationalization of vital industries and the recovery of basic 
resources, CORFO either bought out or bought controlling stock in 
Chile's largest steel, iron, liquid gas and nitrate producers, as 
well as the ITT Chilean subsidiary and the General Motors truck 
plant. 
State purchase was also used to nationalize the banking 
system, one of UP's priority sectors in their attack on monopoly 
capitalism. The state-o,..med Central Bank proceeded to buy stock 
in the twenty-two private Chilean banks; by September 1971 it 
controlled nineteen of them, including the large foreign-owned 
banks, the Bank of London and South America, the Bank of America 
and the First National City Bank. 23 
For the government the means employed to carry out its 
programme were not a matter of principle, but a pragmatic choice 
of one or another possibility allowed by the law, depending on 
the circumstances. But its resort to these "legal loopholes" 
antagonized the opposition, who felt that Popular Unity was acting 
22. see Nacla, 24-5, for details of the major interventions 
and nationalizations in Allende's first year; 'The 
Government and the Workers take Control of Ford Motor 
Company'in Johnson (ed.), 134-6. 
23. see Banco Central de Chile, 'Banking Policy' in Johnson 
(ed.), 428-32. 
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outside the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution. Two 
things upset them: the use of measures initially intended to be 
temporary to bring about permanent state control of industries, 
and that by means of these executive powers Allende was nation-
alizing large sectors of the economy without recourse to Congress. 
Opposition frustration focused on the intended state purchase 
of the paper industry, a sensitive area because it was a potential 
backdoor to government control of the newsprint media, and because 
the major private company, the Paper and Carton Manufacturing 
Company, was headed by Jorge Alessandri, thus bringing the charge 
that the intended take-over was a political action. With CIA 
financing, a group of private stockholders was able to resist 
nationalization. For similar reasons there was concern at the 
takeover of the biggest Chilean publishing house, Zig-Zag, on the 
verge of bankruptcy because of the government policy of raising 
wages and freezing prices. Zig-Zag published the weekly Ercilla, 
which had a Christian Democrat orientation. Although the magazine 
remained independent editorially under government control, political 
interference in the news media became a major and continuing 
·t· th 24 OppOSl lOn emee 
The countryside was the area of reform most removed from the 
centre of national politics. GeographicaJ.ly, agrarian reform 
operated most intensely in the deep south of Chile, a long way from 
the arena of political struggle in Santiago. The revolutionary 
process in the countryside was much more a private conflict between 
24. see Sigmund, 142, 1570 
landowners and peasants, where the presence of the political 
parties as intermediaries was least apparent. Correspondingly, 
it was where Popular Unity leadership and strategy in the 
revolutionary process was most seriously challenged by other 
leftist groups, notably those following the Castroite theory of 
rural-based revolution. 
Yet paradoxically, the UP agrarian programme saw the 
greatest continuities between the Allende government and the 
previous Christian Democrat administration. As with its 
socialization programme in other areas, the Popular Unity govern-
ment made use of existing legislation. Although less than 30 per 
cent of the national population was rural, agrarian reform had 
become a major political issue in the 1960 1s, jointly inspired by 
the Cuban Revolution and the Alliance for Progress. In £act 
there were two issues: the question of social justice and the 
question of productivity. The first concerned the concentration 
of land o'\<mership and the living and work conditions of the 
campesinos; the second, the increasing amounts of food Chile 
needed to import to feed its 01-m population. The problem was 
to reconcile these two issues; the danger for the Left was in 
simply assuming that they were compatible. 
In 1962 Alessandri has enacted Chile's first Agrarian Reform 
Law, a point he stressed in his 1970 campaign. 25 But by concentrat-
ing on the distinction of only neglected land, his reform in £act 
25. on agrarian reform in Chile before Allende, see A. Jefferies, 
•Agrarian Reform in Chile' in Geography, July 1971, 221-30; 
R.R. Kaufman, The Politics of Land Reform in Chile, 1950-1970, 
Cambridge 1972. 
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protected the latifundistas• interests: it answered criticism 
that the land was not being exploited, while creating a small 
group of land-owning peasants who were jealous of their improved 
fortune and fearful 0£ losing it. Nevertheless, Alessandri•s 
reform was important in two respects £or Popular Unity later. 
Firstly, a 1963 constitutional amendment allowed payments for 
expropriated land to be deferred in the form 0£ long-term loans, 
with cash payments of 1-10 per cent, thus making large-scale 
expropriation economically viable. Secondly, it established 
institutions capable 0£ real agrarian reform: CORA (Corporation 
0£ Agrarian Reform) and INDAP (the Institute of Agricultural 
Development). 
The legal basis for genuine land reform was established 
with Frei 's reform law, finally enacted in July 1967. This law 
defined a maximum limit of land ownership 0£ 80 hectares, in 
practice depending on the nature of the land, and sought for the 
first time to incorporate the rural population into the social 
and cultural life of Chile. Peasants were encouraged to join 
unions and up to 100,000 rural workers did so. A precedent was 
established for the organization of peasants into co-operatives 
(asentamientos). 
Not only did UP use Frei•s law, but the whole agrarian reform 
process under Allende was moulded by the experience of the Christian 
Democrats. Popular Unity intended to intensify the reform process 
begun by Frei, while overcoming the negative aspects of the PDC 
endeavour. The agrarian reform had been a major element in the 
political defeat of the Christian Democrats. It alienated the Right 
for being too radical and was criticized by the Left for proceeding 
too slowly, thereby contributing to the political polarization 
that Frei suffered. Under the reform 30,000 peasant families 
at the most were given land, compared with the 100,000 families 
promised in the "Revolution in Liberty" programme, and this 
redistribution was at high cost. Another criticism was that 
the campesinos participated little in the reform, that bureau-
26 cratic paternalism replaced the paternalism of the patron. 
Under Allende, agrarian reform was intensified both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. In 1971 the government 
expropriated 1,373 £arms, almost as many as in the entire 
1965-1970 period, and the further expropriation 0£ over two 
thousand farms in 1972 virtually eliminated the latifundia 
system. 27 
The acceleration of land expropriation was not only at 
the government's initiative, but was also a response to pressure 
by the peasants themselves. During the first months of 1971 
there were hundreds of land seizures, or tomas, beginning among 
the 300,000 Mapuche Indians and spreading through the south 0£ 
Chile. This outbreak of peasant unrest was generally attributed 
to the Christian Democrat mobilization 0£, but £ailed to satisfy, 




see w.H. Agor, •senate vs CORA: An Attempt to Evaluate 
Chile's Agrarian Reform to Date' in Inter~American Economic 
Affairs, Autumn 1968, 47-53; s. Barroclough, 'Agrarian 
Reform and Structural Change in Latin America: The Chilean 
Case• in The Journal of Development Studies, Jan. 1972, 163. 
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The rapid spread of tomas put political pressure on the 
government in Santiago in two ways, apart £rom the direct pressure 
of peasant actions. Firstly, the~ presented an alternative 
revolutionary strategy to the institutional approach to which 
Popular Unity was committed. Hany 0£ the land invasions were 
led by the Guevara-inspired revolutionaries of the MCR (Revolutionary 
Peasant Movement, the rural branch of the MIR), who saw their role 
as to mobilize and radicalize the peasants. At the extreme were 
the mu.ch publicized activities of Commandante Pepe, who had 
reportedly seized a large area of land on the Argentine border and 
was training the peasants there in guerrilla warfare. 29 But it is 
unlikely that most of the tomas represented a high level of 
political consciousness among the Chilean peasants. The campesinos 
were pragmatic, seizing land more often in response to a bad land-
owner or to specific actions like the destruction of crops or 
. 30 livestock. 
Secondly, widespread rural disorder gave the opposition 
parties the opportunity to accuse the government of provoking 
violence and of encouraging extreme leftist groups. A problem 
arose in that some of the farms seized, usually by Hapuche Indians, 
were under the legal limit of 80 hectares. Highlighted by the 
opposition, these seizures disturbed small landowners, despite 
Allende's reassurances that they would not be touched by agrarian 
29. see A. Horne, 'Commandante Pepe' in Encounter, July 1971, 
33-40. 
30. The pragmatism of the Chilean peasant regarding agrarian 
reform is stressed by R.R. Kaufman, The Politics of Land 
Reform in Chile, 1950-1970; J.F. Petras and H. Zemelman 




The tornas put the government in a difficult position. It 
could not use force against the people it claimed to represent, 
and had as warning the political cost to Frei of using troops to 
remove peasants, culminating in the Puerto Montt massacre. 31 
Moreover it believed that the land seizures by the campesinos 
were morally justified, especially those by the Mapuches, which 
Agricultural Minister Jacques Chonchol described as legitimate 
. 32 
"recuperation of land taken from them by force". 
The new government responded by accelerating agrarian 
reform, while trying to dissuade the MCR and the peasants from 
further seizures. Allende declared that he had "established 
that the agrarian reform be carried out under the Agrarian Reform 
Law. Under no circumstances will we accept or proceed in an 
arbitrary way11 • 33 After a confrontation between police and 
landless peasants in Santiago province in May, the MIR agreed to 
end land seizures unless the landowner abused or the government 
£ailed to redistribute the land. But despite the he:lt generated 
by the tomas, the peasants and government mutually aided each 
other: the peasants made the acceleration of reform imperative, 
and the government used peasant action as justification £or more 
intensive reform. 
The Allende government designated Cautin province as the 
first £or full-scale agrarian reform, £or a combination of social 
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during Frei's administration, and the situation of the peasants, 
including the largest concentration of Mapuche Indians, was as 
bad as any in the country. The province also remained a 
conservative political strongholdt which agrarian reform would 
destroy. To overcome the problem of a lack 0£ understanding 
between the central reform administration and the local peasants, 
Chonchol moved his whole agricultural ministry to Temuco, the 
provincial capital of Cautin. 34 
The qualitative change in UP's agrarian policy was also 
inspired by the experience of reform under the Christian Democrats 
and could be traced in the political development of Jacques 
Chonchol. Chonchol, who had worked on agrarian reform in Guba 
in the early 1960's as an agricultural economist, was director 
of the government agency INDAP under Frei. In 1968 he resigned 
because of frustration with the slow tempo 0£ land reform. 
Disappointment with the shortfall in the results of Frei's reform 
led to a reappraisal of the inherent contradiction of reformism: 
its benefits were received by only some of the people who deserved 
them. Even if Frei had fulfilled his promise to give 100,000 
families land, there would still be another 300,000 rural families 
landless. 
The same problem was found in the asentamientos, temporary 
co-operatives into which the reformed land sector was organised. 
A conflict of interest arose between the permanent asentados, who 
had the prospect of becoming individual landowners in a few years, 
34. see T. Harding, •Agrarian Reform - Cautin Province' 
in Nacla, 76-8. 
and the rural workers who did not live permanently on the farms. 
For the latter, agrarian reform more often entailed loss than 
benefit, by shutting them out from traditional employment without 
1 . 't 35 rep acing 1. 
Thus the problem of reform, as offered by Frei, was that 
it excluded more people than it included. Moreover reform, as 
a definition of future organization, shut out peasants not only 
from the present process but from the hope of future inclusion. 
Chonchol believed that the entire agrarian system had to be 
overhauled if the problems of "reformism" were to be avoided. 
Joining UP as an original member of MA.PU, and appointed minister 
of agriculture by Allende, he pursued certain priorities. 
First, the paternalism of the traditional social structure 
required more than simply land redistribution if it was to be 
broken. As a technician rather than a politician, Chonchol saw 
the question of organization in a practical rather than ideological 
or political manner, needing a plurality of solutions rather than 
a single formula. In the 1960 1 s he wrote, 
the problem of the land cannot be solved by standard 
dogmatic formulas which come from various ideologies. 
There are different situations, different aspirations, 
different degrees of pressure of the peasant masses on 
the land, which require a careful analysis of every 
concrete detai1.36 . 
One defect of the as_en.tamiento was that since it was organized 
on the same dimensions as the original £arm it tended to perpetuate 
35. see J. Chonchol, 'The Agrarian Policy of the Popular 
Government• in zammit (ed.), 107-14. 
36. J. Chonchol, 'Eight Fundamental Conditions of Agrarian 
Reform in LA tin America' in R. Stavenhagen (ed.), 
Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America, 
New York 1970, 167. 
the traditional agrarian ima,ge. 
The UP government began to organize the reformed sector 
into Agrarian Re£orm Centres, by combining various neighbouring 
farms to form larger units. This structure sought to make the 
farms more productive, by allowing a degree of specialization, 
and to absorb a greater number of rural workers. However there 
was peasant resistance to the new organization, especially by 
those who benefitted under the asentamiento system. 37 
Secondly, Chonchol stressed the need to reform other 
economic sectors, especially the banking system and the industrial 
monopolies, to coincide with agrarian reform0 
I say that agrarian reform cannot be ended at the door 
of the latifundia. It must be developed in other 
sectors of the society, because if you don•t do this, 
there arrives a time when agrarian reform is cut off.38 
The UP government saw agrarian re£orm not just on its O\<m, but as 
part of the whole socialization programme in Chile, a process to 
take place simultaneously with and complimentary to the overall 
k . 39 changes UP was ma 1ng. Chonchol summed up the qualitative 
change in agrarian reform and the different objective that resulted. 
The problem is not to give a piece of land to 100,000 
families - our original goal - but to change the whole 
structure of agriculture and the relation of agriculture 
with the rest of the economy. That is much more 
important.40 
37. Chonchol, 'The Agrarian Policy of the Popular Government', 
110-12. 
38.. J. Chonchol, 'Land Re£orm in Chile' in The Canadian Forum, 
Nov.- Dec. 1970, 300. 
39. 'The Programme of Unidad Popular•, 39-40. 
40. Chonchol, •Land Reform in Chile', 300. 
With favourable weather, agricultural production in 
1971 increased 6 per cent despite the intensive reform process 
and rural unrest. But the Hay to May agricultural year in 
Chile meant that the spring planting had been completed before 
Allende came to power and the 1971 harvest took place early in 
the year, before the unrest reached many rural areas. 
However, according to Allende, agrarian reform was only 
part 0£ the plan £or Chilean development. "••• the agrarian 
reform is part of a process. That process has as its essential 
fouI1dation, first to recover the basic wealth of Chile and put it 
in the hands of Chileans. 1141 The priority remained the breaking 
of dependence, involving the recovery of Chile•s natural resources 
from foreign domination. The UP government claimed that $10.8 
billion had been taken out 0£ the country by u.s. companies - the 
basic cause of Chilean underdevelopment.42 Moreover, the 
government counted on the increased surplus it expected to receive 
after nationalization to maintain levels of investment in other 
sectors of the economy. 43 
Allende's focus on foreign involvement in Chile was under-
standable from a political as well as an economic viewpoint. 
Firstly, the forces of the UP coalition were unified less intrinsi-
cally than by what they were against, and it was unanimously agreed 
that American imperialism was the main enemy. Secondly, the 




Landau in Nacla, 17. 
New York Times, 25 Jan., 1971, 72. 
see Allende, 160-1. 
to nationalism, The unanimous vote in Congress for copper 
nationalization, and the general public indignation at the 
revelation in April 1972 of ITT activities at the time of the 
1970 election, were indications of the strong nationalist 
feelings in Chile which Allende could channel to validate and 
give impetus to his socialist policies. In the struggle £or 
power, Allende could rally Chileans behind the nationalist cry 
in a way that he could not with appeals to their socialist spirit. 
The Allende government defined its foreign policy towards 
the United States more carefully and precisely than did its 
campaign rhetoric. Allende did not wish to antagonise the 
American government unnecessarily, especially while his govern-
ment was nationalizing u.s. corporate holdings. Although the 
Chilean government pursued an independent and non-aligned foreign 
policy, establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba, Communist 
China, East Germany and Albania, and recognising North Vietnam 
and North Korea, Allende assured the United States that his 
government would never permit Chile to be used for a military 
base by any foreign power. The UP government a ls o , chose , 
despite previous denunciations, to stay in the OAS, reflecting 
a traditional Chilean position 0£ seeking to modify U.S. policy 
towards Latin America from within the inter-American system,44 
In the New York Times, Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda drew 
a careful distinction between anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism. 
Chile's international policy is not aimed against any 
people in the world. Consequently, neither is it 
against the people 0£ the United States. It is a 
44. see ibid., 67-8, 107-8, 167-70. 
policy designed to break the dependent relationship 
0£ Chile's economy with respect to interests which 
are not ours.45 
1 l 6,. 
Copper was at the heart 0£ the matter; 11Chi.le's salary", 
and the national symbol of foreign exploitation and economic 
dependence. In Chile the saying went: "They took the copper 
and left us the holes". 
Unlike the nationalization of other industries, that of 
the copper industry required the government to pass new legislation 
in order to annul the agreements made with the copper companies 
under Frei's "Chileanization" programme. Since the Anaconda 
settlement in 1969 required bilateral agreement to be changed, 
Allende opted to use a constitutional amendment to permit nationali-
zation. This implied a change in mood: whereas the 11Cbileanization" 
agreements had been negotiated by the state copper corporation 
46 (CODEICO), nationalization would be forced through by law. Also, 
as Sigmund notes, 
the use of the complicated and lengthy procedure of a 
constitutional amendment meant that a possible con£ront-
ation on the issue between Chile and the United States 
was avoided for the time being and that a national 47 
consensus was developed in Chile behind the takeovere 
The five big mines to be nationalized were Chuquicamata, El 
Salvador and Ex6tica (Anaconda), El Teniente (Kennecott), and Andina 
(Cerro). The State had a 51 per cent interest in Chuquicamata, El 
Salvador and El Teniente, 25 per cent in Ex6tica and 30 per cent in 
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foreign partners. The constitutional amendment was unanimously 
supported by Congress on July 11, 1971, government posters 
declaring that Chile had put on long trousers. The amendment 
incorporated into the Constitution two new concepts, of 
nationalization (different from the earlier established concept 
of expropriation) and 0£ limiting excess profits on foreign 
't 1 48 cap1 a. 
The crucial issue was not 0£ nationalization, which the 
American companies had come to accept as inevitable, but 0£ 
compensation £or the nationalized properties. The law provided 
£or the deduction of "excess profits", the level to be decided by 
the president, during the period 1955-1970. In September Allende 
announced that the "excess profits" 0£ Anaconda and Kennecott, at 
the rate of over 12 per cent, were $774 million. Then the 
Chilean controller-general established the book value of the 
industries, as 0£ 31 December 1970, at $663.2 million, from which 
he deducted $51.8 million for assets in poor state of repair or 
obsolete. This meant that with the deduction of "excess profits", 
no compensation was owed for the Chuquicamata, El Salvador and El 
Teniente mines. Compensation was paid for the newer mines, $14.8 
million for Ex6tica and $20.2 million £or Andina. In addition, 
the Chilean government took responsibility for debts of $726 million 
contracted under the expansion programme initiated by the Frei 
4g 
government. -
48. ECIA, Economics Survey of Latin America, 1971, 117. 
49. figures from ibid.; see 1The Nationalization of Copper• 
in Allende, 78-83. 
The copper nationalization was not only a moment of 
symbolic transcendence for Chile, but also the vital issue in 
determining the nature of U.S. relations with the new Marxist 
government in Chile. American opposition to Allende was 
primarily economic. Antipathy to his Marxism, while still 
evident; was of less concern. In Peru, where a reformist 
military government under General Velasco had embarked on a 
course of expropriation of foreign investment in 1968, the United 
States had engaged in pressure tactics through its aid programme 
and international financial institutions. Under the Hickenlooper 
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U .s. President was 
required to suspend aid to a country which expropriated the 
property of American citizens without 11appropriate steps" toward 
"speedy compensation". The Nixon administration was characterized 
by a strong identification with U.S. corporate interests. Moreover, 
through OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) the American 
government offered major corporations with overseas holdings 
insurance if their interests were nationalized without compensation. 
This represented a major commitment by Washington to the security 
of private American investment in other countries. In the case of 
the copper companies in Chile, the amount was so great that OPIC 
would have to seek extra funds from the U.S. Congress to meet their 
claims. A National Sec.urity Decision Memorandum issued by the CIA 
in early November 1970, although long before the nationalization 
issue developed, concluded that "the United States has no vital 
interests in Chile. There would however be tangible economic losses. 1150 
50,. quoted by P. Sigmund, 'U .s. Policy Towards Chile: Books in 
Review' in Latin American Research Review, III 1976, 127 n. 
Two policy lines emerged in the formulation 0£ United States 
policy towards the Allende government. A "hard" line was consist-
ently pushed by certain corporations with immediate vested interests 
such as ITT, some government agencies, specifically the CIA and the 
Treasury, and the Nixon-Kissenger team in the White House. 51 This 
group saw economic nationalism in Latin America as something to be 
confronted. Texan Secretary of Treasury John Connally saw Chile 
as a test case, which the United States should use to deter other 
I.atin American countries from nationalizing U.S. corporate 
. t t 52 1n eres s. The £ear was of a "ripple effect" of nationalizations 
throughout the continent. The hardliners also laid greater emphasis 
on Allende's Marxism, raising the spectre of "a second Fidel". 
President Nixon regarded the Marxist threat in Chile as more subtle, 
but just as real as in Cuba, Vietnam and the Middle East. 53 
A 11so£t 11 line, pushed by other corporate interests, the 
American press, and the State Department, urged co-existence with 
Allende rather than confrontation. The ITT documents complained 
of the general reluctance of the American business community to 
take a hard line against Chile. 54 The State Department believed 
that Chile was not another Cuba, and likened Allende more to the 
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in three stages. Initially the government adopted a cool but 
"correct" diplomacy, a period 0£ waiting and confusion. That 
American policy was neutral was contradicted by the NSDM 93 
memorandum, which called £or the termination 0£ new bilateral 
aid and attempts to dry up the £low 0£ new multilateral credit 
and other financial assistance. After Allende's election, the 
American Export-Import bank dropped Chile to its lowest credit 
120., 
rating. However, the u.s. government officially denied Chilean 
allegations that any such policy existed, similar to its denials 
a decade earlier that the United States was involved in a plan 
designed to invade Cuba. 
During the period between the formal nationalization of the 
copper companies and President Allende's decision on compensation, 
the U.S. Government adopted a warning policy. It attempted to 
pressure Chile on the compensation issue by withdrawing a $21 
million loan through the Eximbank for the purchase 0£ three Boeing 
jets for the Chilean airline, LAN, an.YJ:ouncing that the postponement 
0£ the loan was related to the copper issue. The J'imerican move 
was denounced by the Chilean press and by the ambassador in 
Washington, Orlando Letelier. 55 
With Allende's "excess profits" decision, U .s. policy moved 
to the third stage, already prefigured by NSDM 93. The emergence 
of the hard line coincided with a bureaucratic shift in policy 
formulation from the State Department to the Treasury. All U.S. 
aid programmes to Chile, with the notable exception of military aid, 
55. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, 153. 
were officially suspended. When the UP Government was trying 
to reschedule its foreign debt payments for 1971 and 1972 at 
the Club of Rome in Paris., the United States consistently 
tried to tie negotiation to compensation £or the expropriated 
copper companies. 
This policy was still not as determined or concerted as 
thee::onomic blockading and isolation of Cuba. There was some 
evidence that the United States was still prepared to give loans 
. f t' 56 in exchange or compensa ion. It seems also that American 
business was less willing to embark on an economic war with Chile. 
Moreover, Chile did not £ace the formal multilateral blockade 
brought against Cuba through the OAS; indeed, by 1970 several 
Latin American countries were moving to break that blockade, 
led by Chile. Yet the intent behind U .s. policy was similar 
to that against Cuba: the weakening of the Chilean economy in 
order to effect the downfall of the government, a policy known 
in the language of the Nixon administration as "destabilization". 
But despite an intensification of opposition to the Allende 
government among the Christian Democrats and in U.S. policy, 
overall Popular Unity retained the political initiative in its 
first year of office. The increase in popular support for the 
government, seen in April 1971; was a sign that Allende had 
delivered the necessary material improvement to the people. 
56. U.S. Ambassador Korry offered Allende the possibility of 
compensation in the form of 25 year, low interest notes 
£or Anaconda and Kennecott. The offer was related to the 
American government's insurance burden through OPIC, rather 
than concern for the copper companies, but was apparently 
vetoed by PS Secretary - General Altamirano. United States 
Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States and 
Chile during the Allende Years, Washington 1975, 649-50. 
Opposition remained more at the level of talk than action, with 
the exception 0£ the south, outbreaks 0£ violence were isolated 
rather than widespread. The Allende government had avoided a 
major confrontation with the opposition-dominated Congress by 
not insisting on rejected proposals like those £or neighbourhood 
courts and a unicameral parliament. The Christian Democrats 
had also evaded con£rontation with UP, £or £ear of being branded 
reactionary if they were over-intransigent. 57 
Moreover, there was the personal popularity of Allende, 
who proved a firm and persuasive president. His personality 
was admirably suited to the political game as it was played in 
1971. One foreign observer wrote, "Dr. Allende is a consummate 
political technician, with a remarkable talent for detaching 
58 means from ends". Allende also benefitted from the prestige 
that a Chilean president accrued, and from the post-election 
revolutionary fervour among the Left and the young. 
However, some sectors of the Chilean Left were seeking a 
more charismatic leader, a second Fidel. There was a strong 
current of authoritarianism particularly in the Socialist party 
and among the New Left. The mystique of "el companero presidente" 
was invented. "This mystique is just what is needed to awaken the 
people from the lethargy and frustration in which they have been 
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romam.ticism, but it was possible that Allende the committed and 
pragmatic democrat would prove unable to fulfil the image that 
had been created of him. 
While 1971 was the year of Popular Unity initiative, it 
1 f de£ . ·t· 60 was a so 11a year o ini ions 11 • As a result of its policies, 
the UP government was in greater control of the country, but also 
had less flexibility 0£ action after a year. Economy Minister 
Pedro Vuskovic recognised that in many sectors of the economy 
spare capacity had been fully utilised, placing a natural check 
on the mini-boo·m of the fh•st year. 61 Other economic limitations 
were also becoming evident. Private investment had shrunk, 
leaving the burden on government investment, which was financed 
by increases in the money supply and by deficit financing of 
$300 million. The foreign reserves 0£ $341 million left by 
Frei had also been utilized. Outside the control of the Chilean 
government, world copper prices fell by more than t~ty per cent 
from the record high prices of the late 1960•s, so that although 
the volume of Chilean exports rose 4 per cent, their value fell 
62 by 7.4 per cent. Meanwhile the UP's expansion policy had set 
up inflationary pressures which threatened to overflow the 
government's economic planning. "In January 1972 it was no 
longer a question of trying to cure an acute depression, but of 
trying to manage an economy which was beginning to exceed all its 
bounds. 1163 
GO. S. de Vylder, Al,lende•s Chile, Cambridge 1976, 80. 
61. see Vuskovic in Zammit (ed.), 55. 
62. ECIA, 1971, 108. 
6a. De Vylder, 78. 
Eduardo Novoa observed that the government had 
exhausted the variety of legal mechanisms at the disposal 
0£ the executive. This le£t the transformation in the 
institutional structure 0£ the state more imperative i£ the 
64 transition to socialism was to proceed. 
conversation with Debray, Allende said: 
In his 
Now then, i£ these things - a££irrning our national 
sovereignty, recording our basic wealth and attacking 
monopolies - do not lead to Socialism, I don't know 
what does.65 
By the end 0£ 1971, the Popular Unity government had achieved 
all these aims, yet the question 0£ power had not been 
resolved. Indeed, the municipal elections 0£ April and 
other by-elections in 1971 revealed an institutional deadlock, 
with government and opposition evenly balanced. Meanwhile, 
the increasing polarization 0£ political forces suggested that 
the political struggle was only intensifying. 
64. see Novoa in Zammit (ed.), 29-30. 
65. Debray, 85. 
CHAPTER V 
THE INITIATIVE SHIFTS TO THE OPPOSITION 
The second year of' the Allende government was characterized 
by a shift in the political initiative from the government to the 
opposition. This was a result both of mounting problems besetting 
Popular Unity and of developing confidence and coherence among the 
various opposition groups. The struggle £or political power was 
driven along two patterns: the politics of brinkmanship and 
deepening polarization. 
The political struggle developed a push-pull rhythm as the 
various political actors played a game of brinkmanship, testing 
their opponents• strength, alternating confrontation with 
compromise. The new UeS• ambassador to Chile, Nathaniel Davis, 
conunented in a secret cable to the State Department, "The Chileans 
have a great ability to rush to the brink, embrace each other, and 
back off. 111 These tactics tested the Chileans' reputation as born 
compromisers. They also saw the development of rhetoric as an 
integral element in the political process, generating its own 
response. Although, as Dudley Seers wrote at the time, "many of 
the gestures now being made are really designed primarily to obtain 
a better bargain", these gestures encouraged the general momentum 
f 1 . t· 2 o po ariza ion. 
2 .. 
quoted by P.E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, 
Pittsburgh1977, 170. 
D. Seers, •Chile: is the road to Socialism blocked?' in 
The \-lorld Today, May 1972, 207. 
Political polarization had been apparent in Chile since 
the late 1960•s, weakening the political Centre and the politics 
of consensus. It had contributed to the decline of Eduardo 
Frei•s government and, through the split in the non-Marxist 
parties in 1970, had been the primary prerequisite for the 
election of Salvador Allende. Allende's socialization programmes 
had accelerated the momentum of polarization among the political 
parties, encouraging the definition of pro- and anti-government 
blocs. However, with its intensification, the polarization process 
began to move deep into society. In 1971 the political struggle 
had been largely conducted by the parties in the traditional arena 
of national politics. In Allende's second year the Chilean people 
began to become actively involved in the political struggle, often 
emerging as more militant than their political leaders. This 
intensifying conflict within Chilean society, which £or many 
observers was the realization of Marx's class struggle, also 
3 achieved a degree of autonomy in relation to the political system. 
The result was an ever-increasing danger that Chilean politics would 
lose its safety-valve of compromise, that the Chileans would rush to 
the brink and not be able to back off. As Sigmund wrote, "succeeding 
confrontations between supporters of the government and the opposition 
eroded the framework of constitutionalism and civility which had held 
the Chilean polity together11 • 4 
The optimism of the Chilean Left in Allende's first year was 
burst in January 1972 when two by-elections, as usual elevated to 
3. see I. Roxborough, •Reversing the Revolution: the Chilean 
opposition to Allende' in P. O'Brien (ed.), Allende's Chile, 
New York 1976, 192-216. 
4. Sigmund , 161 • 
t2'7., 
national significance, went against the government. Following the 
precedent of July 1971 the Christian Democrats and the National 
~arty co-operated in£ormally in the nomination 0£ candidates. 
These electoral reverses further discouraged the Allende government 
from calling a plebiscite to by-pass Congress. Sigmund estimates 
that the government coalition dropped 4 to 7 per cent on its vote 
in the 1971 elections. 5 
After the political setback, in February the UP leaders met 
at El Arrayan just north 0£ Santiago. They recognized that 
Popular Unity had £ailed to involve a majority 0£ Chileans in the 
country's "process 0£ revolutionary transformation", citing 
bureaucratic ineptitude, administrative dishonesty and sectarian 
political attitudes. More significantly, an internal Communist 
Party document, leaked to the conservative paper El Mercurio, blamed 
the MIR's extremist rhetoric and its promotion 0£ land seizures and 
urban violence £or alienating the middle sectors of the Chilean 
population. In the by-election in the rural province of Linares 
particularly, the fall in government support was attributed to the 
continued violence promoted by the radical Left. The MIR in turn 
accused the PC of debilitating the "revolutionary mobilization of 
£ . IR b t f · b 6 the masses" and o keeping M mem ers ou o government JO s. 
This sectarian strife resulted from long-standing differences 
brought to the surface by the interconnected pressures of a worsening 
economic situation, declining popular support and hardening opposition. 
As the Christian Democrats experienced in the middle of their term 
when faced with the same problems, an evolutionary/revolutionary 
5. see Ibid., 164-6. 
6. L.A. Sobel (ed.), Chile and Allende, New York 1974, 69-70. 
dichotomy emerged within the Left concerning the way to regain the 
political initiative: consolidate in order to advance, or advance 
in order to consolidate. 
The Communist and Radical parties wanted a period 0£ consolid-
ation, emphasizing productivity, economic efficiency and worker 
discipline, especially in the nationalized enterprises. More 
pragmatic and better organized than the PS, the PC promoted a 
Battle of Production. 
Thee:isential thing is to develop the consciousness 0£ 
the workers, to attain a change in their mentality in 
order to assume these new responsibilities that the 
conquest of power implies.7 
The Socialist Party and HAPU within UP, and the MIR outside, 
pushed for radicalization of the revolutionary process. The PS 
felt it was necessary "to convert the present process into an 
irreversible march toward socialism", since, in the words of 
Altamirano, 
The actual class struggle is irreconciliable, that is, 
there is no place for either conciliation or coexistence. 
It will come to an end only when one of the classes assumes 
complete power. 
MA.PlJ Secretary-General Oscar Garretbn asserted that "the socialist 
8 
tasks are the most important ones today". 
In political terms the conflict centred on the Le£t's approach 
towards the "middle sectors", represented by the Christian Dern0.crats 
in opposition and the Radicals in the government. The PC advocated 
8. 
Communist daily El Siglo, •work Without Rest to Win the Battle 
of Production• in D.L. Johnson (ed.), The Chilean Road to 
Socialism, Garden City 1973, 178-180. 
'The Political Position of the Socialist Party• in Johnson 
(ed.), 174; S. de Vylder, Allende's Chile, Cambridge 1976, 
86. 
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negotiating with and neutralizing the Christian Democrats, in 
order to keep the opposition divided. However this strategy 
demanded that the government maintain the living standards 0£ 
the middle sectors. The PS warned the government not to become 
an arbitrator in the class con£lict, but to place itself resolutely 
on the side of the workers. Acceleration of the revolutionary 
process would £orce the middle sectors to define themselves in 
relation to socialism.9 
Allende, who was close to the consolidationist position, 
had an opportunity to define government direction in June when 
the entire cabinet res~gned to facilitate a change in economic 
policy. The controversial Pedro Vuskovic was removed as economy 
minister, yet remained in the government as director of a new unit 
to co-ordinate economic programmes. He was replaced by Socialist 
Carlos Matus, considered more pragmatic and less 0£ a Marxist 
ideologue, as minister of the economy, and the Communist Orlando 
Millas as finance minister. But, as the Economist observed, 
110nce again, Sr Allende has resorted to political hope-trading 
10 instead of making a fundamental choice of strategy." 
Allende's response to Communist pressures to control the 
radical Left was also inconclusive. The formation of a leftist 
11 popular assembly" in Concepci6n (Chile's third largest city) in 
early August, representing the thesis 0£ dual power, was denounced 
by the president, who asserted that it was "unrealistic politics 
to separate the Chilean revolution from the country's democratic 
9. 
10. 
see De Vylder, 85-6; 'The Political Position 0£ the 
Socialist Party•, 172-8. 
Economist, 24 June, 1972, 36. 
11 system". At the same time a police raid on a MIR-controlled 
shantytown in the Lo Hermida district of Santiago, representing 
a symbolic attempt by the government to control armed leftists, 
demonstrated to Allende the political costs of trying to restrain 
the MIR. The night raid led to the death and wounding of 
civilians, suspension 0£ the heads 0£ the Investigaciones police 
branch, and further alienation of the radical Left from the 
government. 12 
Allende resorted to a pattern of compromise: he inclined 
towards the position of the Communists, who therefore represented 
the mainstream in the government, but the Socialists were allowed 
a veto power over the government's activities. Allende was 
afraid both of splitting his own party, the largest in the UP 
coalition, and 0£ becoming too dependent on the more cautious 
Communists. While he pursued legal, democratic methods, he kept 
1 . 1 t . d' 1· 13 the ine open to pro e arian ra ica ism. 
The Socialist veto was vital £or blocking Allende •s options 
0£ compromise and avenues 0£ retreat, the safety-valves of Chilean 
politics. The Socialists prevented the possibility of a compromise 
with the United States, offered by Korry, over the issue of copper 
compensation, and of a productive dialogue developing between the 
UP government and moderate Christian Democrats. One can only 
11. Sobel (ed.), 89. 
12. see Sigm.-tmd, 177-8. 
13. A Socialist veto power is mentioned by Ambassador Edward 
Korry to United States Congressional Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, United States and Chile during the Allende years, 
Washington 1975, 649-50; F. Bourricaud, 'Chile: Why Allende 
Fell' in Dissent, Summer 1974, 406; Economist, 7 Oct., 1972, 
51; Sigmund, 178. 
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spe.culate whether the rise of hard-line opposition to Allende 
in American foreign policy and in the PDC could have been thwarted 
if Allende had overridden this veto. Nevertheless, he allowed 
the radical Left to limit drastically his flexibility of action, 
upon which his transitional position and democratic commitment 
depended. 
The pressures that threatened to blow apart the tenuous 
unity of the Chilean Left resulted primarily from a rapidly 
deteriorating economic situation. The government's ability to 
deal with the emerging problems was further inhibited by its 01,,m 
strategy, so that as De Vylder notes, 
the UP's reactivation program once initiated, became 
impossible to check for both economic and political 
reasons. Tough stabilitization policies were out of 
the question, since the good times should continue. 
We recall Dr Allende's words about •continuing expansion• 
being a necessary condition for the viability of the 
'Chilean road to socialism•. 
He writes that, 11Behind the 1972-3 inflation lay an explosive 
increase in the quantity of money in circulation in Chi1e 11 • 14 
The endemic Chilean problem of inflation returned at a much faster 
rate than ever in the past. Consumer prices rose by 77.8 per cent 
over 1971 in terms of annual averages, and by 163.41 per cent, if 
the December indexes are compared, with the steepest rise in food 
prices. Allende was caught in a wage-drift trap, giving the 
Chilean people large wage and salary increases (22 per cent at the 
beginning of 1972 and 100 per cent increase in October) to maintain 
th . h . 15 eir pure a sing power. Stabilization measures introduced by the 
Matus-Millas team, including a ~rastic currency evaluation, price 
14. De Vylder, 90, 88. 
15. figures from ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1972, 
New York 1974, 68-71. 
rises in the nationalized sector, and limited agricultural price 
increases, only accelerated in£lation, although Matus hoped to 
bring stability "at a higher level''. Criticism of the Matus 
policy by some sectors of the Left represented an unrealistic 
attitude of simply forgetting about inflation. An economic 
adviser to the Central Bank and the Allende government wrote in 
a report, 
There are people, apparently, who think that there is 
something non~revolutionary in taking in£lation 
seriously, that the monetary factor isn't real ••• 
There is nothing revolutionary about ideas that do 
not work and entail political disadvantage.16 
Spiralling inflation combined with a stagnation' in eFonomic 
growth after the mini-boom of 1971, the gross national product 
rising only 3 per cent compared with 8 per cent in the previous 
year. The industrial sector grew by only 2.8 per cent, a clear 
indication that the margins of idle capacity upon which the Allende 
government had relied were exhausted as a result of the rapid 
expansion of 1971. Rapid expansion had also produced bottlenecks 
in production, having an accumulative effect and resulting in 
shortages of a variety of goods from food to capital equipment. 
Long queues outside food stores and a widespread black market 
became part of the Chilean daily life. 
Economic stagnation also resulted from a lack of new 
investment in the Chilean economy and deteriorating productivity 
in the nationalized sectors of the economy. Foreign and domestic 
investors were wary of Chile under Popular Unity £or a combination 
of commercial and political reasons: the uncertainties generated 
16 • E. Boor stein, Allende 's Chile: An Inside View, New York 
1977, 197. 
by economic difficulties and the Narxist nature of the government. 
Edward Korry described the cost inherent in Vuskovic•s economic 
programme: "as your consumption goes up across the board, your 
import bill must go up rapidly. As you nationalize, your access 
to private sources 0£ capital transfer dries up 11 • 17 The problem 
was to move from reactivation to accumulation, but President 
Allende in his annual message to Congress in May 1972 admitted 
that investment had fallen 7.7 per cent in 1971. Opposition 
economists, by including the rundown in inventories, claimed it 
18 had dropped by 24 per cent. 
The Allende government was caught between its short-term 
consumerist policy and its long-term nationalization programme, 
exposing it to the worst effects of both. A decrease in the 
value of exports by 10 per cent with a corresponding 20.3 per 
cent increase in the value of imports resulted in a balance of 
payments deficit of about $600 million. At opposite poles of 
this critical balance-of-payments situation were declining export 
revenues from copper and increasing expenditure for food imports. 
Increased food consumption resulting from the government's 
redistributive policies and problems of agricultural productivity 
led to a food import bill of $313 million in 1971 and $400 million 
in 1972. Declining productivity was attributed to the widespread 
rural unrest as a result of the agrarian reform and land seizures, 
bad weather in the 1971-2 agricultural year, and poor management 
in the reformed agricultural sector. It could be argued that much 
of the state £arm activity during the Allende years was political 
17. United States Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, 10. 
1 8. Sigmund, 177. 
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The increased revenues anticipated as a result 0£ the copper 
expansion programme under the 11Chileanization" agreements £ailed to 
materialize. Production increased in the El Teniente and Andina 
mines, but decreased in Chuquicamata, Ex6tica and El Salvador. 
This was compounded by a continuing fall in the price £or copper 
on the world market. 
Indeed, the big Chilean copper mines make a good case study 
0£ the Allende government's nationalization programme, not only 
because 0£ their central importance to Chile's economic health, 
but also because the problems there following nationalization were 
symptomatic of much 0£ the industrial and agricultural state sector. 
After nationalization the Gran Mineria suffered an operational crisis, 
both internally and internationally, that affected the whole economic 
20 performance 0£ the Allende government. 
Internally, the problem was mainly one 0£ organization, 0£ the 
failure to work out new forms under a socialist government. Norman 
Gall visited Clmquicamata in February 1972 and reported that although 
the old hierarchical American-style structure had been swept away, no 
working order or consensus had been created to replace it. In 
consequence a conflict developed over worker or state control, a 
struggle between the mining union leadership and the political 
19. W.R. Duncan, 1Allende 1 s Chile' in H. Desfosses and 
J. Levesque (eds.), Socialism in the Third World, New York 
1975, 15; J. Chonchol in D. Tiranti and G. Petersen, 
'Allende's Land Revolution' in The New Internationalist, 
May 1975, 16. 
20. Many of the following ideas derive from N. Gall, 'Chile: 
The Struggle in the Copper Mines' in Dissent, Winter 1973, 
99-109. 
appointees, mostly Communist party cadres, to the new state 
21 management. 
Chuquicamata ,,ias a privileged community: its workers were 
among the best-paid in Chile, and had strong political bargaining 
power because 0£ the importance 0£ copper production to Chile. 
The copper workers' union was like many Chilean unions in that it 
had a leftist leadership, yet its concerns were economic rather than 
political. A £ew weeks after the 1970 election, the miners went on 
strike for a 70 per cent wage increase. Allende, who no doubt 
noticed that Chuquicamata had voted for Alessandri in the presidential 
election, talked of a "workers• aristocracy" which the new government 
could not tolerate. 22 
We must struggle to bring the truth home to these workers 
- it is not enough that they should have trade union 
organization, until and unless it is steeped in revolutionary 
ideology ••• The workers in the copper industry must understand 
that they are not going to enjoy a privileged position far 
above those of other workers simply because they are in the 
copper industry.23 
The ironic situation developed of a leftist government dominated by 
working-class parties attempting to curb wage demands while the 
rightest opposition encouraged them. Allende used Fidel Castro's 
visit in November 1971 to persv~de the copper workers to reduce their 




On the problems of management and organisation of the 
industrial sector, see o. Garretbn in J.A. zammit (ed.), 
The Chilean Road to Socialism, Sussex 1973, 63-8. On the 
problems of workers• participation, see J. Garc~s in zammit 
(ed.); 181-6, £or a government viewpoint; L. Figueroa in 
zammi t (ed.) , 1 87-191 , for the trade union viewpoint. 
s. Allende, Chile.•s Road to Socialism, Middlesex 1973, 112. 
R. Debray, The Chilean Revolution, New York 1971, 109-10e 
miners and to nitrate workers, Castro stressed the importance 0£ 
workers' discipline and unity among the Left. 24 These calls 
themselves implied the heterogeneity of the working class in Chile, 
its failure to consolidate behind Allende, and the decline in 
labour discipline at the copper mines. 
From the copper workers• perspective, the new government 
management was characterized by political rivalries among members 
of the various UP parties and mismanagement. Many of the new 
political appointees had little technological experience in the 
copper industry. The new management also reduced the benefits 
that the workers had received from the American companies. 
Following Allende's election nearly half 0£ the 460 mine 
supervisors at Chuquicamata, who lived in free company housing 
and received salaries in dollars, left either for political 
reasons and/or £or better-paid positions offered by the American 
companies. At the time of Allende's election, Castro had warned 
him to avoid a loss of technical experience, as Cuba had suffered 
a decade earlier. The mass exodus of the mine technicians was 
probably the most important single factor in the stagnation of 
copper production, and revealed the continuing inadequacy of 
technological experience in Chileo 25 Chile was dependent on the 
world's technological centres in another way, as demonstrated at 
the new Exotica mine, when problems in processing its copper ore 
developed after nationalization. 
Our technicians in the copper industry are now acutely 
aware 0£ the political dimension of technological dependence. 
24. see F. Castro, Fidel in Chile, New York 1972 .. 
25. Sigmund, 176. 
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In the old days, when our mineral resources were foreign 
controlled, technical problems were easily resolved. A 
telex message was simply rushed to the United States and 
a new part promptly flown in. Now, of course, the 
replacement of broken parts is not so easily resolved ••• 26 
In the international struggle over copper nationalization the 
weapons used by Chilean nationalists were almost wholly political, 
whereas those of the large foreign companies were mainly technological. 
Other pressure tactics adopted by the u.s. companies against 
Chile included bringing a u.s. Supreme Court action blocking the New 
York accounts of CODELCO and CORFO. Kennecott also attempted 
successfully to have Chile:ln shipments of copper in European ports 
held, claiming the copper belonged to it. The company issued a 
White Paper in which it detailed the benefits 'to Chile of Kennecott•s 
ownership of the El Teniente mine, and saying that although Chile was 
in its right to nationalize the mine, the "excess profits" decision 
meant that "the expropriation contravenes accepted principles of 
. . 1 1 27 1nternat1ona aw11 • 
Problems outside government control also affected production. 
The Kennecott White Paper reported that output at El Teniente was 
hindered by the most severe drought in over 80 years. The government 
also pointed to the rundown state of the mines as they had been left 
by the foreign companies. Most importantly, Chile nationalized its 
Gran Mineria just when the world copper market moved from scarcity 
to abundance, causing a dramatic fall in world prices. The ending 
of the £actors that had caused scarcity in the second half of the 
1960 1s, the Vietnam war and a major strike by copper workers in the 
26. J. Cayuela, 'The Hidden Invasion• in Johnson (ed.), 118. 
27. 'The Kennecott White Paper on Chile's Expropriation of the 
El Teniente Copper Mine' in Inter-American Economic Affairs 
Spring 1972, 37. 
United States,coincided with the opening of mines in the early 
1970's by the multinational companies in "safer" areas. 
In November 1971 Chile called a moratorium on its foreign 
debt, thus declaring a critical balance-of-payments problem. 
Increasingly the Chilean goverrunent cited as responsible an 
"invisible blockade" against Chile by the United States. This 
theme was given credence with the publication by Washington Post 
columnist Jack Anderson in March 1972 of confidential ITT documents. 
Quickly translated into Spanish, they revealed that corporation's 
clandestine efforts to prevent Allende's election in 1970 and its 
advocacy of an economic blockade against Chile. The references in 
the documents to Eduardo Frei provoked attacks on him by pro-UP 
newspapers, although the ITT officials indicated bitterly that Frei 
had not responded to their approaches. Allende "could be stopped 
if F'rei would stand firm for his country and quit trying to play 
the part of Hamlet, wishing to go down in history as the great 
28 
democrat". 
On January 19 President Nixon announced a tougher policy 
against nations that expropriated U.S. property without "prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation", stating that the United States 
would "not extend new bilateral economic benefits to the expropriating 
country11 • 29 Thus the U.S. government was explicitly and publicly 
putting economic pressure on Chile. Its economic aid dropped from 
almost $30 million in 1970 to $8.6 million in 1971 and $7.4 million 
in 1972, the latter mainly money for existing aid projects. 30 In 
28. ITT, Subversion in Chile, Nottingham 1972, 51. 
290 quoted by NACLA, New Chile, New York 1973, 51. 
30. figures from United States Senate Select Committee, 
Covert Action in Chile, Washington 1975, 34. 
September Al£onso Inestroza, president of the Chilean Central Bank, 
claimed that since Allende came to office the World Bank had not 
issued Chile with one new loan which was directly related to the 
nationalization of the u.s. copper companies. 
In acting as it did, the World Bank acted not as an 
independent multinational body at the service of the 
economic development of all its members, but in fact 
as a spokesman or instrument 0£ private interests of 
one of its member countries.31 
Bank President Robert McNamara replied that internal economic 
stability was the prerequisite for new loans, claiming ·that the 
most important issue was of Chile's creditworthiness, cast into 
doubt by its debt payment suspension. But he indicated that the 
Bank had also reviewed the copper nationalization in its lending 
1 . 32 po icy. 
The existence of external economic pressure was one thing; 
its efficacy was another. Efficacy is difficult to assess, but 
although American pressure undoubtedly had an unsettling effect on 
the Chilean economy and planning efforts, the Chilean government 
secured loans from other sources that compensated for the loss of 
American money. 
The overall volume of credits - and imports - rose 
markedly, and if the amount and commodity composition 
of Chilean imports nevertheless turned out to be 
inadequate it was because of the domestic economic 
situation which made Chile's import requireinents 
virtually insatiable. 33 
Furthermore, at the Club of Rome in Paris in April 1972 Chile 
managed to renegotiate most of its foreign debt, so that it was 
31. A. Inestroza, 'The world Bank and Imperialism' in c. Wilber 
(ed.), The Political Economy of Development and Under-
development, New York 1973, 154. 
32. 'Chile and the World Bank• in Inter-American Economic 
Affairs, Autumn 1976, 81-91. 
33. De Vylder, 106. 
required to pay only 30 per cent of the amount oweld1 in 1972, 
despite U.S. attempts to tie refinancing to the compensation 
issue. In June, the UP government reached a similar agreement 
with private American banks. 
Economic difficulties encouraged the opposition to take a 
more active initiative. The rhetoric of radicalization and armed 
conflict by the extreme Left, which was divisive to the Chilean 
Left, was countered by a developing rhetoric on the Right, which 
gave cohesion to the disparate groups in opposition. Criticism 
of the government was especially strong over the government's 
nationalization of industry, which threatened state totalitarianism, 
and its toleration of extreme leftist groups, which undermined its 
democratic commitment. The opposition interpreted statements 
made by Allende to Regis Debray in the interview published by the 
Communist newspaper El Siglo as confirmation of those fears. On 
the question of sedition Allende declared that, "we shall meet 
reactionary violence with revolutionary violence" but that, 11for 
the time being, to stay within the domain of legality". Allende 
also said that he had accepted the Statute of Democratic Guarantees 
. . 34 
11as a tactical necessity11 • 
The challenge to the government came on two fronts: through 
Congress, where the opposition parties showed increasing coherence, 
and in the country generally, where two polarized and increasingly 
militant social forces confronted each other. Effective congress-
ional action against the government required the Christian Democrats 
to collaborate with the National party, which was unequivocal in its 
34. Debray, 97, 119. 
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opposition. But the Christian Democrats seemed unwilling to 
move until they had a social base of support for stronger anti-
government action. That base was provided by the effects of a 
deteriorating economy on the standard-of-living of the middle 
class. In general, congressional initiatives were encouraged 
by or began with action by private middle-class groups. 
Middle class protest began with the March of the Empty 
Pots on December 1, 1971, in which 5,000 women from the relatively 
affluent suburb of Barrio Alto in Santiago banged saucepans in 
demonstration against food shortages, the rising cost-of-living, 
and the coincident visit to Chile of Fidel Castro, accused in the 
opposition press of interfering in internal politics. Street 
violence ensued when MIR and Communist youths threw rocks at the 
women, leading to the declaration of a "state of emergency" (a 
form of martial law) in Santiago. 
Other clashes between Marxist and non-Marxist students took 
place during a struggle for control of the University of Chile. 
Government plans to restructure the twelve professional schools 
and faculties led to a conflict between the pro-Christian Democrat 
university rector, Edgardo Boeninger, and the University Council 
with a pro-Marxist majority. A series of occupations of various 
faculties and clashes between pro- and anti-government groups was 
only quietened after a compromise agreement was reached to hold new 
university elections in April 1972. 35 
This social violence was the catalyst £or the PDC to join in 
35. on castro•s visit, the March of the Empty Pots, and the 
university conflict, see Sigmund, 162-4. 
a congressional initiative to discredit the government by the 
impeachment of ministers and to delimit the President's 
flexibility of action by constitutional amendment. In 1971 
the Christian Democrats had refused to support a National 
attempt to impeach Pedro Vuskovic, in return for concessions 
from the government. But the debacle of the women's march, 
prompted the Christian Democrats to initiate impeachment 
proceedings against Interior Minister Jos~ Toh~ on the grounds 
that he had permitted armed leftist groups to operate. The 
announcement of the impeachment by Senator Re~n Fuentealba 
indicated the hardening attitude of a Centre politican who was 
initially sympathetic to Popular Unity. Moreover, as interior 
minister, Toha was second only to the president in the government, 
a clear warning to Allende. Allende sidestepped the impeachment 
by retaining Toh~ in the government, declaring that the congress-
ional action had been promoted solely for political purposes. 
Itmust be clearly understood that this is a presidential 
regime and we will do everything possible to prevent this 
kind of thing, which is~ throwback to an outdated 
parliamentarian system. 3 
/ 
The next interior minister, Hernan del Canto, was impeached on 
similar grounds during a new wave of intense social tension in 
July. Again the government declared that the proceedings were 
political and not constitutional, and switched Del Canto to 
another portfolio. 
Also at the end of 1971, Christian Democrats Juan Hamilton 
and Fuentealba sponsored a constitutional amendment defining and 
delimiting the government's nationalization programme. While 
36. Sbbel (ed.), 70. 
retaining the three areas - public, mixed, and private - of the 
economy, it required that all nationalizations of private 
enterprises be carried out by specific congressional legislation, 
aiming at the congressional regulation of what the president had 
been doing by legal loophole. The amendment also reconunended 
worker rather than state control, a reflection of the Christian 
Democrat conununitarian ideology. 37 
By vetoing the bill Allende provoked a constitutional debate 
over whether a simple majority or a two-thirds majority in Congress 
was necessary to override a presidential vote. Since a change in 
the legislation in 1970 had not specified which, each side interpreted 
the legislation favourably to itself. The opposition parties 
insisted on a simple majority, and wanted to settle the issue with 
a plebiscite which they were confident of winning. Allende argued 
for a two-thirds majority, and that the dispute be submitted to the 
new Constitutional Tribunal, which he believed was sympathetic to 
the government. 
Two attempts were made to come to a compromise in the issue. 
In April Justice Minister Hanuel Sanhueza, a member of the party 0£ 
the Radical Left (PIR) negotiated with the Christian Democrats. 
But the agreement he reached, providing for legal regulation of 
government takeovers, was rejected by the UP Political Conunand 
(made up of all Popular Unity parties), again demonstrating the 
blocking 0£ Allende's options by his Oim coalition. Allende's veto 
of the nationalization amendment and the rejection of Sanhueza's 
37. see Sigmund, 158-60. 
agreement were the signal for the PIR to leave the government 
coalition. Its departure was a blow to government aspirations 
of attracting middle-class support, and was bitterly denounced 
38 by Allende. Again in June, on Allende's initiative, 
negotiations were held between the PDC president Fuentealba and 
Jorge Tapia of the official Radical party. This time it was the 
Christian Democrats who broke of£ the talks, a decision apparently 
influenced by a forth-coming by-election in Coquimbo. 39 The 
constitutional issue remained stalemated until the overthrow of 
Allende in 1973. 
In September two other bills met with presidential veto. 
The first was a constitutional amendment guaranteeing £arms under 
40 hectares from expropriation, in response to the land seizures 
and many cases of agrarian reform abuse in which landholdings under 
the legal limit were taken. The amendment also provided that 
expropriated land be assigned to the peasants in individual or 
cooperative oi,,mership within a year, reflecting the roc•s antipathy 
to state oi,,mership and its capitalization on the resistance 0£ many 
peasants to the Agrarian Reform Centres. 
The second provided for public financing and price guarantees 
for the press and radio, because of continuing concern for the 
independence of the news media and the near bankruptcy of the 
Alessandri paper company. Despite their problems, however, the 
news media of the Right still had superior :resources and reached a 
far greater audience than that of the Left. The CIA gave over 
$1.6 million to support El Mercurio {in September 1971 and April 1972), 
38. Ibid., 168-9. 
39. Ibid., 170. 
·1 /,5., 
which it considered to be the most important channel £or anti-Allende 
40 propaganda. El Mercurio displayed a Cold War mentality in which, 
as novelist and diplomat Jorge Edwards wrote, 11The political 
realities of the centre are transformed with retarded myths on the 
periphery11 • 41 Ironically, at times these myths complemented those 
0£ the extreme Le__f't, such as confusing America with the CIA, and 
exaggerating both the armed strength of the extreme Left and a 
climate of anarchy to encourage paranoia among the middle class. 
Congress had more success in blocking government proposals, 
such as controlling inflation through increased taxation. 
Chonchol complained that Congress refused to allow material 
incentives for collective farming, with the result that the 
Jacques 
campesinos in the reformed sector preferred to work on their own 
plots rather than on communally held land.42 
But the constitutional impasse and Allende's ability to 
sidestep ministerial impeachments only increased the opposition's 
frustration at being unable to effectively control Allende by 
constitutional means. Meanwhile the Allende govermnent was 
proceeding with the nationalization of a list of 91 industries it 
had dra,-m up, mostly through the purchase of shares by CORFO. 
Congress's failure to ensnare Allende in the Constitution, or to 
convert Chile to a congressional-run system, turned the Christian 
Democrats to the hard-line National policy of forcing Allende to 
leave office. There were still different interpretations as to how 
best to do this: peacefully by plebiscite or impeachment, or force-
40. U.S. Senate Select Committee, 29, 60. 
41. J. Edwards, Persona non grata, London 1977, 271. 
42. Tiranti and Petersen, 16-17. 
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On taxation, see Boorstein, 
fully by a military coup; whether to push £or an immediate 
confrontation or wait. 43 But Sigmund concludes that in retrospect 
the Fuentealba-Tapia negotiations "appear to have been the last 
chance to prevent the polarization which terminated in the 1973 
44 
COUP"• .. 
The middle months of 1972 saw a series of confrontations in 
various sectors of society between government and opposition, the 
confrontations both institutional and increasingly militant as 
people resorted to extra-legal means to show their strength. The 
university elections held in April and a by-election in Coquimbo 
in July confirmed the pattern 0£ declining support for the Allende 
government. At the University of Chile the delay of a few months 
bene£itted the Christian Democrats. Not even Felipe Herrera, 
former president 0£ the Inter-American Development Bank and a 
personal friend 0£ Allende, could defeat the incumbent Edgardo 
Boeninger. Anti-Marxist candidates also narrowly outpolled UP 
sympathizers on the university council. The attention paid to 
these elections reflected the polarized condition of Chile, but they 
were also intrinsically important as the university ran television 
and radio stations. The victory of the Popular Unity candidate in 
Coquimbo encouraged the government, but Coquimbo had always been a 
strong Marxist area and the UP plurality was significantly down on 
the April 1971 figures. 
In April the "First I.a.tin American Encounter of Christians 
£or Socialism" was held in Santiago. Although in principle 
43. Roxborough, 205. 
44. Sigmund, 170. 
international, the conference grew out of the specific Chilean 
context and was welcomed by Allende. Drawing on the theology 
of liberation, the Christians for Socialism intended to serve 
three main £'unctions: to provide Christian support for the 
Allende government, to undercut the idea that Christianity and 
Marxism were incompatible, and to forestall a right-wing 
exploitation of Christianity by unmasking an unconscious alliance 
in practice between Christianity and bourgeois ideology. The 
manifesto issued by the conference was explicitly Marxist in its 
analysis of Latin American reality. 45 
The Christians for Socialism conference was part of an 
intense debate within the Catholic Church on socialism in general 
and the Allende government in particular. A year previously the 
Chilean Bishops had released a document The Gospel, Politics and 
Socialism, in which they showed respect for the Allende government, 
but at the same time opposed doctrinaire Marxism. They believed 
that Christians could collaborate with Marxists to build a more 
humane society, provided that their Marxism was pluralist, 
humanist and undogmatic. 46 The Catholic Church showed its respect 
for the Allende government in other ways: Cardinal Silva Henriquez 
held a service on the day of Allende's inauguration which the 
president attended, and the bishops supported the takeover of the 
copper industry. 
A wave of labour unrest in May-July contributed to polarization. 
45. see 'F'irst Latin American Encounter of Christians for Socialism' 
inc. Wilber (ed.), 390-400; P. Hebbelthwaite, The Christian-
Marxist Dialogue, New York 1977, 57-62. 
46. Hebbelthwaite, 58; Sigmund, 145. 
11Economistic11 strikes £or wage increases or better conditions, 
including those at the Chuquicamata and El Teniente copper mines 
and the Lota and Coronel coal mines, were encouraged by the 
opposition parties. Other stoppages at companies were intended 
to force nationalization by the government. In August Santiago 
shopkeepers held a one-day strike protesting at inflation, the 
scarcity of goods, price controls and other official restrictions. 
Government and opposition supporters clashed with each other and 
with police in a series of marches, demonstrations and street 
violence, forcing the government to declare "states of emergency" 
in Santiago and Concepcibn. In the south, groups of small land-
owners began to regain by force land seized by leftists. 
\'/11ile the opposition parties continued their ideological 
campaign against Allende, there developed also an organizational 
dimension to the opposition. Particularly important were the 
gremios, or militant trade associations, such as the Sociedad 
Nacional de Agricultura (sNA) representing private landowners, the 
Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA) which claimed to include a 
majority of Chilean private industrialists, and national confederations 
of retail store owners, truck owners, professionals and others. The 
gremios claimed to transcend party politics, and facilitated a sense 
of identity between the various elements of the middle class, from 
47 the small to the large entrepreneur. 
This developing coherence in middle-class opposition resulted 
in the most serious challenge yet to the Allende government and the 
culmination of the opposition initiative in 1972: the massive, 
47. see Roxborough, 207-10. 
nationwide strike of October. 48 The strike began in the deep 
south in the province of Aysen, where truckers protested against 
government plans to establish a state trucking agency and the 
shortage of spare parts. Because of the vulnerability of Chile 
to dislocations of transportation, the nationwide truckers' strike 
quickly caused chaos in the distribution and supply 0£ goods. 
The government immediately called the strike "seditious" and 
arrested many strikers, including the leader 0£ the truck owner's 
gremio, Leon Vilarin. 
But the protest snowballed into a popular protest against 
the UP government, the truckers being joined by most shopkeepers 
and small businessmen, engineers, bank employees, gas workers, 
lawyers, architects, taxi and bus drivers, doctors and dentists. 
Behind the strike lay an accumulation 0£ economic grievances. But 
it was also clear that many people were using the stike to overthrow 
the government. The opposition parties expressed support £or the 
strike, and on October 17 Christian Democrat leaders rejected an 
invitation from Allende to discuss the crisis.49 Despite widespread 
rumours, the U.S. 40 Committee did not approve any financial support 
for the truckers, although the strikers were actively supported by 
l . . . ,..,IA £ d 50 severa groups rece1v1ng v un s. The strike compounded a 
disastrous beginning to the 1972-3 agricultural year, in which food 
production declined 2.3 per cent. Heavy rain had stopped the early 
sowing of seed; when the weather cleared, the truckers' strike meant 
that the campersinos could not obtain seed, fertilizer or farm 
48. on the truckers• strike, see Sigmund, 184-7. 
49. Sobel (ed.), 97e 
50. U.S. Senate Select Committee, 2, 31. 
h . 51 mac 1nery. 
At the height of the crisis 20 out of 25 provinces were 
placed under a state of emergency, with the army ensuring a 
minimum supply 0£ goods, especially food and fuel. The government 
authorised the takeover of shops that remained closed and took over 
all radio stations, an action later declared illegal by the 
controller-general. Parallel workers• organizations, knmm as 
cordones industriales, emerged to help establish some co-ordination 
in the production in requisitioned industries and in supplies to 
the shantytown areas. Once it became evident that the Allende 
government would survive, it began to reach agreements with 
different striking groups, most of whom were back at work by October 
25. 
The October strike revealed a curious stalemate between the 
polarized social forces. The strike had brought rapid economic 
deterioration and political polarization, yet the opposition 
initiative had not been sufficiently strong to succeed in over-
throwing the government. Allende was also forced to compromise. 
The settlement with the strikers included a pledge by the government 
not to nationalize trucking, no government reprisals against 
stri1<ers or strike leaders, and the return of private businesses 
taken over or requisitioned during the strike. 52 But the 
opposition was satisfied most by Allende's incorporation of three 
senior military officers in the new cabinet reorganized on November 
5, among them the former commander-in-chief of the army and stnong 
51. Tiranti and Petersen, 16. 
52. see Sobel (ed.), 98-9, for the terms of the strike 
settlement. 
constitutionalist, General Carlos Prats, in the controversial 
position of minister of the interior. Military involvement 
marked a turning point both £or the Allende government and 
£or civilian predominance in Chilean politics. 
151. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE MILITARY ENTERS POLITICS 
The inclusion of General Prats and his fellow officers in the 
government in November made explicit a subtle shift of balance in 
Chilean civil-military relations. For the first time in forty years 
the armed forces were actively involved in the institutional politics 
of the country. Less than a year later the armed forces overthrew 
the Allende government and established a military regime. Why the 
Chilean military, which enjoyed a reputation in the Latin American 
continent for its constitutionalism, moved unilaterally against a 
democratically-elected government and in the brutal manner that it 
did, involves the nature of the military and its relation to the 
civil authority, and the events of 1970-73. 
There are a number of problems in discussing .the role of the 
military in this dramatic reversal of civil-military relations. 
Foremost of these is the lack of information. On one level, as an 
insular institution, a "state within a state", the internal workings 
of the armed forces were seldom on public display. Information is 
indeed most limited in the planning of a coup, since this is by 
definition a conspiratorial action. As such, not only do the 
activities of the inner core of officers remain shrouded.in mystery, 
but also the conspiratorial element gives rumour and speculation an 
edge over more factual evidence. This introduces the problem on 
another level, that of sources. Robinson Rojas, for example, 
providing a journalistic description of what happened within the armed 
forces during Allende's regime, uses mostly unidentified sources. 
Although one cannot dismiss his explanation that to name these sources 
would jeopardize the lives 0£ many Chileans, the problem 0£ 
"£" t" . 1 veri ica ion remains. 
A problem 0£ interpretation concerns the kind of analysis 
used. Of three writers concentrating on the Chilean armed £orces, 
Rojas takes a Marxist approach ("The Armed Forces of the bourgeoisie 
constitute the main support of 'formal democracy• and will always 
act in its defense"), while Frederick Nunn takes an institutional 
approach ("In sum, this was a military coup, neither rightest nor 
leftist, and one which served the interests of Chile as interpreted 
by the armed forces. Other interests are ancillary. 11 )2 Alain Joxe 
attempts to blend both class and institutional analyses, within an 
explicit "dependency" framework. Thus the military was 11a social 
formation with its own distinct method 0£ organization", yet there 
was 11a grea.t dea.l of historical evidence on the Chilean armed forces• 
close ties with imperialism, as well as the impossibility of 
insulating the military £rom a class struggle that had polarized 
the country as a whole." He concludes, "Military interventions 
are rare in Chilea.n history, but when they have occurred, it has 
always been at a critical point in the history of world capitalism. 113 
The relationship 0£ the Chilean armed forces with the United 
States is also critical: intimate ties are generally emphasized by 
those taking a Marxist line and diminished by those with an 
1. R. Rojas, The Murder of Allende, New York 1976, 223 n. 
2. R. Rojas, 'The Chilean Armed Forces' in D.L. Johnson (ed.), 
The Chilean Road to Socialism, Garden City 1973, 311; 
F.M. Nunn, The Military in Chilean History, Albuquerque 1976, 
297. 
3. A. Joxe, 'The Chilean Armed Forces and the Making 0£ the· 
Coup• in P. O'Brien (ed.), Allende's Chile, New York 1976, 
245, 248. 
institutional approach. For Roxborough et al., "it is easy 
enough ••• to £ind evidence which suggests that for more than 20 
years, the armed forces had been steadily becoming less 'Chilean• 
and more of a local police force £or American imperialism"; 
Nacla also develops the theme of a patron-client relationship 
between the United States and the "local" military.4 Nunn, on 
the other hand, denies that the relationship was so dependent, 
arguing for example that U.S. groups seriously miscalculated the 
Chilean military at the time of Allende's election in 1970. 5 
The terms "armed forces" and "military" are used inter-
changeably to refer to the four services totalling ninety thousand 
officers and men: army, 32,000; navy, 18,000; air force, 10,000; 
and police (carabineros,which included para-military forces), 
6 30,000. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion relates to the 
officer corps, who were the professional administrators of the 
military and formed a class or elite of their O\,m. Because of its 
size and position, the army was the most politically significant of 
the services. The navy and air force were considered to be more 
conservative than the army, while the army and the carabineros were 
more 11popular 11 in composition. 
The "apolitical" image of the Chilean armed forces derived 
not from some static matter of principle, but £Porn specific historical 
experience. The factors conducive to military acceptance of civ.iliap 
4. I~ Roxborough et al., Chile: The State and Revolution, 
U.S.A. 1977, 187; North American Congress on Latin America, 
New Chile, New York 1973, 52-3. 
5. see Nunn, 268. 
6. figures from The Mtillitary Balance, 1973-1974, London 1973, 61. 
authority were outgrowths of the previous sustained. period of 
intervention, 1924-32: the disastrous end to Ib~nez•s military 
dictatorship ('l:-927-31) and the chaotic, turbulent events of 1931-32 
forced the military to retire from political involvement. 7 Nunn 
writes, "military involvement became synonymous not only with 
authoritarianism and depression, but with golpe, countergolpe, 
extremism, continual depression, and government without directions"; 
8 
11the military appeared as gangrene." 
antipathy towards the armed forces. 
There was great civilian 
The rejection of the military in politics, combined with a 
revival of civilian organizational solidarity, fed the belief that 
civilians could govern better than officers. Although this belief 
continued until the 1970's, it could potentially be reversed by 
events since it was itself a reaction to the events of 1931-32. 
In a 1965 interview published in the magazine Ercilla, a former 
army commander-in-chief maintained that non-intervention was based 
on constitutional and professional reasons, but indicated that 
acceptance of civilian authority was conditional. 
Not only the army - I guarantee - but all the armed forces 
have a clear doctrine: military power is consciously 
subordinated to the political power, the Constitution and 
the laws ••• never could we intervene on our own, because 
we are disciplined... Furthermore, history demonstrated 
to us that never has that intervention been necessary, 
because our governors have a common sense a.nd good 
judgement.9 
For their part, the armed forces recognized the debilitating 
7. see Nunn, 182-194; B.G. Burnett, Political Groups in Chile, 
Austen 1970, 43-4. 
8. Nunn, 185, 183. 
9o quoted by A. and J.s. Valenzuela (eds.), Chile: Politics 
and Society, New Brunswick 1976, 23. 
impact of political activity on their professional development 
and internal unity. The officers rejected politics to avoid 
the disintegration of the armed forces• corporate identity and 
integrity. Instead, they chose to concentrate on professional 
development, which seemed to require that they stay out of 
politics. The result was a high degree of professionalism, 
institutional autonomy and corporate cohesion. 10 The armed 
forces preferred a civilian minister of defense because it 
allowed the officer corps and general staff a certain insulation, 
since a civilian would have no authority over professional 
11 matters. 
One reflection of the Chilean military•s "apolitical" 
stance and corresponding high professionalism was, at least 
until the 1970's, the lack of an ideology or a "national development" 
mission, comparable to those developed by the armed forces in Brazil 
and Peru. In a study 0£ the type 0£ article accepted for the 
army journal ~, Nunn concluded that the military had become 
more technically oriented each decade since the 1930's. 
"Professional training has not inclined the Chilean armed forces 
toward a sense of mission, beyond a set of militaristic values. 1112 
"Apolitical" did not mean "politically unimportant". The 
armed forces exercised a veto power on the political system in two 
10. R.R. Kaufman, Transitions to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate 
Regimes: The Chilean Case, Beverly Hills 1976, 44. 
11. see Nunn, 224. 
12. Ibid., 265. See also Kaufman, 46; P. Werder, 
The Military and Modernization in Peru and Brazil, 
University of Canterbury 1978, chap. lX. 
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areas: non-interference of civilians in internal military affairs 
and respect by the civil government £or the Constitution. 
The first was essentially a quid pro quo arrangement, 
guaranteeing the independence of the military and civil-political 
spheres. The armed forces• defence of their institutional unity 
was translated into several concerns. The economic concern £or 
pay increases and expenditure on military equipment was a reminder 
that military wages were as much affected by inflation as those of 
civilians. In October 1969, recently retired General Roberto 
Viaux led a military revolt at the headquarters of the Tacna 
Artillery Regiment in Santiago. Viaux maintained that he was 
concerned solely with professional matters, in particular military 
pay, and the incident was settled without violence. But the 
Tacnazo, described by Nunn as "melodramatic, old-fashioned military 
insubordination", indicated that some sectors of the armed forces 
were prepared to take political action as a means of resolving 
political problems. Although most of the military did not support 
V'iaux (who a year later was imprisoned £or complicity in the 
Schneider assassination), he enjoyed a considerable popularity 
among the rank-and-file of the armed forces. 13 
Another concern of the armed forces was a monopoly on the 
means 0£ force. This had become more urgent in the 1960•s as the 
spectre of guerrilla warfare increased and the "internal security" 
£unction of the armed forces was emphasized. The United States 
encouraged this £unction among Latin American militaries, including 
counter-insurgency training in military bases in the Panama zone 
and in North America. Guba rem,3.ined a provocative motif, and the 
13. see P.E. Sigmund, The Overthrow 0£ Allende, Pittsburgh 1977, 
85-7; Nunn, 260. 
nationalism of the officer corps was particularly sensitive to 
any attempts to import subversion. 
A related concern was of attempts to infiltrate the armed 
.forces, especially by leftists, opening as it did the military 
to politically-inspired disunity. For instance, in May 1970 
it was reported that 2 army officers and 14 privates ha.d been 
asked to leave the service because of suspected connections 
with the MIR. The army colTlm:lnder General Schneider denounced 
the conspiracy as being 11 in concommittance with a certain 
civilian clandestine movement." 14 
The second political role of the armed forces, that of 
defending the Constitution against civil abuse, was described 
by a retiring general in 1966. 
Its ~he military1 duty is to constitute itself as a 
bulwark of internal security so that the Constitutional 
government can carry on its work... Our respect as 
soldiers of the fatherland, is for. the Constitutional 
government. Its breakdown would bring great harm to 
the country. Initially a certain structuring of 
authority would be maintained, but soon an open struggle 
would develop for the highest governmental positions. 
As long as there is a Constitutional gove:r.~nment it will 
have the unreserved respect of the Armed Forces.15 
Again, the last sentence qualified the belief that non-intervention 
was axiomatic. The general accurately foretold the result of a 
breakdovm of the constitutional authority. 
11Constitutionalism" also meant respect for a legitimately 
elected government. The self-consciously "apolitical" armed forces 
14. 
15. 
Times of the Americas, 13 ~.ay, 1970, 8. 
quoted by M.D. Wolpin, CUban Foreign Policy and Chilean 
Politics, U.S.A. 1972, 23-4. 
·159,. 
did nothing to prevent Allende from assuming office, despite 
clear evidence that the United States government was encouraging 
a coup and the coup-directed activities of a few officers 
congregated around General Viaux, and despite the realization 
that a large number of people in different spheres were not only 
prepared to see them act, but wanted them to. 
The U.S. Senate report on covert action in Chile noted 
that on September 15, 1970, President Nixon instructed CIA 
Director Richard Helms to play a direct role in organizing a 
" military coup d'etat to prevent Allende's accession to office. 
This policy, known as Track II, was distinguished from other 
efforts against Allende not because its objective was a coup but 
because of its direct contact with the Chilean military. 
the knowledge of the Departments of State and Defense or of 
Without 
Ambassador Edward Korry, the CIA made 21 contacts with 1<:ey 
military and carabinero o£ficials in Chile between October 5-20. 16 
On the one hand, the failure of this u.s. activity suggested that 
the Chilean military was not meekly subservient to the wishes of 
the political Right or American imperialism. On the other hand, 
it confirmed that the constitutionalist line was predominant in 
the armed forces at this point. This was also reflected in the 
failure of the assassination of General Ren~ Schneider, the 
leading army voice of constitutionalism, to provoke a coup as was 
evidently intended. The politically-inspired killing shocked the 
officer corps as it did the nation as a whole. Schneider's 
16. u.s. Senate Select Committee, Covert Action in Chile, 
_1963-1973, Washington 1975, 23, 25-6. 
successor as commander-in-chief of the army was another leading 
constitutionalist, General Carlos Prats. 
·1 (;(),. 
, 
Therefore, the 1973 coup d'etat and the development by the 
armed forces of a political ideology were primarily responses to 
events after 1970. The politicization of the military, not only 
the rejection of their "apolitical" position but also the 
decision to overthrow the government, resulted from a variety 
of pressures: Allende's o"m policy toward the armed forces, the 
effect in the country of his policies in general, the activities 
of other political groups and efforts by the opposition directed 
toward the military, and moves within the armed forces. However, 
the interpretation of these pressures was that of the officer 
corps, and not one handed do"n1 from sources external to the 
military. In 1971 Korry stated before a U.S. congressional 
committee that "the military will do whatever they wish to do in 
the defense of Chilean national interest with or without U .s. 
influence. 1117 
In Allende's first year a joke circulated in Chile that 
the president had to spend twenty-three out of every twenty-four 
hours worrying about the military. His strategy towards them 
indicated that he saw the military as a political force and one to 
have on his side. He wooed them with pay rises and military 
equipment, thus pre-empting possible naterial grievances. 
Allende's generosity contrasted with the relative neglect under 
Presidents Alessandri and Frei that led to the military discontent 
expressed in the Tacnazo. Korry remarked to the congressional 
committee, 
17. U.S. Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
United States and Chile, Washington 1975, 6. 
The military is extremely placid. It has gotten the 
best deal that any President in modern history has given 
to the military ••• It has received very large pay 
increases. It has been given almost everything it 
requests in the way of new equipment ••• Moreover, on 
every occasion where national interest is involved, the 
military is in some way consulted by the Presidffit• 
He shows them a great deal of public deference. 
In speeches Allende £requently praised the armed forces for their 
respect £or the Constitution. 19 
At the same time, Allende sought to include the armed 
forces in his "national development" programme, again capitalizing 
on military feelings of neglect. 
we believe that the armed forces should not remain on 
the fringes of what is now taking place and that 
consequently they should be integrated directly with 
Chile's process of development. We cannot have powerful 
armed £orces in a country with high rates of mortality and 
sickness. We cannot afford to have armed forces which 
are technologically advanced and disproportionally well-
equipped in a country whose economic development is 
inadequate.20 
Representatives of the armed forces were appointed to various 
administrative and ma.nagement positions, in CORFO, the copper 
corporation, the Pacific Steel company, and various other national 
production boards. Allende himself met frequently with the 
military chiefs to discuss policies and to enlist their support. 
Allende judiciously refrained from purging officers 
unsympathetic to his government. Under the Statute of Democratic 
Guarantees he had pledged not to nake reforms in the armed £orces, 
such as 11democratization11 , but he successfully resisted efforts to 
18. Ibid., 4. 
19, see s. Allende, Chile's Road to Socialism, Hiddlesex 1973, 
120, 122, 135. 
20. Ibid., 135. 
remove from the president the right to appoint the service 
leaders. Allende could effectively purge the officer corps 
by appointing sympathetic officers further down on the seniority 
list, since it was military custom £or officers more senior to 
a newly-appointed service chief to retire from active service. 
But to upset the officer hierarchy in this way would have invited 
a military coup (both the Tacnazo and the abortive June 1973 coup 
were led by recently retired officers, around whom other officers 
rallied demanding their reinstatement). By respecting the norms 
of officer promotion, Allende was still able to have sympathetic 
officers heading all £our services by early 1972. 
For its part the military showed respect for the UP govern-
~ I 
ment when it accepted Jose Toha, impeached as interior minister by 
Congress, as defence minister in January 1972. His predecessor 
was also pop1Jlar with the armed forces: Alejandra Rios Valdivia, 
a well-liked, elderly, former military school instructor. 21 
The two major parties in Popular Unity appeared to differ 
in their attitudes towards the military, as seen during the Tacnazo 
when the Socialist party supported military claims while the 
Communist party supported the Frei government. The attitude of 
the PS, apart from exploiting an opportunity to gain favour with 
the armed forces, was related to its conception as a product of the 
"Socialist Republic" of Marmaduke Grove, a military-created 
experiment. 22 Another underlying cause of sympathy might have 
21. Joxe, 262-3; Nunn, 224. 
22. see Sigmund, 85; Nunn, 208-15. 
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been the greater militaristic tendencies of the Socialists. The 
Communist party, however, was aware of the anti-Communism that 
existed in the armed forces and was concerned to "play safe" to 
avoid a repetition of the 1948-58 repression of the party. The 
Communists' attitude also re£lected their firm commitment to 
peaceful means. 
Allende's policy of involving the armed forces in the 
political process carried with it the seeds of his downfull. 
Although the president emphasized that involvement of the military 
was to utilize their technical capabilities and would not compromise 
their professional status, his policy encouraged a consciousness 
of power, or politicization, among the officer corps. 23 In an 
increasingly polarized political conflict, both government and 
opposition looked to the military as an independent arbiter, indeed 
as the only effective mediating force in the country. Both 
emphasized the military•s role as guardian of the Constitution, 
although £or contrasting purposes: the government reaffirmed its 
legitimacy by reiterating that it was constitutionally elected, 
while the opposition claimed that UP had lost its legitimacy because 
of constitutional infringements. 
But as Allende and the opposition attempted to strengthen 
their ties to the military, the army began to divide into 
constitutional and institutional loyalties. The constitutionalists 
were foremost, since their leaders - Carlos Prats, Augusto Pinochet, 
Pablo Schaffhauser - were predominant and encouraged both by Allende 
and by tradition. The institutionalists emerged only gradually, 
23. Allende, 97, 135-6; Economist, 11 March, 1972, 29. 
under the pressure of the political conflict and since their 
leaders were either retired or neutralized: Viaux was 
imprisoned then exiled, Colonel Alberto Cabb~ was retired in 
January 1971, and General Alfredo Canales in September 1972. 
Whereas the constitutionalists believed that unity of the armed 
forces lay in adherence to the Constitution, the institutionalists 
believed in protecting the military against any disrupting 
association with leftist politics. 24 
The two groups were distinguished by their attitude 
towards military participation in the cabinet, an issue that 
reached prominence during the October strike. Underlying all 
attitudes was the appreciation that the armed forces meant, above 
all, control and stability. Whether the armed forces were 
rightest or leftist in political leaning was of lesser importance: 
the military were not against the revolutionary process per se, 
as seen in their refusal to stop Allende from coming to power. 
But they were concerned that the process be orderly: the 
maintenance of public order, the avoidance of spontaneity or 
political romanticism in any form. The military were, like the 
opposition, particularly disaffected with the activities of the 
far Left. These, plus the increasing violence between government 
and opposition supporters, involved the military in three ways. 
Firstly, the tomas of farms, land, housing and factories 
were anathema to the military's way 0£ thinking. Nor did it 
appreciate lyrical expressions 0£ the revolution. After the coup, 
the revolutionary murals painted by the Ramona Parra brigade and 
others were destroyed, the young folksinger Victor Jara was beaten 
24. see Nunn, 272-3. 
to death, and books were burnt, including Pablo Neruda's papers. 
Secondly, the army and the carabineros were called on to 
control physically the street clashes that began with the 11March 
0£ the Empty Pots" and spread during 1972. The of£icers 
received direct administrative responsibilities whenever the 
president declared a "state of emergency" in a province, as he 
did more and more £requently. During the October strike, most 
0£ the country was under military controle 
Thirdly, the armed £orces' monopoly of arms was threatened 
by the proliferation 0£ violent tactics by the political extremes. 
Then, as now, it was di£ficult to distinguish the reality from the 
rhetoric and rumour, with regard to the extent of private arming 
in Chile. Dudley Seers ,,rote in 1972, 
On the £ace of it, the situation seems desperate, and 
Santiago is buzzing with rumours - of householders in 
the upper-class suburbs arming themselves, 0£ MIR 
accumulating stocks of arms, of vigilante groups in 
the south, of the armed forces standing by.25 
This belonged partly to the politics of brinkmanship, for as 
Seers remarked, few people had anything to gain £rom a confrontation. 
Whatever the extent to which it was real, the image of massive 
arming among Chileans undoubtedly concerned the military. Nor 
was Allende helped by the frequent statements emanating from the 
revolutionary Le£t 0£ the need to prepare militarily £or the 
inevitable confrontation. The Libro Blanco, which the military 
junta published to justify the September 1973 coup, vas overwhelm-
ingly concerned with revelations of the acquisitions of weapons by 
25. D. Seers, 'Chile: is the road to Socialism blocked?' 
in '.Ehe World Today, Hay 1972, 207. 
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the Left and of plans for armed defence in the event 0£ a 
con£rontation. 26 Paradoxically, it was when the Le£t threatened 
the ability of the armed forces to undertake a coup d'etat 
against Allende, that they were most likely to provoke one. 
The relation 0£ the Allende government to armed leftist 
groups was a critical issue. The opposition charged that the 
government tolerated leftist violence, and used this as grounds 
£or the impeachment 0£ interior ministers Jos~ Toh&t and Hern£n del 
Canto. An incident with great political implications occurred in 
March 1972 when thirteen large wooden crates imported from Cuba 
were cleared through customs on the order of the head of 
Investigaciones and a close friend 0£ Allende, Eduardo Paredes. 
The government described the contents as "works of art", but the 
Libro Blanco contained inventories and photographs of armaments 
27 found in Allende's Santiago residence, Tomas Moro, after the coup. 
The episode of los bultos cubanos was important £or showing that 
some sections 0£ the Popular Unity government were actively 
preparing £or an armed con£rontation, and that this was happening 
with the knowledge of Allende himself. The incident received much 
,. 
attention and contributed to the impeachment of Hernan del Canto on 
a charge of customs violation. 
Other indications of Allende's personal ambivalence regarding 
revolutionary violence were his continued ties with Castro, a nephew 
who was a HIR leader and a· daughter married to an official in the 
Cuban secret police. A focus of military antipathy was the group 
26. 
27. 
see Military Junta, Libro Blanco del Cambio de Gobierno en 
Chile, Santiago 1973, passim. 
see Ibide, 103-8; H. Millas, Anatomia de un £racaso, 
Santiago 1973, 100-5. 
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of personal bodyguards (GAP, Grupo de Amigos Personales), 
comprised of young Socialist and MIR militants, which Allende 
formed in the tense months before Congress ratified his election 
in 1970. 
Military £ears of institutional disunity were also encouraged 
by rightist claims, voiced through El Mercurio, that the Conmn:u1ist 
party was in£iltrating young Marxists into the armed forces. 28 
Allende in £act sought military involvement in his cabinet 
before the October strike, In April 1972 Allende appointed a 
military engineer, General Pedro Palacios, as mining minister after 
the defection of the Radical Left party from the government. The 
appointment was part of Allende's aim "to incorporate the armed 
forces into the country's process of development in its economic, 
technical, scientific and cultural aspects", but it was also 
related to his increasing loss of middle-class support. 29 Again 
in the cabinet reshuffle of June it was reported that the army 
commander-in-chief rejected an offer by Allende of five cabinet 
posts, indicating military reluctance to participate actively in 
30 the government at that stage. 
By the time of the October strike, the opposition was push ing 
for military participation, both to guarantee the fairness of the 
forthcoming March congressional elections and to ensure that the 
government would not take reprisal action against strikers. In 
general terms they believed that military participation would bring 
a measure of order and restraint to government programmes and would 
28. L.A. Sobel (ed.), Chile and Allende, New York 1974, 79. 
29. Ibid., 82. 
30. Economist, 17 June, 1972, 18-9. 
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pressure the government to control the £ar Le£t more actively. 
The same belie£ coloured the attitudes 0£ the UP parties, 
resulting in the apparent reversal 0£ their previous positions. 
The le£t-wing 0£ Popular Unity - the Socialist party and MA.PU - and 
the MIR opposed military involvement, which they £elt would put a 
brake on the revolutionary process and hold back the momentum of 
"popular power", which the October strike had stimulated. Their 
uncompromising view of the middle class also a£fected their view 
0£ the military. Socialist Robinson Rojas, for example, was 
critical 0£ Allende's conciliatory approach toward the armed forces, 
which he condemned as the "armed bourgeois referee". In an 
article which the PS magazine Causa ML initially rejected £or 
publication because it would "damage the Le£t image 0£ ComNUiero 
Allende", Rojas argued that the armed forces had not intervened 
only because Allende had not yet broken with bourgeois institution-
l ·t 31 a J. Y• 
The Communist party, on the other hand, had the same concern 
as the armed forces £or the ordering of the revolutionary process 
and the avoidance 0£ spontaneous revolutionary tactics. Allegedly 
behind the June o££er 0£ cabinet posts to the military, the PC was 
afraid both 0£ being outflanked on the le£t and of the possibility 
of civil war or a coup. 
The extreme social tensions generated by the October strike 
encouraged both Allende to go against the wishes 0£ his left-wing 
and the military constitutionalists to reverse their previous 
decision, with the inclusion 0£ General Prats, Rear Admiral Ismael 
31. see Rojas in Johnson (ed.), 310-322. 
Huerta and G~1eral Claudio Sep~lveda in the November cabinet. 
Formal military involvement in the Allende government 
meant that the ef£ective military veto the military 
already exercised in certain policy areas - military 
aid from the United States, border disputes with 
Argentina, military pay and perquisites - now extended 
much more broadly to issues 0£ law and order, including 
the legality of the methods adopted £or the extension 
of state control over the economy. It also meant that 
the military services became collectively responsible 
£or approving and implementing government policy, thus 32 
abandoning the fiction of their ."nonpolitical" character. 
Its signi£icance was underlined a month later when during an 
overseas trip Allende left Interior Minister Prats as vice-president 
and in political charge of the nation. 
The October strike also encouraged Allende to accept an 
ArmsControl Law, despite strong opposition from the Socialist 
party, because it was_supported by the military. The bill aimed 
at strict regulation 0£ the possession of arms, giving the armed 
forces responsibility to enforce the bi11. 33 The passing 0£ the 
Arms Control Law and military participation in the cabinet 
I 
suggested that the veto power of the UP left-wing over Allende 
was becoming less effective and that the armed forces, not the 
militant working class, were coming to occupy a position of dual 
authority. 
But political involvement, while bringing a short-term 
easing of tension, only encouraged the divisions developing within 
the military, ultimately strengthening the position of the 
institutionalists at the expense of the constitutionalist officers 
who supported participation. As the military was sucked into the 
32. Sigmund, 188. 
33. see Ibid. , 183-4. 
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daily business of administration, it became increasingly 
identified with a highly controversial government. Prats, in 
particular, was dubbed the "Red General" by the Right, and was 
charged with giving speeches in the barracks supporting the UP 
government. 
Political involvement also encouraged corporate ideological 
tendencies reflecting the political implications of the differences 
within the armed forces. On the one hand, the constitutionalists, 
with Prats as their spokesman, became allied to the working class 
organisations. The November 1972 cabinet included not only the 
three officers, but also long-time CUT President Luis Figueroa 
and Secretary-General Her~n del Canto, giving the cabinet a 
"national unity" profile. Prats emerged as a caudillo-like 
figure at this stage, established nationally as a political figure, 
the voice of the army, urging national unity and supervising the 
congressional elections: the popular image of an impartial 
t . 1 · t 34 na 1.ona is • Prats may also have had political ambitions of 
his own. 
On the other hand, the institutionalists tended to align 
with the gremios, which had risen to a position of independent 
political strength with the nationwide strike. These links were 
not manifest until the military junta took over in late 1973. 
Significantly, both the constitutionalists and the institutionalists 
bypassed the political parties 0£ the Left and Right, and sought 
their connections with mass social groups, thus avoiding a strictly 
"political" image and suggesting an element of anti-parliamentar-
ionism. 
34. see Nunn, 272-3, 277-9. 
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However, military involvement did not resolve the political 
impasse that resulted from the October strike. From then until 
March the civil-military cabinet presided over a period of stalemate 
and armed truce, as political activity was directed toward the 
March 4 congressional elections. But this situation was superficial, 
as both before and after March government policy showed little 
coherence, and as soon as the military left the cabinet, political 
and social tensions rapidly escalated. 
The Allende government was increasingly seen to be a government 
without power: characterized by contradictory initiatives, some 
moving to the left, others to the right , and wi thdra"m when they 
encountered opposition. On January 20 Allende admitted to many 
mistakes since taking power, in agricultural and international 
policies, and in the failure to dismiss Congress and call a plebiscite 
soon after he was elected. His young minister of agriculture, 
,I 
Socialist Rolando Calderon, admitted the seriousness of the food 
problem, which was to cost the country over $600 million in food 
imports in 1973. 35 
Three major government initiatives were either withdra\>m or 
weakened, thereby increasing political opposition to the government 
without achieving any benefits. A proposal presented in January 1973 
by Economy Minister Orlando Hillas called for a re-examination of the 
industries within the Social Area, with the implication that many of 
the firms requisitioned during the October strike might be returned 
to their former owners. The Hillas Plan was strongly and publicly 
criticized by the cordones and the Socialist party, which were urging 
a rapid expansion of state control over industry. The left-wing 
35. Sobel (ed.), 110; Sigmund 196. 
interpreted it as an attempt to pull back in order to reach a 
conciliatory position toward the Christian Democrats, and it was 
eventually shelved. 
Also in January the minister of finance, Fernando Flores, 
announced a new distribution system £or basic foods, to overcome 
172. 
the problems of shortages and extensive black marketing. A family 
quota was to be established covering 30 essential food items, 
which the government-created supply and price committees {JAPs, 
Juntas de abastecimiento y precios) would enforce and help distribute. 
The opposition exaggerated the plan as a rationing system which would 
bring political control through the stomach, because most of the JAP 
committees were dominated by the Marxist parties. Criticism was 
only deflated when air force General Alberto Bachelet was named to 
head the new National Distribution Secretariat (DINAC), thus 
guaranteeing impartiality under the new measures. 36 
Shortly after the March elections, an ill-timed report 
proposing a major reorganization of the educational curriculum in 
line with "the values of socialist humanism" was released. The ENU 
school reform provoked a broad base of protest, from the opposition, 
the Catholic Church, the military, and high school students, with 
the charge that it would deliver education to a partisan ideology 
and end pluralism in Chilean education. On April 13, after a 
demonstration by the Christian Democrat-controlled Secondary School 
students Federation in Santiago was broken up by the police, 




on the Millas and Flores plans, see Sigmund, 195-6, 197; 
B. Stallings, Class Conflict and Economic Development in 
Chile, 1958-1973, Stanford 1978, 144-5. 
see Sigmund, 202-4; Sobel (ed.), 123-4. 
Two international overtures also had mixed results from the 
Chilean government. In late 1972 Allende visited Mexico, the 
United Nations, the Sovie.t Union and Cuba, with stopovers in Peru, 
Algeria and Venezuela. He received wide support for his 
government's nationalization of natural resources and denunciation 
of the international economic pressure against Chile. Speal<ing 
at the United Nations on December 4, the Chilean president centred 
his criticism on the U.S. based corporations ITT and Kennecott. 
He also accused the United States of promoting an economic blockade 
that had affected his country•s_ability to secure equipment, spare 
parts, food and medicine. 
But Allende was not so successful in his economic purpose, 
primarily the expansion of Soviet assistance. The Russians had 
promised Chile $293 million of aid in the preceding two years, and 
to purchase copper and copper products from Chile. But they 
extended few extra credits, revealing their unwillingness to under-
write the Marxist government in Chile as they had Castro's Cuba, 
reportedly at the cost of $1 million a day. Moscow did offer 
$50 million in low interest credits to buy Soviet military equipment, 
but Allende refused this since the Chilean armed forces preferred to 
38 obtain new equipment from the United States. 
Also in December the U.S. and Chilean governments held talks 
on their continuing disputes, including Chilean nationalization of 
u.s. property, Chile's $1.7 billion debt to the u.s., and 
Washington's obstruction of international credits. These problems 
38. see Sigmund, 191-5; Sobel (ea.), 101-2. On Chilean-Soviet 
relations under Allende, see J.L. Nogee and J.\'l. Sloan, 
'Allende's Chile and the Soviet Union' in Journal of Inter-
American Studies and World Affairs, Aug. 1979, 339-68. 
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were given greater urgency when Chile suspended paYf!lent§ to the 
World Bank on January 1, 1973. A second round 0£ negotiations 
was held in March, but ended in an impasse. 
For the opposition the March congressional elections were 
the last chance for three yea.rs to obstruct Allende electorally. 
The National party talked of a two-thirds majority, by which it 
intended to impeach the president. The more rational Christian 
Democrats, realising that two-thirds was unlikely since only half 
of the senate, seats were to be contested, saw the elections as a 
plebiscite on the Allende government. Allende hoped to increase 
39 on his presidential vote, and talked 0£ gaining 40 per cent. 
The campaign was acrimonious, especially in Santiago, where 
£our 0£ the senatorial candidates were Eduardo Frei, Sergio Onofre 
Jarpa (leader of_the National party), respected Communist Volodia 
Teitelboim, and the Socialist leader Carlos Altamirano. Another 
source of tension was that the elections were being contested on 
a straight government-opposition basis. The UP El Arrayan 
conference in early 1972 had recommended that coalitions be allowed 
to contest the congressional elections, resulting in the formation 
of two federations: the Popular Unity federation ( the Communist 
and Socialist parties, MA.PU, the Radical party, The Christian Left 
and API), and the Confederacion Democratica or CODE (the Christian 
Democrat and National parties, the Radical Democrats and the Left 
Radicals). The u.s. 40 committee approved nearly $1.5 million to 
support opposition political parties and private sector organisations 
39. on the 1973 congressional elections, see A. Angell, 
•congressional elections in Chile' in The World Today, 
April 1973, 135-8; Latin America, 2 Feb., 1973, 37-8; 
Sigmund, 196-201. 
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in anticipation 0£ the March elections, in October 1972,and a 
$ 0 . 40 further 200,00 in February 1973. 
The results were most remarkable for the stability they 
recorded in the Chilean electorate, corresponding closely to the 
figures £or the 1969 congressional elections. The government 
gained almost 44 per cent 0£ the vote, the opposition won 55.7 per 
cent. In terms 0£ seats, Popular Unity gained two senate seats 
and six in the Chamber 0£ Deputies, leaving the opposition with 
30 out 0£ 50 in the Senate and 87 out of 150 in the Chamber. 
Generally the £our main parties (PDC, PN, PS, PC) gained at 
the expense of the smaller parties. The Radicals, divided into 
three groups, lost 17 seats in the lower house, while the Left 
Christians were reduced from 9 deputies to one. Frei's lead in 
the Santiago race confirmed his position as the leading contender 
£or the opposition nomination in 1976, but Teitelboim and Altamirano 
also finished strongly. The estimated 700 1000 new voters, since 
18 year olds and illiterates were enfranchised in 1970, probably 
benefitted the government. 
The unexpected good showing of the UP coalition indicated 
primarily that working class support for the Left remained loyal. 
The deteriorating economy had disaffected the Chilean middle class, 
but hardship was nothing new to the working class. If the shortage of 
beef cut into the consumption habits of the middle class, the working 
class now had money to buy it when available. From July 1972 to 
July 1973 the amount of money in the private sector increased about 
300 per cent; despite the 70 per cent increase in the value of 
40. U.S. Senate Select Committee, 60. 
imports, the main factor in the inflation rate estimated at 300 
per cent by the middle of 1973 was excessive internal demand.41 
Alan Angell noted another kind of stability in the March 
elections. 
If many things are greatly changed in Allende's Chile, 
one characteristic of the political situation remains 
constant - no one admits to defeat in elections, and 
anyone with the sli4htest credible claim pronounces 
himself the victor. 2 
The March elections proved inconclusive regarding the 
political stalemate, encouraging both Allende and the opposition 
not to compromise. Pointing to the £act that no previous 
president had increased his support in mid-term elections, Allende 
named an all-civilian cabinet, although it was not clear whether 
this reflected more his or the military's wishes. Within UP he 
helped strengthen the position of the moderates: in the cabinet, 
in MA.PU and the Socialist party, and in launching Clodomiro Almeyda 
as a potential successor. This was at the cost of further 
distancing the radical Left, which suspected the Communist party 
. d . £ d . p 43 0£ seeking a pre om1nance o mo erates in U. 
The opposition hardened in attitude towards Allende. Within 
the Christian Democrat party the right-wing established its predomin-
ance when in May Patricio Aylwin, a close associate 0£ Frei, replaced 
the moderate Reiilin Fuentealba as president of the party. In the 
41. figures from ECIA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1973, 
New York 1975, 164-6. 
42. Angell, 135 • 
43. Rojas, The Murder of Allende, 128; Stallings, 146; 
Latin America, 1 June, 1973, 174-5. 
same month Frei himself, who had excluded all possibility of 
collaboration with the Allende government, was elected president 
of the Senate, thus reversing the positions he and Allende had 
held in 1967. 44 
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Political tension heightened in the months April-June as 
the Allende government £aced increasing political opposition, 
labour strikes and unrest, and an escalation of extremist violence. 
The related nationalization and constitutional issues re-emerged 
when the government expropriated another 41 companies by means of 
a "decree of insistence", which all members of the cabinet signed 
in order to overrule the courts and controller-general. Following 
this the PLC and PN threatened to impeach the entire cabinet, also 
a reaction to Allende's minister reshuffling method of avoiding 
impeachments. In June Allende received a setback when the 
constitutional tribunal, to which he had submitted the constitutional 
issue, re£used to pronounce on the dispute. 
In April El Teniente miners initiated a strike over wage 
claims, being joined by the miners at Chuquicamata on June 1. 
The strike reflected the miners' concern at the erosion of their 
position as the highest paid workers in Chile. They were supported 
by the opposition parties, the gremios, and farmers in the south, 
who sent food to the striking families. The strike was accompanied 
by much violence, both in the northern mining towns and in Santiago, 
where it erupted late in June as strikers came to the capital. On 
June 6 the government suspended copper shipments because of the 
strike, at a time when copper prices were rising on the world market 
44. Latin America, 6 April, 1973, 106; 1 June, 1973, 176. 
(70 per cent in 1973). Both the Communist and Socialist parties 
charged Allende with being too lenient with the miners, intervening 
when he proposed to talk with the strike leaders. "The length 0£ 
the strike demonstrated both Allende's determination to hold down 
soaring wages and the loss of confidence in his government, at 
least by the best-paid workers. 45 
The rise in labour unrest was paralleled by an increase in 
activity by the political extremes. The MIR was calling £or the 
formation 0£ armed worker groups, and denounced government repression 
when police dispersed MIR assaults on private and state food 
distributors. The right-wing Patria y Libertad also stepped up a 
campaign of subversion designed to overthrow the government. 
Patria y Libertad was growing openly into a quasi-fascist organization, 
with many links with the ~ios: one leader, Benjamin Matte, for 
example, was a former president of the agricultural association, SNA. 
Members of Patria y Libertad were also suspected 0£ involvement 
in an abortive military coup led by Colonel Souper 0£ the Second 
Armoured Regiment on June 29, the climax to three months 0£ growing 
tension. Since the military had left the cabinet, there had been a 
growing ambivalence in their position. While General Prats was 
travelling overseas, differences of opinion within the military were 
becoming increasingly public. It was reported that Allende sought 
military participation to end the copper strike as he had done in 
November 1972, but that he was not prepared to accept the abandonment 
0£ his programme for rapid socialization as the military demanded.46 
45. Sigmund, 210. 
46 • Sobel (ed.), 127-8. 
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The June 29 episode was in £act a putsch rather than a coup 
d•~tatt representing a £airly spontaneous decision to actt with 
little organization or planninge Returning to the barracks £rom 
the presidential palacet which the presidential guard had de£ended, 
one tank had to stop at a service station for gasoline on the way. 
The rebellion was put down by the armed forces itself led personally 
by Prats, who emerged as something of a national hero. It was 
later clear that only the one regiment had rebelled, although five 
Patria y Libertad leaders including Pablo Rodriguez subsequently 
took re£uge in the Ecuadorian embassy, suggesting their complicity. 
One foreign report commented on the episode, 
It is obvious that the great hope of those who want Allende 
out of o££ice - the support of the armed £orces - has been 
removed. The events of last Friday demonstrated that the 
armed forces and police want to maintain their tradition, 
interrupted £or the £irst time in 42 years last week, 0£ 
non-intervention in politics.47 
In retrospect, the lack of military support £or the rebellion 
represented a more ironic truth. A group of officers hat begun, 
but not yet completed, plans £or a military intervention. They 
helped suppress the June 29 episode not because 0£ its aim, but 
because it was "adventurist11 and to keep their ovm e££orts alive. 
However, even the golpistas (of£icers planning a coup) were 
reluctant to act militarily be£ore all other means 0£ overthrowing 
Allende were exhausted. The congressional elections wer~ critical 
£or confirming to the military that Allende could not be ousted by 
democratic means. General Arellano, a member of the clandestine 
group planning the coup which took place in September, said in 
February 1974, "We all wanted a democratic way out. There wasn•t. 
47. Latin America, 6 July, 1973, 212. 
It was a tremendously difficult decision." But, "we were the 
army that wielded the sword. 
48 to play. 11 
We were the last card Chile had 
48. quoted by J.E. Garcts, 'World Equilibrium, Crisis and 
Militarization of Chile' in Journal of Peace Research, 
II 1974, 93 n. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE 1973 COUP 
OVERTHROW OF ALLENDE 
The £ailed putsch 0£ June 1973 (the tancazo) provided a brief 
respite £or the Allende government, but it soon became apparent that 
there was little changed in the political stalemate. More importantly, 
the rebel military action exposed the internal disunity that threatened 
to submerge the armed forces as an institution in the bitter political 
contest. In the space of two months the military•s need to preserve 
itself and its interpretation of the solution to the Chilean crisis 
merged into the united military action which overthrew the Popular 
Unity government. 
In the short term, Allende benefitted £rom the military 
rebellion, which provoked claims that he had engineered it himself. 
Expression of an upsurge of civilian solidarity proved to be illusory 
however, when Allende attempted to capitalize on it. On the grounds 
that the country was on the brink 0£ civil war Allende sought a three 
month "state of siege" giving the President wider powers than those 
under a "state 0£ emergency", but the bill was blocked by Congress. 
More signi£icantly, during the military uprising the national 
trade union leadership called on workers to occupy factories; in a 
single stroke government control 0£ companies nearly doubled. The 
CUT directive was related more to a £ear of being outflanked on the 
left by the developing cordones industriales than to the June 29 
putsch. The traditional trade union was concerned to bring the 
mobilization known as '\)opular power" under its direction rather than 
allow the creation 0£ a parallel working class organization. This 
also reflected the conflict between the Communist party, which 
retained its traditional control of the CUT, and the Socialist party 
and MIR, which were encouraging the cordones industriales. 
Following the suppression of the military revolt, but not 
necessarily a direct result 0£ it, was a resolution of the 74 day 
copper strike at El Teniente. In his May 21 message to Congress 
Allende criticized the "economist" political consciousness of some 
workers, referring specifically to the copper miners. 11The workers 
must make a decision: they must say whether we continue with an 
economistic policy whose symbol is El Teniente or i£ we go towards 
the sacrifice 0£ having less money £or the sake of grea.ter progress 
1 and more prosperous development." He felt personally the failure 
0£ some sectors 0£ the working class to support him, as indicated 
by petulant remarks he made threatening to leave office if the 
copper strike continued. 2 
It was clear after the tancazo that the Allende government had 
lost control of the country: the political and economic battles 
were lost long before the final military confrontation. 
On July 26 the truckers began a second national strike, which 
their leader Le6n Vilar:!n made it transparently clea.r was political 
in intent, that is, the dovm£all of the Allende government. 
Vilarin had acquired importance as a political figure in his own 
right, representing the independent political strength of the91;emios. 
According to one report, 11Sr. Vilarin clea.rly sees himself as a 
catalyst in a process 0£ confrontation that will either bring the 
government down or force Dr Allende to meet the demands of the 
1. quoted by H.A. Ia.ndsberger and T. McDaniel, 'Hypermobilization 
in Chile, 1970-1973' in World Politics, July 1976, 524. 
2. Latin America, 27 April, 1973, 133. 
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opposition majority in congress."3 
The Christian Democrat leaders were playing a dual role, torn 
between their commitment to constitutional democracy and the 
obsession of the predominant right-wing with the Marxist threat. 
Calling for a democratic solution to the political crisis, they 
simultaneously supported the strikes and demonstrations aimed at 
total capitulation by the government. On August 27 the Chamber 
of Deputies passed a motion censuring the government for constant 
violations of the Constitution. While the resolution did not 
explicitly call for a coup, it called on the armed forces to ensure 
the legality of government actions, thereby implicitly inviting a 
military solution. In a strong reply Allende accused the 
opposition of seeking to promote a military coup by inciting the 
armed forces to disobey the civil authoritiese4 
Allende was also playing a dual role, one which stemmed from 
the paradoxes in his o,m personality and in the nature of the 
Chilean Le£t. Hence his position on issues such as 1rpopular power" 
and conciliation with the middle class appeared ambiguous, leaving 
him open to the charge of lack of direction by both the Right and 
the radical Le£t. The latter saw that the way to regain the 
initiative was through "popular power", including the arming of the 
workers. The opposition insisted that a return to "normality" must 
begin with the government showing a commitment to peaceful means by 
disarming the radical Le£t and controlling workers• seizures. But 
"popular power" presented an embryonic form of the new revolutionary 
socialism which Allende could not suppress without appearing to 
3. Economist, 18 Aug., 1973, 34. 
see L.A. Sobel (ed.), Chile and Allende, New York 1974, 138-9; 
P.E. Sigmund, The Overthrow of Allende, Pittsburgh 1977, 232-3. 
compromise his socialist beliefs, while democracy represented a 
personal commitment and source of strength. Politically Allende 
was caught also: to break openly with the democratic system would 
unleash the opposition and the armed forces, while the suppression 
0£ the radical Left would cost Allende much 0£ his political support. 
Torn between the future and the past, Allende clung to the belie£ in 
a democratic road to socialism that by 1973 was illusory in Chile. 
By May 21, when the President gave his annual speech to 
Congress, he could offer no way out 0£ the current political impasse. 
In contrast to his previous two reports, the 1973 message, symboli-
cally titled "For democracy and the revolution, against civil war", 
lacked decisiveness and the promise of action. 5 After the coup his 
widow, Hortensia Bussi de Allende, spoke 0£ the change she 
experienced in her husband. 
He was always tense and worried, he certainly lost the 
calm and imperturbability 0£ former times... His sense 
of humour gradually became more polemical. Replies 
which were once subtle and ironical now became curt and 
dry. 6 
Stanley Plastrick made another assessment 0£ Allende during his last 
year in office: 
Allende himself - caught up in this turmoil, engulfed by 
waves 0£ clashing rhetoric, more and more cut of£ from 
his own party - appeared to lose control of the nachinery 
of government. His public posture grew uneasy, oscillating 
between extremes of language... These zig-zags, signs of 
desperation and loss 0£ nerve, ended with Allende alone in 
his palace, slaughtered by the army.7 
The president's perception and approach to reality was made 
no easier by the dreamlike sequence of events in the last few months 
6. 
sees. Allende, Mensaje presidente allende ante congreso pleno: 
21/mayo '73, Santiago 1973, vii-xxxv. 
G.,Borovik (comp.), The Tragedy of Chile, Moscow 1974, 20. 
S. Plastrik, •A Fir st Word on the Chilean Tragedy' in Dissent , 
Winter 1974, 10. 
of the Popular Unity government. There was an increasing sense of 
inevitability, of an irreversible dialectic, and of an impending 
confrontation. As early as May 1973 the British newsletter ~tin 
America observed that, "In the continuing crisis in Chile, both 
government and opposition seem like helpless spectators waiting 
8 
for something to break." 
Not only were they spectators, but the intense politicization 
of Chileans made them all actors integral to the drama. Each event 
had a political charge and was interpreted by geometrically opposed 
points of view. The assassination of Allende's naval aide, captain 
Arturo Araya, by unknown gunmen at his home in Santiago, was 
symptomatic: government and opposition presses each presented 
evidence that extremists from the other side were responsible for 
the killing. In a letter to General Carlos Prats a few days before 
the September coup, Radomiro Tomic, one of those whose voices of 
conciliation and moderation were drowned, wrote, 
As in the tragedies of Greek classical theatre, all know 
what will happen, all do not wish it to occur, but each 
one does precisely what is necessary to provoke the 
unfortunate outcome everyone pretends to avoid. 119 
In this atmosphere talks held between Allende and Patricio 
Aylwin, the hard-line president of the PDC, to attempt to resolve 
differences could be little more than ritual. The negotiations 
covered £our principal points: disarmament of paramilitary groups, 
presidential promulgation of the Christian Democrat bill defining the 
three areas of the economy, return of the industries occupied on 
June 29, and military participation in the cabinet. Allende revealed 
8. Latin America, 11 May, 1973, 145 • 
quoted by A. and J.S. Valenzuela (eds.), Chile: Politics and 
Society, New Brunswick 1976 , vii• 
that he was prepared to compromise on some issues, but the parties 
on both sides were unwilling to renounce any political advantage 
they had acquired. 10 The failure of the dialogue demonstrated how 
the demands of naintaining internal political unity in a competitive 
multi-party system could encourage intransigence rather than 
conciliation. 
The economy was also dominated by political factors. The 
ECI.A report on Chile in 1973 declared that the economy was influenced 
11 by "transcendental political and social developments". De Vylder 
suggests also that "while stagnation of output was what could be 
expected from a •strictly economic• point of view, the decline that 
1 1 t b .b d t 1· . l f 12 eventual y took p ace mus e attr1 ute o po itica actors alone. 11 
(original emphasis) 
Furthermore, most of the features of the economic crisis in 
1973, such as inflation, shortages, balance of payments problems and 
fiscal deficits, were not introduced by the Allende government but 
had plagued successive Chilean governments £or decades. The policies 
of the Allende government dramatically accentuated these recurrent 
problems. De Vylder cites UP's short-term economic policy as an 
example of policy which created more problems than it solved. 
Chile's productive capacity remained unable to meet all the demands 
that economic policies, and most notably those of Popular Unity, 
. ·t t t 13 required J. o mee. 
One traditional feature of the Chilean economy which returned 
was the reliance on a single export commodity, which Popular Unity 
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Economic Commission £or Iatin America, Economic Survey of latin 
America, 1973, New York 1975, 162. 
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Ibid., 208-220. 
In 1973 the share of copper in the total exports increased from 
71•7 per cent to 82.2 per cent. This was related to domestic 
production problems, a decrease in gross fixed investment by 14.3 
14 per cent,as well as a 70 per cent rise in the, world price 0£ copper. 
In the two months from the tancazo to the September coup 
Allende had to reorganize his cabinet three times. Controversy 
no longer centred on the balance 0£ the UP parties or 0£ moderates 
and radicals, but on the inclusion of the armed forces. After the 
June putsch Allende asked officers to join his cabinet, but they 
set unacceptable conditions £or their participation, amounting to 
military control of the Popular Unity government. 15 Two weeks 
into the second truckers' strike however, the economic chaos and 
political violence accompanying the strike, and related right-wing 
terrorism and sabotage, forced Allende to seek military presence 
in a National Security cabinet. The military officers included 
were the £our service chiefs: Prats as defence minister, Admiral 
Raul Montero as finance minister, air force commander General Cesar 
Ruiz as transport minister, and as such responsible for finding a 
solution to the truckers• strike, and police chief General Jose Maria 
Sep~lveda in the less important lands and colonization ministry. 
But military participation did not bring about a resolution 0£ 
the crisis as it had in November 1972, since this time the armed 
14e figures from ECIA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1973, 
162-8. Similarly in the Cuban Revolution, after an early 
attempt at rapid industrialization and development 0£ non-
traditional exports, the Castro government returned to a 
reliance on sugar exports, to the degree that in 1970 the 
drive towards a 10 million ton harvest dominated Cuban a££airs. 
But Castro inherited a far less developed industrial infra-
structure than did Allende. 
15. see F .M. Nunn, The Military in Chilean History, Albuquerque 
1976, 284; Sobel (ea.), 131-2. 
forces themselves were deeply divided over involvement in the 
Allende government. Involvement met with criticism from the 
Right, which wanted the military to exercise far greater control 
over the Allende government, and from the radical Left, which 
saw the armed forces as an obstacle to the revolution. 
issue. 
0£ greatest direct concern to the armed forces was the arms 
After the June putsch, and with pressure from the 
congressional opposition, the army began seriously to enforce 
the Arms Control Law, which allowed it to conduct raids in search 
of weapons without requiring authorization from the government. 
In reality, the army focused mainly on the Left, causing bitterness 
among Allende's left-wing supporters who demanded the immediate 
repeal 0£ the law. The law served the armed forces in two ways. 
Firstly, the genuine search £or arms revealed many caches 0£ 
weapons, intensifying military £ear of an armed working class. 
Secondly, the law allowed less scrupulous officers to test their 
soldiers in confrontations with the working class and also to 
terrorize the workers. 16 
Thus the prerequisites £or a military coup in Chile existed: 
wide popular support and implicit congressional encouragement for 
military action, the concern £or national and internal "security" 
as a result 0£ economic and political chaos and subversion, the 
threat to the armed forces as an institution, and general antipathy 
to the anarchic situation. Moreover, the Brazilian, Peruvian, 
Bolivian and Uruguayan militaries had all presented examples of 
military solutions to national crises, thus putting pr.assure 
16. I. Roxborough et al., Chile: The State and Revolution, 
U.S.A. 1977, 197-8, 201-3, contains instances 0£ military 
intimidation of the working class. 
on the Chilean o££icers to act similarly. In August and early 
September an accumulation 0£ precipitants made some £orm 0£ 
military action inevitable. 
In August the navy accused Altamirano 0£ the PS, Oscar 
, 
Garreton 0£ MAPU and Miguel Enriquez 0£ the MIR 0£ sponsoring a 
le£tist revolt 0£ sailors at Valparaiso, requesting that the 
congressional immunity 0£ Altamirano and Garretbn be li£ted. 
Amid reports 0£ the torture 0£ sailors, the UP executive committee 
later issued a statement, not supported by the Allende government, 
claiming that the sailors had refused to obey orders, promoting a 
naval coup. 17 That sel£-proclaimed Marxists were openly trying 
to in£iltrate the armed £orces and to subvert military discipline 
could only provoke counter-revolution. 
Meanwhile, Allende himself became involved in a dispute with 
the of£icers of the air £orce. On August 18 General Ruiz. 
resigned from the cabinet on the grounds that he had not been 
given su£ficient powers to end the truckers• strike. Allende 
also dismissed him as air force commander, at which Ruiz protested. 
Earlier in the month Allende had also retired the air £orce generals 
who were second and fourth in seniority. A large group of 
of£icers threatened to take action i£ Ruiz was not reinstated as 
air force commander, but finally allowed Allende's new appointee, 
General Gustavo Leigh, to take command. 
Allende's action, like that 0£ the radical Le£t, seemed to 
antagonize the service officers unnecessarily. Other rumours 
circulated 0£ an impending purge 0£ senior officers. These were 
related to the visit 0£ two leading Cubans, Vice-President Garlos 
17. see Sobel (ed.), 134-140. 
190,. 
Rafael Rodriguez, known to have Soviet connections, and the head 0£ 
the C'uban secret police, Manuel Pineiro, carrying a letter from Fidel 
Castro. The visit increased military suspicion of Cuban activities 
. Ch" l 1 S 1n 1 e. 
On August 22, after a noisy demonstration by the wives 0£ army 
officers outside his home and a subsequent hasty meeting 0£ generals, 
Prats announced his resignation as both de£ence minister and army 
commander, thus depriving Allende of his most crucial ally in the 
past year. Prats declared he had resigned to avoid a split in the 
army and "so as not to serve as a pretext for those who seek to 
overthrow the constitutional government 11 • 19 This indicated not 
only the deep divisions within the armed forces, but also that the 
constitutionalists had lost their control over the military. Prats, 
caught between the open hostility of the Right and the suspicions 0£ 
the extreme Left, had lost the con£idence of a majority of officers. 
His resignation left of the military members 0£ the cabinet only 
Admiral Montero, who in the following week was pressured into retiring 
by his fellow navy officers led by second-in-command Admiral Jos~ 
Merino. The discrediting of the constitutionalist o££icers, and in 
particular Prat•s resignation, opened the doors to the coup. 
18. 
19. 
The armed forces moved on Monday, September 11, beginning with 
Economist, 25Aug,1973, 38; 1 Sept, 1973, 19. Military Junta, 
Libro Blanco, Santiago 1973, 101-2, contains a handwritten 
facsimile of the Castro letter. After the coup Admiral Huerta, 
foreign minister £or the junta, read the letter to the U.N. General 
Assembly; see IDCX::, L., Birns (edo), Chile, New York Dec 1973, 
16-22. 
quoted by Sigmund, 231. 
Empty Pots'' and the visit of Fidel Castro, he was the army garrison 
commander in Santiago, thereby responsible £or implementing the 
"state of emergency" in the capital. later, as chief 0£ general 
sta££, he became second-in-command behind Prats. With the latter 
committed to a constitutionalist position and closely identified 
with the Allende government, the support 0£ Pinochet became crucial 
to the coup planners if they were not to go over the heads 0£ the 
two most senior army men. At the generals' conclave that voted 
12 to 6 against Prats, Pinochet supported his commander, but as the 
succeeding army chief would "reflect the predominant tendency in 
the high command which is clearly opposed to giving political support 
to the Unidad Popular". 21 
However, in 1974 Pinochet stated that on April 13, 1972, the 
general staff discussed the political situation and concluded that 
the "insuperable conflict between the executive and legislature will 
be without a constitutional solution." In the same year he said 
that he and seven other officers had signed a document on March 20, 
1973, declaring that a constitutional solution was now impossible. 22 
Rojas cites a meeting on June 30 at which Pinochet was invited to 
join the conspiracy, becoming the leader of the operation. 23 
Although inconsistent with each other, these reports suggest that 
Pinochet was committed to a military solution before he supported 
Prats at the generals' meeting. Furthermore, although after the 
coup Pinochet spoke of a restoration 0£ constitutionalism, placing 
him as a moderate within the junta, he subsequently consolidated his 
21. quoted by Sigmund, 231. 
22. Ibid., 170, 312 n.l. 
23. R. Rojas, The Murder 0£ Allende, New Yorlc 1976, 167-8. 
a revolt by the navy at Valparaiso. Allende went to the Moneda 
Palace to learn 0£ the extent of the rebellion. In the event of 
a coup, many people expected the armed forces to split. Crucial 
to their unity was the position of the army, since the navy and air 
force had already made clear their opposition to the UP government. 
If the army supported President Allende, there might be a repeat of 
the bitter 1891 civil war, when the army and navy clashed over the 
dispute between President Balmaceda and the parliamentary opposition. 
But the armed forces functioned efficiently and in united fashion, 
with all £our services being represented in the military junta that 
was created. 
In particular, the role of General Augusto Pinochet, the new 
army commander succeeding Prats, closely resembled that of the 
"swing man", although his O'\lm statements after the coup suggested 
a more duplicitous role. The "swing man", because of his personal 
influence within the armed forces, prestige among the public or his 
critical position in the command structure of the armed forces, 
provides the critical margin of support £or the coup conspiracy. 
Often concerned to avoid conflict within the armed forces, which 
may result in a civil war, he encourages unity and provides leader-
20 ship during the coup. 
By reputation General Pinochet followed in the constitutionalist 
tradition of Schneider and Prats. However he was also involved in 
events which politicized the military generally. During the first 
wave of street violence in late 1971 surrounding the "March of the 
20. H.C. Needler, 'Political Development and Military Intervention 
in Latin America' in A. von Lazar and R.R. Kaufman (eds .. ), 
Reform and Revolution, Boston 1969, 229-248, develops the 
theory of the "swing man". 
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personal position as President and indicated that democracy would 
remain "in recess" for an extended period. In this he differed 
from the "swing man" who, because he is the latest adherent to 
the conspiracy, is theoretically least committed to the coup and 
favours an early return to civilian constitutionalism. 
Another reason for the military•s outward solidarity emerged 
after the coup with reports of the suppression within the armed 
forces of officers and troops thought to be sympathetic to Popular 
Unity. 24 This internal war included the arrest of officers, such 
as Admiral Montero and air force General Bachelet, and even 
shootings on the night before the coup. One school of carabinero 
NCOs in Santiago resisted £or three days before being wiped out. 
General Prats, who it was thought might lead a force against the 
golpistas, was allowed to slip over into Argentina, where he was 
later murdered. 
The failure of the armed forces to split meant that plans by the 
Left to resist were largely stillborn. The coup gave lie to the 
belief that the working class had the military capa,bility to confront 
the armed forces. Apart from armed resistance at the presidential 
palace, a few factories (notably the Sumar factory), the Technical 
University in Santiago, and some guerrilla activity in the southern 
provinces, the armed forces did not meet the confrontation they 
expected. Even after a full month of repression, Frei told Spanish 
journalists that before the coup "the Chilean Marxists disposed of 
arms superior in number and quality to those held by the armed 
24., see Latin America, 9 Nov, 1973, 356-8; G. Garcia Marque:z, 
'Why Allende Had to Die• in New Statesman, 15 Har, 1974, 
358. 
forces. 1125 The opposition leaders and El Mercurio continued to 
broadcast uncritically the claims made by the armed forces to justify 
the continued repression. 
The scale and brutality 0£ military repression derived from a 
number of factors. First, there was the potential brutality 0£ 
any military and in particular the professionalism of the Chilean 
armed forces, hence the desire to do the job properly. When asked 
why so many people died in the relatively harmless June putsch, 
General Pinochet replied, "When the army comes out, it is to kill. 1126 
Second, the armed forces were acting from a position of 
insecurity, because 0£ both their uneasy ideological stance and 
doubt as to internal unity. The fascism with which the military 
junta was characterized was more an "ideological cover", designed 
to conceal and replace the technocrat - military current that the 
Chilean military did not have. 27 The divisions within the armed 
forces encouraged a rapid, brutal action to weld them together againe 
Third, the sense of prevailing anarchy and heightened urgency 
in Chilean society, along with the rhetoric of violence emanating 
from both the extreme Left and Right, encouraged the military to 
overreact, in the belie£ that they would face a far greater confront-




Fourth, and most importantly, was the nature of Popular Unity 
quoted by L. Whitehead, 'Why Allende Fell' in 'fhe World Today, 
Nov 1973, 474 n. 
quoted by Sigmund, 215. 
see o. Paz, 'The Centurions of Santiago• in Dissent, Spring 
1974, 356; R.R. Kaufman, Transitions to Stable Authoritarian 
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and its relation to the political system. Allende's election was 
not an anomaly but inherent in the Chilean democratic system. 
Therefore the armed £orces were concerned not simply to remove the 
person at the head, but to dismantle the whole system that had 
allowed a Marxist regime to come to office. The armed £orces 
wanted to destroy the Marxist Left, but also to depoliticize the 
entire country, involving the suppression 0£ all parties and 
democratic liberties. Ultimately, the officers held democracy 
to blame £or the crisis in Chile. 
The Christian Democrats led by Frei, who implicitly invited 
a military solution, £ailed to appreciate the strength 0£ this 
antidemocratic current. Following the coup the official party 
statement supported the military action to preclude an armed coup 
by the Left, describing "the sensation of relief with which the 
majority of the citizens welcomed the military uprising", but 
questioning the continuing repression and consolidation 0£ a 
military dictatorship. A group of dissenting Christian Democrats, 
including former party president Fuentealba and deputy Bernardo 
Leighton, categorically condemned Allende's overthrow and the 
"antidemocratic deviation" of the country. 28 This documertt, plus 
an article by Tomic before the coup supporting General Prats, 
indicated the determination 0£ the increasingly isolated moderates 
to be heardo The bitterly divided Christian Democrats, criticized 
by both the Right and Left, and under suspicion of complicity with 
the CIA, were discredited by the coup. 
The United States was also widely held to be involved in the 
overthrow of Allende .. One claim was that the joint U.S.-Chilean 
28. IDOC, 31-35, 29-30, contains these two documents. 
naval manoeuvres off the Chilean coast were a cover £or the golpe. 
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on covert action in Chile found 
no evidence that the United States was 11directly11 involved in the 
1973 coup. 
However, the United States sought in 1970 to foment a 
military coup in Chile; a£ter 1970 it adopted a policy, 
both overt and covert, of opposition to Allende; and it 
remained in intelligence contact with the Chilean military , 29 
including officers who were participating in coup plotting. 
Moreover, while U.S. economic aid was shut down t military aid 
to Chile increased under Allende: $5.7 million in 1971, $12.3 
million in 1972, $15 million in 1973. 30 But arms sales in them-
selves do not cause military coups. Other points 0£ contact 
between the U.S. and Chilean armed forces were of£icer training 
programmes in America and in the U.S. canal zone in Panama and joint 
manoeuvres, but the political or ideological implicationsof these, 
while existing, were indirect at most. 
In sum, U.S. policy towards Allende's Chile was undoubtedly 
hostile. It wished to see the down fa 11 of the UP government, and 
both the United States and its leading Latin American partner, 
Brazil, benefitted in geopolitical terms from the military coup in 
Chile. But the decisions for that coup were taken by the Chilean 
armed forces, and it was they who carried it out. 
The armed forces claimed as their leading victim the president 
of Chile, Salvador Allende. Whether he committed suicide or was 
murdered as the armed forces attacked the presidential palace is 
29. U.S. Senate Select Committee, Covert action in Chile 1963-1973, 
Washington 1975, 2. 
30. Ibid., 34. 
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ultimately of little signi£icance.31 Allende was determined to 
fight to the end, rather than join the ever-growing colony 0£ 
exiled Latin American presidents: in the morning the generals 
of£ered him the option 0£ exile, but he refused to take it. 32 
The soldiers were equally prepared to kill him i£ necessary. 
It is more important to ask what impelled Allende to resist 
to the death. Gabriel Garcia Marquez felt it was his belated 
disillusionment at the £ailure of his democratic ~oad to socialism. 
"Experience taught him too late that a system cannot be changed by 
33 a government without power." Allende seemed to remain optimistic 
0£ finding a way long a£ter most other political actors had lost 
£aith in la via chilena. 
Moreover, to defend his beliefs to his death would maximize 
the future impact of his overthrow, £or both political and personal 
reasons. 34 There is an essential word in Spanish, duende, which 
although it has no exact English equivalent, involves the transmitting 
0£ a profoundly felt emotion to an audience 0£ strangers with the 
minimum 0£ fuss and the maximum of restraint. Allende's final 
message to the Chilean people, delivered from the presidential 
palace a few hours before his death and perhaps preconceived £or this 
moment, had duende. Calling on the people to defend themselves but 
31. see Sigmund, 244-7, £or a summary 0£ the arguments in the 
suicide/murder debate. 
32. F. Castro and B. Allende Bussi, The highest example of heroism, 
La Habana 1973, 16-17i 52-3. 
33. Garcia Marquez, 35 8. 
34. see Appendix 1 for Allende• s final message. "History has 
given me a choice. I shall sacrifice my life in loyalty to 
my people, in the knowledge that the seeds that we have 
planted in the noble consciousness of thousands 0£ Chileans 
can never be prevented £rem bearing fruit. 11 
to avoid needless sacrifice, he sought as throughout his three 
years in office to avoid a civil war, which for humanitarian 
reasons and from political realism he knew would be senseless. 35 
Duende is not style or ability: it is a struggle and it 
invokes the possibility of death. The Spanish poet Lorca wrote, 
"Every step that a man ••• takes towards the tower of his per£ection 
is at the cost of the struggle he maintains with a duende", and 
11the duende likes the edge of things, the wound, and... is dra'\>m 
to where forms £use themselves in a longing greater than their 
visible expression". It is a ma.tter "of real live form; of 
blood; of ancient culture; of creative action11. 36 Allende, 
who spent his life seeking a nonviolent road to socialism, chose 
to die holding a machine gun given to him by Fidel Castro. In 
his final day this patrician in the workers' movement lived out 
the paradox of his own life and of the Chilean Left which he 
embodied: both belonging to a democratic system and committed to 
a socialist revolution. From this stemmed the final irony of a 
ma.n defending the legality he had sought to transcend, while those 
who had declared him illegitimate in the name of that legality 
overthrew it violently, either by action or by sanction$ Alle.nde 
died defending a democracy that was not just of the "bourgeoisie" 
but was his mm, not simply the product of a reactionary social 
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With the overthrow 0£ Allende and Popular Unity, Chile's 
attempt at political creativity within a democratic framework 
£ailed. The 1973 coup placed Chile, which had previously 
been seen as an exception to the norms of latin American 
politics, within the contemporary Latin American context of 
a wave 0£ military interventions and governments. 
The political process in Chile in the early 1970's was 
extraordinarily complex - a struggle in which all aspects 0£ 
Chileans' lives were integral and which dema.nded an intense 
commitment •. Hence, retrospective "lessons" from the Chilean 
experience of a democratic road to socialism are in danger of 
facile answers and of underestimating the labyrinthine reality 
that faced Allende. Such lessons are often based on one of, 
two assv.mptions concerning la via chilena; that it was doomed 
from the start, or that it was viable if certain events or 
mistakes had not happened. The question remains whether 
Allende's downfall could have been avoided by an alternative 
strategy, or, conversely, whether any of the three strategies 
proposed could have produced another result. 
The first alternative strategy was to break with the 
non-violent democratic path and pursue openly revolutionary 
means to achieve socialism. This line was pursued by the left-
wing 0£ the PS, the MIR and militant working class groups, 
200 .. 
especially during Allende's final months. MIR leader Miguel 
Enriquez believed that the coup represented the tragic end 
and price of "the re£ormist illusion" that sought an alliance 
with the armed forces and the middle class. 1 Socialist 
Carlos Altamirano also argued that an agreement with the middle 
class could only be sought from a position of the monopoly of 
2 power. However, he denied the military junta's charge 0£ 
preparations by the Left to seize total power by force, known 
as Plan Zeta. 
There was no such thing as a Plan 'Z •. It is quite 
certain that there was no plan at alL There should 
have been one. Not the stupid and crazy plan which 
the Junta is crediting us with, but a reasonable one 
that the circumstances demanded.3 
Since UP had no armed forces 0£ its mm, the revolutionary 
strategy also called for alternative leftist political forces. 
The militant working class "popular power" represented an 
embryonic dictatorship of the proletariat, the MIR a revolution-
ary military dictatorship on the Cuban model. 
But there was a virtual antithesis between the historical 
situations of the Cuban Revolution and the revolutionary process 
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£or the military's version 0£ Plan Zeta. The plan, 
which the junta used to justify continuing repression 
of the Left, contained many inconsistencies, not the 
least of which was the intended death 0£ Allende himself. 
achieved power by the revolutionary violence of a £ew men. 
In Chile the success of the Left rested on the wide electoral 
support commanded by Marxist parties, committed by choice or 
necessity to non-violent means and headed by the non-
charismatic parliamentarian Allende. Whereas the Cuban 
Revolution began without an explicit ideology, with Castro 
not adopting Marxism-Leninism until 1961, in Chile ideology 
was an essential political feature. In 1959 Castro emerged 
in a power vacuum, with all the previous power elites deserted; 
in 1970 Allende faced the complete array of traditional 
institutional elites - Congress, judiciary, controller, 
bureaucracy, armed forces, etc. - which were jealous of their 
prerogatives and concerned to defend their interests. 
While UP' s overthrow has led many to argue that a 
democratic road to socialism is impossible, the strategy of 
armed revolution has succeeded in Cuba and Nicaragua but 
£ailed elsewhere. Furthermore, Allende's failure is contrasted 
with the debatable assumption that Castro "succeeded" in 
establishing "the first free territory in Latin America". 
The path of revolutionary violence was unrealistic in 
Chile because 0£ an "objective inequality 0£ the current military 
£orces".4 Given the continued independence, armed strength and 
vigilance of the Chilean military, any major build-up 0£ arms by 
the Left or attempt to break with the existing system would most 
4. J.E. Garces, 'World Equilibrium, Crisis and Militarization 
0£ Chile• in Journal of Peace Research, 2 1974, 83. 
likely have only provoked an earlier military intervention. 
This strategy of insurrection consistently overestimated the 
armed strength of the Left and the working class, or the 
influence of the revolutionaries within the Le£t. While the 
existence of the revolutionary Left and "popular power" was 
significant and conspicuous, neither had a mass following. 5 
Behind their thinking lay the appeal of the revolutionary 
✓ 6 !2£2 developed by ehe Guevara. 
In opposition to the revolutionary strategy was the 
second alternative of democratic consensus. This meant a 
broad political front, requiring in reality an alliance between 
UP and the Christian Democrat party. Allende demonstrated on 
several occasions that he was willing to seek agreement with 
the PDC, and many moderate Christian Democrats also sought a 
Centre-Left consensus to avoid the process of polarization. 
Radomiro Tomic described the need for "far-reaching agreement 
between socialists inspired by Christianity and those inspired 
by Marxism" if the socialist transformation was to be achieved 
without dictatorship. He argued that the failure to achieve 
5. In the 1972 CUT elections the MIR received only 2 per cent 
of the vote, although their influence was wider than this 
figure indicated. 
6. The revolutionary foco derived from the Cuban experience 
and embodied the i~that the revolution makes itself. 
Guevara believed that a small guerrilla group could 
begin the revolution, supplying leadership, mobilizing 
the surrounding population and acting as catalyst for the 
spread of revolution outwards from the foco. Popmlar 
support for the guerrillas was the crucTal"element. 
Guevara himself died in Bolivia trying to realise a 
revolutionary !£S2 in the centre of the continent. 
this "unity of the people" was UP's "fatal political error11 • 7 
PC leader Luis Corvalan also believed that the strength of the 
PDC in the "middle strata" and their considerable influence in 
the working class required that UP and the PW establish 
8 channels £or agreement. 
However, two questions remain unanswered in this strategy. 
The first is whether such an alliance was fe3.sible. One could 
overestimate the strength of those Christian Democrats sympathetic 
to the Left, or the willingness 0£ the middle class, the social 
base 0£ the PDC, to accept an alliance with the Marxist Left. 
Beginning in late 1971, militant opposition by middle class groups 
to Allende strengthened the position in the PDC of Eduardo Frei 
and other hard-liners relative to that of the moderates. 9 
The second question is whether a UP-PDC alliance would have 
allowed the socialist transformation to continue. The conflict 
within the PI:C and its political and ideological competition with 
the Left, including the fact that Frei was the leading candidate 
for the 1976 presidential election, may well have encouraged the 
Christian Democrat leaders to demand more than Allende could give 
without compromising his programme. Concessions by Allende would 
8. 
R. Tomic, •One View of Chile• s Present Political and Economic 
Situation' in J.A. za.mmit (ed.), The Chilean Road to Socialism, 
Sussex 1973, 37-40. 
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COl"Val~n was arrested by the military after the coup and 
sent with many other leftist leaders to Dawson Island. 
An international campaign secured his release. 
Frei continued his uncompromising opposition to the Marxist Left 
a£ter the coup. His work, The Mandate of History and Chile's 
Future, Ohio 1977, is noteworthy for its lack of self-criticism 
and unrepentant outlook. 
also have alienated the revolutionary Left, certainly the MIR 
and possibly the radical Socialists, from the democratic process 
into violence. 
The broad front strategy excluded the revolutionary strategy, 
since a prerequisite demanded by the Christian Democrats and the 
middle class was that the government control the activities 0£ the 
revolutionary Left. Allende did display a personal and political 
ambivalence towards the revolutionaries. But criticism that he 
£ailed to control them was not always relevant. 'rhe toma.s that 
were outside the institutional process were often taken directly 
by peasants and workers as defensive responses to o~mer provocation 
or from the perception of their and UP's interests. Former 
Agricultural Minister Jacques Chonchol maintained that, 11the impetus 
for agrarian reform in Chile lay consistently with the campesinos 
who pushed for the expropriations of the big estates11 • 10 Thus, 
the issue of the involvement of the revolutionary Left was of 
secondary importance·. Furthermore, Allende's sporadic attempts 
to restrain the revolutionaries demoralized the Left more than they 
demobilized the Right. 11 
The third strategy open to Allende was to seek to increase 
his electoral support with the aim of securing a congressional 
majority or, alternatively, of calling a plebiscite to change the 
constitutional arrangement. Since this was the strategy Allende 
implemented, we can view it in actual terms and in more direct 
10. 
11. 
D. Tiranti and G. Petersen, 'Allende's Land Revolution' in 
The New Internationalist, May 1975, 17. 
L. Whitehead, 'Why Allende Fell' in The World Today, 
Nov. 1973, 471. 
relation to the £ailure of la. via chilena. Unfortunately £or 
Allende, congressional elections did not £all due for two and a 
half years, by which time an absolute majority was out of the 
question. The most favourable time to call a plebiscite was, 
in retrospect, mid-1971, but Allende's proposal for one was 
rejected by his UP coalition which £eared, not without cause, 
that they would not win. 
UP' s economic performance ·was considered crucial to this 
strategy, and it was subsequently charged that economic mismanage-
ment was the cause of UP's do,,m£all: "Allende was not overthrown 
because he was a socialist, but because he was incompetent 11 • 12 
The Chilean Left underestimated the serious effects of uncontrolled 
in£lati011, falling levels of investment and decline in productivity 
in nationalized sectors. However, even in the midst of a govern-
ment-created mini-boom, the Left only just managed to obtain 50 per 
cent of the vote in the 1971 municipal elections. 
Both the government and the opposition used the economy as 
a political weapon. UP explicitly saw economic policy as an 
instrument in the struggle for power. Opposition groups responded 
in kind, beginning with the "empty pots", at least half-full and 
culminating in the October 1972 strike. The perception of economic 
pressure by the United States was also important. The thesis of 
economic mismanagement was narrow, not only regarding these 
political £actors, but also in its implication that another left-
wing government could succeed if it simply avoided these economic 
12. New York Times, 16 June, 1974. 
mistakes. 
The socialist transformation was hindered by the failure 
of UP to develop a coherent direction. The Chilean Left did not 
have a single mass party, a populist ideology or charismatic 
leadership necessary to provide that coherence. The existence 
of two directions in UP meant that Allende had the worst of two 
possible worlds. The veto of the Socialists proved to be a 
negative £actor, blocking Allende's options without replacing them. 
The Communists displayed a more disciplined realism and sensitivity 
to the realities 0£ the Chilean situation, but their caution and 
the £ears of both the non-Communist Left and the Opposition of a 
Communist predominance in the government weakened their influence. 
Allende himself, sucked into political and partisan conflict, was 
increasingly unable to use his presidential authority to address 
himself directly to the Chilean people. Because of his personal 
ambivalence and transitional position, he could not provide 
direction once the different sectors of the Left were concerned 
to impose their own solutions rather than find a consensus. 
An essential element of revolutions seems to be surprise; fh<i!.'i 
occur neither when nor where they are expected. In this sense, 
their legitimacy or justification is derived ex post facto. The 
Chilean road to socialism demanded, however, that revolutionary 
changes be legitimized before they were made; that is, rationale 
had to precede, not follow, action. This made easier the job of 
the opposition, whose o,m flexibility of action was guaranteed by 
UP's democratic commitment. 
The revolutionary rhetoric of some sectors of the Left 
compounded this difficulty, simultaneously heightening their ovm 
expectations and making it more difficult to fulfill those 
expectations by giving justification to counter-revolution. 
The moderate Left was strongly critical of the violent language 
0£ the revolutionary Left. Volodia Teitelboirn, Communist 
senator, argued that, "the conspirators continuously took 
advantage of the ultra-revolutionaries• talk of armed forces, 
which they did not have". 13 ~ . Corvalan believed that, "The real 
popular power was also weakened and the enemy moves facilitated 
by the acts of the ultra-leftists, who sought to turn the 
emergent organizations into a power alternative to the Allende 
1Ll / government". ' As diplomat writer Jorge Edwards noted, the 
revolutionary Left 
failed to understand the danger of undermining the 
foundations of the political system that had enabled 
it to achieve power, and did not realise on whose 
behalf it was working when it scorned what it called 
'bourgeois legality,.15 
The events in Chile in 1970-73 bore a resemblance to the 
Spanish Civil war and the French Revolution, seen in the dilemmas 
that faced the Left, in the differing personalities and the roles 
they played, such as the compromiser and the believer, and the way 
in which individuals saw themselves and their relation to others 
in a moment of accelerated experience. This raises the interesting 
concept, beyond the scope 0£ the present discussion, of a cyclical 
notion 0£ history, with human experience repeating itself. 
13. V. Teitelboim, •Reflections on the 1,000 Days of Popular Unity 
Rule' in World Marxist Review, Jan. 1977, 37. 
,,, 
14. Corvalan, 25. 
15. J. Edwards, Persona non grata, London 1977, 252. 
A review of the possibilities open to the Left in Chile 
stresses their limitations and concludes that the odds were 
against the achievement of' the socialist transformation. No 
strategy guaranteed success or failure, and the strategy that 
Allende chose seemed the most flexible and viable at the time. 
Its chances of success were diminished by UP• s economic errors, 
its lack of cohesion and direction and revolutionary rhetoric. 
In the process of polarization, these factors benefitted the 
opposition forces, which proved more cohesive, militant and 
purposeful than those supporting the government. With its 
tenuous control of the government, UP £ailed because it lost the 
balance of power. Once the Left lost its momentum and went on 
the defensive, la via chilena became no longer a revolutionary 
process but a matter of survival. Ultimately, democracy and 
socialism were inseparable in Chile: each constituted the 
strength of the other. An outbreak of violence was probabl·e 
if' either was abandoned - the effect of this threat of violence 
within the armed forces finally tilted the balance of power in 
favour of counter-revolution. 
Indeed, the fundamental change of direction in recent 
Chilean history occurred not in 1970 but in 1973. Leaving aside 
ideological considerations, the characteristics of a revolutionary 
situation, such as the acceleration of human experience within 
time, the sudden break with the existing system or moment of 
transcendance and the ex post facto justification, appeared when 
the military seized power in September 1973. The Allende 
government was the catalyst £or that change of direction, Allende 
assuming from Frei the role of Kerensky in Chilean politics. The 
£ailure 0£ Chilean democracy involved many systemic £actors 
that transcended individual governments. Political 
polarization, mobilization that over£lowed the institutional 
system, a climate 0£ latent and real violence and a continuing 
sense of economic crisis and political stalemate were all 
evident before Allende came to power. Ironically, these 
£actors encouraged both his election and, accelerating under 
the experience of the UP government, his downfall. 
Octavio Paz described the militaristic caudillo as 11the 
barbarous reply of Latin America •s reality to the unreality of 
.d 1 . ' 16 1 eo ogies'. In Chile, as in Hispanic countries generally, 
counter-revolution has proven to be a stronger force than the 
forces 0£ the Western secular tradition, democracy and socialism. 
16. o. Paz, 'The Centurions 0£ Santiago• in Dissent, 
Spring 1974, 356. 
APPENDIX I 
PRESIDENT ALLENDE'S IAST MESSAGE 
Compatriots: 
This is certainly the last time I shall speak to you. 
The air force has bombed all our radio stations. My words 
£low more from disappointment than from bitterness - let 
them serve as a moral condemnation of those who betrayed 
their oath, these Chilean soldiers - so-called Commanders 
in Chief like the self-appointed Admiral Merino, or that 
jackal Mr. Mendoza, a general who only yesterday protested 
his loyalty to the government and has now appointed himself 
Director General of the Carabineros. 
Faced with all these events, there is only one thing 
I can say to the workers: I shall not surrender. 
History has given me a choice. I shall sacrifice 
my life in loyalty to my people, in the knowledge that the 
seeds th9.t we have planted in the noble consciousness of 
thousands of Chileans can never be prevented from bearing 
fruit. 
Our enemies are strong; they can enslave the peopleo 
But neither criminal acts nor force of arms can hold back 
this social process. History belongs to us; it is the 
people that make history. 
Workers of my country: 
I want to thank you for the loyalty you have always 
shmm, for the trust you have always placed in a man who 
has been no more than the interpreter of your great desire 
for justice, a man who undertook publicly to respect the 
constitution and the law and who did not betray that under-
taking. This is the last chance I shall have to speak to 
you, to explain to you what has happened. Foreign capital 
and imperialism have allied with the forces of reaction to 
produce a climate in which the armed forces have broken with 
tradition. General Schneider and Commander Araya, who 
upheld and reasserted that tradition, have fallen victim to 
those people, to that class which now hopes, through its 
intermediaries - the armed forces - to regain the interests 
and privileges it had lost. 
Let me speak first to the ordinary women of our country, 
to the peasant woman who had faith in us, to the working woman 
who worked even harder, to the mother who knew that her children 
were our concern. 
Let me speak to those members of the professions 
who acted in patriotic fashion, who a few days ago were 
still resisting the mu.~iny led by the professional associa-
tions, the unions of the upper class, a mutiny which they 
hoped would allow them to retain the privileges a few of 
them had enjoyed under a capitalist system. 
Let me speak to the young, to those who sang and 
who added their joy and their enthusiasm to our struggle. 
Let me spealc to the workers, peasants and intellectuals 
0£ Chile who will now su££er persecution, for Fascism has 
existed in our country for some time, and has already revealed 
itself in terrorism, in the sabotage of bridges, railway lines 
and oil pipelines. 
No doubt Radio Magellanes will be silenced very soon 
too, and my words will no longer reach you. Yet you will 
continue to hear them; I shall always be with you. And 
at the very least I shall leave behind the memory of an 
honourable man, who kept faith with the working class. 
The people must defend themselves; but they must 
avoid needless sacrifice. The people must never be crushed, 
humiliated or destroyed. 
workers of my country: 
I have faith in Chile and its destiny. Other Chileans 
will come forward. In these dark and bitter days, when 
treachery seeks to impose its o,-m order, you may be sure that 
soon, very soon, the broad road towards a new society will open 
again, and the march along that road will continue. 
Long live ChileJ 
Long live the peoplel 
Long live the workersJ 
These are my last words. I know that my sacrifice is 
not in vain. May it be a lesson for all those who hate dis-
loyalty, cowardice and treachery. 
Source: I. Roxborough, et al., Chile: The State and 
Revolution, U.S.A. 1977, 229-30. 
A NOTE ON SOURCES 
The following is a comprehensive, but by no means complete, 
list of material on Allende's Chile. The primary/secondary division 
is somewhat arbitrary, because of the contemporaneity of events and 
the essential passion and commitment of much of the writing. 
Sigmund's The Overthrow of Allende (1977) is noteworthy as the first 
detached, objective and thorough account of what happened in Chile. 
Neruda's plea in his poem 'Let the Railsplitter Awake' has 
had its response in the interest of many Americans in Chile's road 
to socialism and the subsequent questioning of their government's 
role in Allende's downfall. Consequently, the American invo 1 vement 
in Chile is one of the best documented areas, especially with the 
two government reports published in 1975. 
What is most lacking is a private record - personal papers, 
letters, confidential reports, etc. - by the principal Chilean 
actors. Hence most sources deal with the public dimension, as this 
thesis reflects; the interior human landscape must be inferred by 
individual writers. The reasons for this paucity of unpublished 
sources are varied: contemporaneity, the violent death of Allende 
and others or exile, unwillingness of many to reveal their true 
activity and, not least, the silence and re-interpretation of Chilean 
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